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Kurzfassung (Deutsch)
Drahtlose Sensornetze stellen eine noch relativ junge Technologie zur Informationsgewin-
nung und -verarbeitung dar. Ein Sensornetz besteht u¨blicherweise aus vielen kleinen, in
ihren Ressourcen stark beschra¨nkten Sensorknoten. Diese fu¨hren Messungen u¨ber physi-
kalische Pha¨nomene durch, verarbeiten diese Daten, erzeugen einen Report und senden
diesen mittels Hop-zu-Hop Kommunikation zu einer zentralen Datenverarbeitungsein-
heit, genannt Sink. Je nach Szenario erfolgt die Datenerfassung und -verarbeitung auch
durch mehrere Sensorknoten gemeinsam, z.B. zur Bestimmung der mittleren Temperatur
in einem gro¨ßeren Areal.
Durch ihre vielfa¨ltigen Einsatzmo¨glichkeiten erhalten Sensornetze immer gro¨ßere Auf-
merksamkeit. Entstammten die urspru¨nglichen Einsatzszenarien noch gro¨ßtenteils dem
milita¨rischen Umfeld, z.B. Erfassung von feindlichen Truppenbewegungen, zeichnen sich
mittlerweile immer mehr zivile Einsatzszenarien, wie z.B. die U¨berwachung der struktu-
rellen Integrita¨t von Geba¨uden und kritischen Infrastrukturen, ab.
Um die Funktionalita¨t eines Sensornetzes insbesondere unter Angriffsbedingungen zu
gewa¨hrleisten, mu¨ssen Sicherheitsmechanismen integraler Bestandteil jedes Sensornet-
zes sein. Sensornetze unterscheiden sich jedoch von klassischen (drahtlosen) Netzen, was
die Absicherung erheblich erschwert. Gru¨nde hierfu¨r sind die Ressourcenbeschra¨nkung
der einzelnen Sensorknoten, die drahtlose Multihop-Kommunikation und die meist vor-
handene Mo¨glichkeit der Kompromittierung von Sensorknoten durch einen Angreifer.
Knotenkompromittierungen sind in Sensornetzen besonders einfach durchzufu¨hren, da
Sensorknoten meist in unkontrollierten oder sogar feindlichen Gebieten ausgelegt sind
und aus Kostengru¨nden u¨blicherweise keine manipulationsresistente Hardware eingesetzt
wird. Durch eine Knotenkompromittierung erha¨lt ein Angreifer somit Zugriff auf alle Da-
ten, wie z.B. kryptographische Schlu¨ssel, die auf einem Sensorknoten gespeichert sind.
Hierdurch werden Sicherheitsmechanismen, wie z.B. wechselseitige Authentifikation der
einzelnen Sensorknoten, wirkungslos. Als Folge dessen kann sich ein Angreifer als be-
rechtigter Sensorknoten ausgeben und als legitimes Mitglied des Sensornetzes Angriffe
durchzufu¨hren. Solche Angriffe werden in dieser Arbeit als Insider Angriffe bezeichnet
und stellen ein ernsthaftes Problem fu¨r viele Sensornetze dar.
In dieser Arbeit werden Konzepte und Mechanismen entwickelt, wie man mit Insi-
derangriffen in Sensornetzen umgehen kann. Den Beitrag dieser Arbeit kann man grob
in zwei Teile gliedern: Zuna¨chst wird eine allgemeine Klassifikation von Schutzmaßnah-
men gegen Insiderangriffe vorgeschlagen. Im zweiten Teil werden Sicherheitsprotokolle
vorgeschlagen, die verschiedene Insiderangriffe abwehren oder deren mo¨gliches Schadens-
potential begrenzen.
In der Klassifikation wird zuna¨chst nach den grundsa¨tzlichen Strategien unterschie-
den, die man verfolgen kann, um mit Insiderangriffen umzugehen. Die Strategien werden
anschließend weiter nach den Mechanismen die sie umsetzen unterteilt. Bestehende Ar-
beiten werden nach den eingesetzten Mechanismen und verfolgten Strategien eingeord-
net, um so systematisch offene Probleme und besondere Eigenschaften in den jeweiligen
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Bereichen zu identifizieren. Solch eine systematische Betrachtung wurde in Sensornetzen
bisher noch nicht durchgefu¨hrt. Die erarbeiteten Ergebnisse ko¨nnen als Basis fu¨r den
Entwurf von neuen Sicherheitsprotokollen verwendet werden.
Die im zweiten Teil dieser Arbeit vorgestellten Protokolle decken verschiedene Bereiche
ab. Zuna¨chst wird ein Protokoll zum Schutz gegen einen Denial-of-Service Angriff vorge-
schlagen bei dem der Insider viele gefa¨lschte Nachrichten einschleust oder alte Nachrich-
ten wieder einspielt. Diese Nachrichten werden u¨ber viele Sensorknoten weitergeleitet, die
sowohl hierdurch u¨berlastet werden als auch ihre knappen Energiereserven (vollsta¨ndig)
verschwenden. Im Gegensatz zu bestehenden Arbeiten, die grenzwertbasiert gefa¨lschte
Nachrichten probabilistisch ausfiltern, ermo¨glicht das vorgeschlagene Protokoll gefa¨lschte
Nachrichten sofort auszufiltern und toleriert eine beliebige Anzahl an kompromittierten
Sensorknoten.
Anschließend werden Protokolle zum Schutz gegen Insiderangriffe bei denen kompro-
mittierte Sensorknoten zur Ta¨uschung des Sinks falsche Reports einschleusen vorgestellt.
Bestehende Protokolle verwenden hierzu einen redundanzbasierten Ansatz, bei dem meh-
rere Sensorknoten gemeinsam einen Report erzeugen mu¨ssen, damit er gu¨ltig ist. Hierbei
ist es jedoch mo¨glich, dass ein einzelner kompromittierter Sensorknoten eine erfolgrei-
che Reporterzeugung verhindern kann. Bisher wurde eine ausschließlich auf ein Protokoll
anwendbare Erweiterung fu¨r dieses Problem vorgeschlagen, bei der die angreifenden Sen-
sorknoten nicht identifiziert und ausgeschlossen werden ko¨nnen. In dieser Arbeit werden
zwei Protokolle zum Schutz gegen eingeschleuste Reports vorgestellt, die es erstmals
ermo¨glichen solche Angriffe zu erkennen und die verantwortlichen Sensorknoten auszu-
schließen. Weiterhin ko¨nnen die vorgeschlagenen Protokolle als Erweiterung zu beliebigen
anderen Protokollen eingesetzt werden.
Neben diesen Protokollen wird ein grundsa¨tzlicher Ansatz untersucht, wie man in be-
stimmten Szenarien Insiderangriffe verhindern und versuchte Knotenkompromittierun-
gen erkennen kann. Hierzu wird der Einsatz von manipulationsresistenter (engl. tamper-
resistant) Hardware in Form des Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) vorgeschlagen. Aus
Kostengru¨nden werden nur einige Sensorknoten, die besondere Aufgaben wie Schlu¨ssel-
management, Lokalisierung oder Zeitsynchronisierung fu¨r andere Sensorknoten durch-
fu¨hren und somit ein lohnenswertes Ziel fu¨r einen Angreifer darstellen, mittels TPM
geschu¨tzt. Zur Erkennung von Manipulationsversuchen an diesen Sensorknoten werden
zwei neue effiziente Attestationsprotokolle vorgeschlagen. Diese sind an die Ressour-
cenbeschra¨nkungen von Sensornetzen angepasst, d.h. der Energieverbrauch fu¨r Berech-
nungen und Kommunikation ist sehr gering, da keine Public Key Operationen auf den
verifizierenden Knoten beno¨tigt wird und nur wenige, kurze Nachrichten ausgetauscht
werden. Weiterhin hat der vorgeschlagene Ansatz Vorteile gegenu¨ber softwarebasierter
Attestation, da nun auch eine erfolgreiche Attestation u¨ber mehrere Hops mo¨glich ist,
was wichtig fu¨r Sensornetze ist. Mit dem vorgeschlagenen Ansatzes ist es nun mo¨glich,
die Vertrauenswu¨rdigkeit von bestimmten Sensorknoten auch in unkontrollierten oder
feindlichen Gebieten u¨berpru¨fen zu ko¨nnen und sie so fu¨r besondere Aufgaben einzuset-
zen.
Abstract
Wireless sensor networks are a relatively new technology for information gathering and
processing. A sensor network usually consists of many, resource constrained sensor nodes.
These nodes perform measurements of some physical phenomena, process data, generate
reports, and send these reports via multihop communication to a central information
processing unit called sink. Depending on the scenario, information gathering and pro-
cessing is collaboratively performed by multiple sensor nodes, e.g., to determine the
average temperature in a certain area.
Sensor networks can be used in a plethora of application scenarios. Emerging from mil-
itary research, e.g., sensor networks for target tracking in a battlefield, sensor networks
are nowadays used more and more in civil applications such as critical infrastructure
monitoring.
For ensuring the functionality of a sensor network, especially in malicious environ-
ments, security mechanisms are essential for all sensor networks. However, sensor net-
works differ from classical (wireless) networks and this consequently makes it harder to
secure them. Reasons for this are resource constraints of the sensor nodes, the wireless
multihop communication, and the possibility of node compromise. Since sensor nodes are
often deployed in unattended or even hostile environments and are usually not equipped
with tamper-resistant hardware, it is relatively easy to compromise a sensor node. By
compromising a sensor node, an adversary gets access to all data stored on the node,
such as cryptographic keys. Thus, deployed security mechanisms such as node-based
authentication become ineffective and an adversary is able to perform attacks as a “le-
gitimate” member of the network. Such attacks are denoted as insider attacks and pose
a serious threat for wireless sensor networks.
In this thesis, we develop concepts and mechanisms to cope with insider attacks in
wireless sensor networks. The contribution of this thesis is twofold. First, we propose a
new general classification to classify the different approaches to protect against insider
attacks. Second, we propose several security protocols to protect against insider attacks.
In our classification, approaches to protect against insider attacks are first distin-
guished by the implemented security strategy. The respective strategies are further
subclassified by the applied mechanisms. Related work is integrated in the classification
to systematically identify open problems and specific properties in the respective areas.
The results may be a basis for future protocol design.
The protocols, proposed in the second part of this thesis encompass different areas.
First, we propose a protocol to protect against a serious Denial-of-Service attack where
an adversary injects or replays a large amount of false messages to overload many mes-
sage forwarding nodes and to (totally) waste their scarce energy resources. Proposed
approaches usually apply threshold-based mechanisms to filter such messages out. The
drawback of this approach is that messages are not filtered out immediately and if the
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threshold of compromised nodes is reached, the attack becomes again possible. Our pro-
tocol is able to immediately filter such messages while tolerating an arbitrary number of
compromised sensor nodes.
Further mechanisms are required to additionally protect against an insider attack
where an adversary injects false reports to deceive the sink. Usually a redundancy-based
approach is used where a report is only valid if it has been collaboratively generated
by multiple sensor nodes. However, previously proposed protocols are susceptible to an
insider attack where an adversary that has compromised only a single node might be able
to impede a successful report generation. So far, only one protocol has been proposed
to cope with this issue. However, it is a specific enhancement for a particular protocol
and the attacking nodes cannot be identified and excluded. In this thesis, we propose
two protocols which protect against the injection of false reports and also enable the
detection and exclusion of nodes trying to disrupt the collaborative report generation.
In addition, our protocols can be used in combination with or as an extension to any
other protocol.
In addition, we investigate a general approach to prevent insider attacks and to detect
compromised nodes in certain scenarios. We propose to use tamper-resistant hardware
in form of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Due to cost reasons, the TPM is in-
tegrated only in some special sensor nodes that perform some special tasks such as key
management, localization or time synchronization in the sensor network. These nodes
are a valuable target for an adversary. To detect tampering attempts on these nodes, we
propose two efficient attestation protocols. In contrast to attestation protocols proposed
for “classical” networks, our protocols have a low communication and computational
overhead. They do not require expensive public key operations on the verifying nodes
and the few exchanged messages are very short. In addition, compared to software-based
attestation, our protocols have the advantage to enable attestation along multiple hops
which is of high concern in sensor networks. Using our approach, it is possible to verify
the trustworthiness of certain sensor nodes even in unattended or hostile environments
making them suitable to perform special tasks.
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11 Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) provide a technological basis for many different ap-
plications. Applications range from battlefield or critical infrastructure surveillance over
emergency response to health care scenarios. Depending on the application, the moni-
tored environment can be covered by hundreds or even thousands of sensor nodes. Sensor
nodes consist of a sensing, a processing, a transceiver, and a power unit. The sensing
unit is used to perform some measurements of some physical phenomena, e.g., tempera-
ture, pressure, movements. The processing unit consists of a slow CPU and a restricted
memory space. It enables a sensor node to pre-process the measured data before sending
it using the transceiver unit. The measurements are sent to a central base station called
sink. The power unit usually consists of a battery pack. In addition, a sensor node may
be equipped with some additional application-dependent components such as location
finding system, actuators etc. Most WSN applications scenarios, especially large-scale
WSNs with thousands of sensor nodes, require that an individual sensor node has to be
cheap. As a result, the available resources are extremely constrained. The constrained
computational power of a sensor node requires the use of only efficient operations which
are suitable for the limited CPU and the restricted memory space. Especially the lim-
ited energy resources make energy saving of paramount importance to achieve a long
lifetime of a WSN. Thus, the overhead for computation and communication must be
low. Since communication requires a significant amount of energy, only as few messages
as necessary which are as short as possible should be transmitted. Since the range of
the wireless transceiver is also limited, messages are sent in a multihop communication,
i.e., sensor nodes forward messages hop by hop to the destination.
The focus of this thesis is security in WSNs. More precisely, we investigate the serious
threat of insider attacks and how to cope with them. As the above mentioned properties
of WSNs indicate, securing WSNs is a challenging task, especially, against inside adver-
saries. In Section 1.1, we motivate this problem in detail. After that, we present the
contribution of this thesis in Section 1.2. In Section 1.3, we give a short outline of the
thesis structure.
1.1 Motivation
For ensuring the functionality of a WSN, especially in malicious environments, security
mechanisms are essential for all sensor networks. Obviously, scenarios such as emer-
gency response or battlefield surveillance require security mechanisms. These WSNs
are valuable targets for an adversary where he can cause serious damage. For example,
the functionality and correct operation of a WSN for battlefield surveillance can be dis-
rupted by an adversary that injects bogus location information. However, even WSNs
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deployed for security- or safety-uncritical applications, such as wildlife monitoring, re-
quire security. Without security, even a very limited adversary can disrupt the whole
functionality of the WSN. Thus, security mechanisms, appropriate for the respective
security requirements of the scenario, should be deployed in every WSN.
However, securing WSNs is a challenging task [114, 216, 236, 185]. The resource con-
straints allow only the use of efficient security mechanisms and protocols. For example,
only efficient cryptography should be used. The wireless multihop communication en-
ables an adversary to eavesdrop, inject, drop, or alter messages, maliciously participate
on a route, or to perform DoS attacks by jamming the wireless channel. Since sensor
nodes are often deployed in unattended or even hostile environments, and are usually not
equipped with special tamper-resistant hardware, an adversary is able to compromise a
sensor node. After compromising a node, an adversary has access to all data stored on
the node. By analyzing the code, the adversary is able to identify the applied (security)
protocols and by accessing the application data, he gets access to security data such as
cryptographic keys. The adversary can misuse this data either to program its own device
or to reprogram the compromised sensor node with its own malicious code and perform
subsequent attacks as a “legitimate” node of the network. Such attacks, where an adver-
sary uses data of a compromised node to circumvent the applied security mechanisms
and appears to be a legitimate node of the WSN are denoted as insider attacks.
Examples of insider attacks can be found at nearly all layers. In the following, we
name only a few examples. At the link layer, an adversary can compromise a sensor
node to get access to the cryptographic keys of the applied link layer security mecha-
nism. This mechanism is used to ensure the authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of
the exchanged messages between neighboring sensor nodes. This enables the adversary
for example to perform attacks such as eavesdropping, i.e., decrypting the encrypted
messages exchanged between the neighboring nodes and the compromised node. Link
layer security mechanisms can be used to additionally protect messages of a higher level.
Thus, circumventing the link layer security mechanism also affects these layers, e.g., an
adversary is able to inject bogus routing information to disrupt the routing functionality
at the network layer. The application layer is ideally suited for insider attacks since an
adversary is able to perform sophisticated attacks affecting not only neighboring nodes.
For example, an adversary can send false report messages to the sink which results in
false alarms. This may considerably disturb the functionality of the WSN.
As the examples have shown, insider attacks can cause serious damage to a WSN. In
addition, insider attacks are much easier to perform in WSNs than in classical computer
systems. Classically, an inside adversary is a person with extensive knowledge of and
privileged access to the target system and is able to attack inside a system’s perimeter
defense. This restricts the possible number of persons which are able to perform insider
attacks, e.g., to former employees of a company or powerful hackers which may be able to
break into the system. Security management mechanisms such as “changing passwords
after an employee leaves the company”can be used to prevent a former employee to access
the system again. Applying resource-consuming security mechanisms such as firewalls
or intrusion detection systems (IDS) and regular system updates with security patches
minimizes the risk of successful hacking attempts. Even if a system is compromised,
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it can still be reinstalled to remove all malicious code and lock out the adversary. In
WSNs this is all usually not possible making insider attacks a serious and relatively easy
to perform threat.
Thus, it is of paramount importance to secure WSNs against insider attacks. As
mentioned before, this is a challenging task. Security mechanisms to cope with insider
attacks in WSNs must be designed in a well-considered way. In order to achieve this,
it is very helpful to know the general strategies which can be implemented in security
mechanisms. Knowing the so far approaches and the open problems in the respective
areas further facilitates the development of new security mechanisms. New security
mechanisms are required in sundry areas; more than can be addressed in one thesis.
One of these areas requiring research is at the application layer relating to secure the
report generation against certain insider attacks.
We address these issues in this thesis. In the next section, we describe the contribution
of this thesis in relation to the investigated problems.
1.2 Contribution
In this thesis, we focus on the threat of insider attacks in WSNs. We investigate different
ways to cope with these attacks and propose new protocols to secure WSNs against
inside adversaries. In general, the contribution of this thesis can be divided in two parts:
classification and protocol development.
In the classification part, we present a new classification scheme of the different strate-
gies and mechanisms to handle insider attacks in WSNs. In general, we distinguish be-
tween the strategies prevention, detection, and recovery. The respective strategies are
further subclassified by the applied mechanisms which implement the respective strategy.
Related work is classified based on our classification. For all areas of our classification,
we identify properties and open problems which should be considered when developing
security protocols for WSNs.
The protocol development part is the main part of this thesis. We propose several
efficient protocols to cope with different insider attacks.
First, we propose different protocols to enable a secure report generation in the pres-
ence of an inside adversary. We consider resource constrained WSNs which perform the
principle tasks of a WSN: a query is sent to the WSN, a measurement of the correspond-
ing physical phenomena is performed, a report is generated, and the generated report is
transmitted back. The protocols apply detection and recovery strategies and consider
problems identified in our classification.
Second, we investigate how tamper-resistant hardware can be used to secure WSNs.
The tamper-resistant hardware enables prevention of insider attacks and the detection
of tampering attempts.
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The major contribution of this thesis is sketched in the following:
Classification A lot of research has already been performed to develop mechanisms and
protocols to cope with different types of insider attacks in different application scenarios.
For the development of new security mechanisms and protocols it is helpful to know which
general strategies can be pursued, how strategies can be implemented by different types of
security mechanisms, how related work can be classified, and which open problems exist
in the respective areas. For this purpose, we introduce a new two-tiered classification
[132]. First, we distinguish between the well-known strategies prevention, detection, and
recovery. These three categories are the first level of our classification. For each type of
strategy, we elaborate the relation to insider attacks in WSNs and identify which types of
security mechanisms exist to implement the respective strategy. The different categories
of the type of the security mechanism represent the second level of our classification. For
each category, we present related work and show properties and open problems which
should be considered when developing new security protocols.
Addressing PDoS Attacks We propose a protocol to secure the report generation
against Path-based Denial of Service (PDoS) and false data injection attacks [129]. The
focus of this work is the protection against PDoS attacks where an adversary replays or
injects a large amount of false report messages to drain the energy resources of message
forwarding nodes. A false data injection attack has the goal to deceive the sink, e.g., to
cause false alarms.
Our proposed protocol implements recovery strategies to cope with these attacks.
The recovery strategy addressing PDoS attacks is based on fault tolerance mechanisms.
The idea is to limit the impact of the attack to the immediate neighboring nodes while
protecting the rest of the network. Our protocol achieves this by tolerating an arbitrary
number of compromised nodes and using only efficient symmetric cryptography to filter
messages immediately out at the next hop. This protects all subsequent nodes from the
PDoS attack and saves their scarce energy resources.
This is an improvement compared to previously proposed protocols which use thresh-
old schemes and probabilistic filtering to cope with PDoS attacks. One disadvantage
of these protocols is the use of a threshold scheme which is only secure up to a certain
number of compromised sensor nodes. If the threshold is reached, the security totally
breaks down. The second disadvantage is that injected messages are not filtered out im-
mediately. Thus, the attack affects much more sensor nodes compared to our protocol.
To protect against false data injection attacks, we use a threshold-based mechanism
(with the above mentioned issue) that is commonly used in many other protocols, too.
The idea is that multiple sensor nodes must collaboratively generate a report for the
sink. To be valid, a report must be endorsed by a certain number of other sensor nodes.
This prevents an adversary that has compromised fewer nodes than the threshold value
from injecting false reports. However, an adversary that has compromised a single node
can invalidate this report by generating a false endorsement to prevent a successful re-
port generation. We introduce the term False-Endorsement-Based DoS (FEDoS) attack
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for this attack [130] and propose two additional protocols to address this issue. This
contribution is introduced in the next paragraph.
To show the benefit of our protocol, we perform a security and a performance analysis.
In the security analysis, we analyze the resilience against false data injection attacks,
against PDoS attacks, and the influence of other attacks on our protocol. The per-
formance analysis shows that our protocol has a low storage overhead and is able to
significantly reduce the energy consumption compared to an unprotected network. In
order to perform simulations of the protocol, a simulation environment is implemented.
Simulations can be adjusted by different parameters, e.g., number of nodes of the WSN,
number of compromised nodes performing PDoS attacks, protocol activated or not, etc.
The simulation environment enables the visualization and evaluation of different scenar-
ios to show the impact on the energy and storage consumption of the protocol. The
performed simulations confirm the results of the theoretical analysis.
Addressing False Data Injection and FEDoS Attacks We propose two protocols which
protect against false data injection attacks and also address the above mentioned FEDoS
attack [130, 131]. Our protocols implement detection and recovery strategies to enable
a protection against false data injection attacks without being susceptible to FEDoS
attacks.
Previously, a protocol has been proposed in [150] to cope with FEDoS attacks. How-
ever, this protocol is a specific extension for an already proposed protocol to cope with
PDoS attacks and uses a threshold scheme with the above mentioned issue. In con-
trast, our protocols are generic solutions and can be used in combination with any other
protocol. In addition, our protocols enable the detection and exclusion of compromised
nodes performing a FEDoS attack. The detection process does not require intensive
monitoring. This is an advantage compared to usually applied detection mechanisms
which require intensive monitoring of neighboring sensor nodes and thus are very energy
consuming. In addition, the exclusion process is also very efficient since it does not
require to transmit many messages, e.g., to inform the sink. Compromised sensor nodes
are immediately after detection locally excluded. This prevents them from successfully
continuing the attack and to cause further damage.
For both protocols we perform a security and performance analysis. In the security
analysis, we analyze the resilience against false data injection attacks, against FEDoS
attacks, and the influence of other attacks on our protocol. The performance analysis
shows that the storage requirements of both protocols are feasible for current sensor
hardware and the energy consumptions are low. In order to perform simulations of
the protocols, the above mentioned simulation environment is extended to additionally
support our proposed protocols to cope with FEDoS attacks. The simulation results
confirm the low energy overhead and that the storage requirements are feasible on current
sensor hardware.
Prevention of Insider Attacks We propose an approach to prevent all types of insider
attacks at their root and enable the detection of tampering attempts of sensor nodes.
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For this purpose, we introduce the use of tamper-resistant hardware and propose two
efficient attestation protocols [133].
Prevention of insider attacks in the usually assumed homogeneous WSNs with ex-
tremely resource constrained sensor nodes is virtually impossible. In our approach we
use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [231] to prevent successful node compro-
mise. However, because of the cost factor, it is not possible to equip all sensor nodes of
a WSN with tamper-resistant hardware. Thus, we assume a hybrid WSN consisting of
“ordinary” sensor nodes and a few special nodes which are equipped with a TPM. These
special nodes perform and coordinate some special tasks, such as data aggregation, key
management, localization, or time synchronization for ordinary sensor nodes. The TPM
is used to protect the cryptographic keys. However, an adversary can still try to tamper
with the remaining components of a sensor’s system to achieve an invalid system state
enabling illegal access to the TPM. These tampering attempts have to be detected.
We propose two efficient TPM-based attestation protocols for hybrid WSNs. Previ-
ously proposed TPM-based attestation protocols are not suitable for WSNs since they
make intensive use of public key cryptography and introduce a high communication over-
head. In contrast, our protocols are adapted to WSNs, i.e., ordinary sensor nodes need
only to perform efficient symmetric (cryptographic) operations and the few exchanged
messages are very short. In contrast to previously proposed software-based approaches
which require exact time measurement, our protocols enable attestation even if nodes
are multiple hops away from each other.
Our first proposed protocol runs in fixed time intervals, allowing multiple ordinary
nodes to perform a simultaneous attestation. Direct attestation is provided by our second
protocol. Both protocols use the sealing concept provided by the TPM. The protocols
are not limited to the use in WSNs. They might be also appropriate for scenarios where
resource constraints are an issue and efficient attestation along multiple hops is required.
We perform a security and theoretical performance analysis for both protocols. The
security analysis shows that our protocols are resistant against the forging of attestations.
However, an adversary may try to disrupt attestations. The performance analysis shows
that the storage and energy requirements for the ordinary sensor nodes are for both
protocols low. To show that both protocols can be realized with current TPMs, a proof
of concept implementation is provided.
1.3 Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present necessary background
information of WSNs and security in WSNs. Furthermore, we give a brief overview of
resource consumption in WSNs and present values of the energy requirements of the
wireless communication and the computation of (cryptographic) operations to secure
WSNs. To be able to understand our proposed attestation protocols, we also present the
necessary background information of trusted computing and the TPM in this chapter.
In Chapter 3, we present the different ways how to handle insider attacks in WSNs. For
this purpose, we present our two-tiered classification scheme. In Chapter 4, we introduce
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the system model, i.e, the device, network, and adversary model, we assume for our
proposed protocols. Afterwards, we describe our protocols. In Chapter 5, we present
our protocol to cope with PDoS and false data injection attacks. The two extension
protocols, addressing false data injection and FEDoS attacks, are described in Chapter
6. In Chapter 7, we present our approach to prevent insider attacks and two TPM-based
attestation protocols to detect tampering attempts. Finally, we conclude this thesis in
Chapter 8.
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92 Background
In this chapter, we give some general background on Wireless Sensor Networks and
security in Wireless Sensor Networks. Furthermore, we give a brief overview of the
resource consumption in WSNs and some background on trusted computing which we
use in some of our proposed protocols.
2.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
This section gives a brief introduction to Wireless Sensor Networks. Typical hardware
platforms, application scenarios, and general properties of Wireless Sensor Networks are
presented. For each property we briefly introduce challenges which arise when designing
security protocols for Wireless Sensor Networks.
2.1.1 Basics of Wireless Sensor Networks
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) [3] is a network composed of a large number of
low-cost, low-power, multifunctional sensor nodes that are deployed for monitoring the
physical world. Sensor nodes are also often called motes. The term originates from
dust motes1, i.e., a single piece of dust. The main components of a sensor node are a
microcontroller, memory, transceiver, power source and one or more sensors to perform
measurements of some physical phenomena. The power source is mostly a battery.
Sensor nodes are deployed in a sensor field. The deployment can be either done directly,
by placing the sensor nodes in specific positions, or randomly, e.g., via aerial scattering in
inaccessible terrains or disaster relief operations. Thus, the position of the sensor nodes
in the sensor field may not be known in advance. After deployment, the sensor nodes
perform some self-organization mechanisms to set up the network, e.g., by determining
their neighbors and setting up routing tables. Self-organization is also required to adapt
to changes of the network, e.g., caused by node failure due to energy exhaustion.
During operation of the WSN, sensor nodes perform measurements of some physical
phenomena, e.g., the temperature at a certain location. This data is sent to one (or
more) base station(s), called sink, for further processing. Since the transmission range
of a sensor is limited, the sink may not be directly reached. Thus, messages are forwarded
in a multihop communication to other sensor nodes which act as routers. Also sensor
nodes may perform some operations on the data, e.g., data aggregation to decrease the
amount of transmitted data. Since the transmission of data is much more cost-intensive
than data processing, this is a commonly used approach to decrease the overall energy
consumption. However, this may not be possible in all scenarios.
1http://robotics.eecs.berkeley.edu/~pister/SmartDust/
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Figure 2.1: Example WSN
Figure 2.1 shows an example WSN. Multiple sensor nodes are deployed in a sensor
field. The user generates a query, e.g., ”What is the temperature at location X?” using
the task manager node. The query is sent via a network connection (e.g., LAN, Inter-
net, satellite . . . ) to the sink which further sends it to the WSN. The query is routed
along sensor nodes S1, S2, S3, S4, to sensor node S5 which performs the measurement
and generates a response, e.g., ”The temperature at location X is 23◦C.”. In this ex-
ample, the response is routed back along the same route. Alternatively, the WSN may
autonomously perform measurements, e.g., following a certain time schedule, and send
these measurements in regular intervals to the sink.
WSNs share many properties with wireless ad hoc networks and may require similar
techniques such as routing protocols. However, sensor networks differ significantly in
certain areas which prohibit the (direct) usage of many protocols proposed for wireless
ad hoc networks. To illustrate this issue, the differences between sensor networks and
ad hoc networks are summarized [3]:
• The number of sensor nodes in a sensor network can be several orders of magnitude
higher than the nodes in an ad hoc network, e.g., hundreds or even thousands of
nodes in a WSN.
• Sensor nodes are often densely deployed, i.e., multiple sensor nodes are able to
perform a measurement about the same or similar physical phenomena.
• Sensor nodes are prone to failures, e.g., a node fails due to battery exhaustion.
• The topology of a sensor network can change frequently, e.g., caused by node
failure, mobile nodes etc.
• Sensor nodes mainly use a broadcast communication paradigm, whereas most ad
hoc networks are based on point-to-point communication.
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• Sensor nodes are constrained in computational power, memory space, wireless
range, and especially in the available energy.
• Sensor nodes may not have global identifiers because of the large amount of over-
head and large number of sensors.
The special properties and challenges of WSNs have to be considered when designing
(security) protocols and algorithms for WSNs. Before we illustrate these properties and
challenges in detail in Section 2.1.5, we first give a brief overview of the protocol stack in
Section 2.1.2, some standard sensor network hardware in Section 2.1.3 and some example
application scenarios in Section 2.1.4.
2.1.2 Protocol Stack
Nearly all communication and computer network protocols are oriented at the seven
layers of the OSI model [119]. Likewise the communication architecture of WSNs can
be classified in different layers. However, WSNs do not adhere as closely to the layered
architecture of the OSI model as other networks for efficiency reasons. The limited re-
sources of sensor nodes require efficient implementations and low overhead. For example,
in practical WSNs, such as those using the TinyOS platform [233], the protocol stack can
be roughly broken into only four major layers: physical, link, network, and application
layer. Transport, session, and presentation layer are not explicitly considered.
Nevertheless, the layered model is also useful in WSNs for categorizing protocols,
attacks, and defenses. Within this paper, we concentrate on the protocol stack for sink
and sensor nodes introduced by Akyildiz et al. in [3]. In contrast to the traditional seven
layers, the protocol stack is reduced to the following five layers:
• physical layer
• link layer
• network layer
• transport layer
• application layer.
The layered architecture has the advantage that conceptually similar functions are
combined at one layer. Each layer provides services to the layer above and receives
services from the layer below.
The physical layer should provide robust modulation, transmission, and receiving tech-
niques. Since the wireless channel is susceptible to noise and sensor nodes may be mobile,
the medium access control protocol at the link layer must be power-aware and able to
minimize collisions. The network layer is responsible for the routing of data supplied by
the transport layer. The transport layer is able to maintain the data flow if the WSN
application requires it. Depending on the sensing tasks, different types of applications
can be implemented at the application layer. Orthogonal to these five layers, Akyildiz et
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al. define power, mobility, and task management planes which are responsible for mon-
itoring the power, movement, and task distribution among sensor nodes. These planes
help sensor nodes to coordinate sensor tasks and lower the overall power consumption.
2.1.3 Hardware
Sensor hardware can be divided in four groups [103]. Special-purpose sensor nodes are
purposely designed to sacrifice flexibility in order to be as small and inexpensive as
possible. In contrast, generic sensor nodes can be flexibly adjusted to different appli-
cation scenarios. They provide a rich expansion interface where various different types
of sensors can be attached. Typical examples are the MICA Motes [104, 105, 53] or
the TelosB motes [187, 56]. High-bandwidth sensor nodes possess processing and com-
munication capabilities to deal with complex sensor streams, including video and voice
processing. An example are the Bluetooth equipped BTnodes [29]. Gateway nodes can
act as the sink to provide the link between the WSN and backbone infrastructure, i.e.,
the network connection to the task manager node and the user. The Stargate platform
[55] is a typical example for gateway nodes.
Hardware platforms for WSNs are developed by many research groups and commercial
companies2. Since WSNs are currently in a development stage and there is no true killer
application that would decrease the costs, there exists no platform which dominates the
market. For many research groups it is often more convenient and even less expensive
to build their own WSN devices instead of buying commercial ones.
However, the above mentioned Berkeley MICA Motes [104, 53] and their clones are
broader used as other platforms and are accepted as the de facto platform in the re-
search community. Algorithms and protocols proposed for WSNs usually assume hard-
ware resources comparable to the MICA Motes. We make the same assumption for our
developed protocols.
Figure 2.2 shows a MICA2 Mote [104, 53]. The sensor node is equipped with an Atmel
ATmega128L [52] processor which is based on a Harvard RISC architecture. The max-
imum clock signal of the CPU is 16 MHz which provides a throughput up to 16 MIPS.
The MICA2 mote provides 128 kbyte Program Flash Memory, 512 kbyte Measurement
Flash, and 4 kbyte Configuration EEPROM. The radio is a TI CC1000 (formerly Chip-
Con) with a data rate of 38.4 kbps. The standard packet size is 36 byte (with a payload
of 29 byte). The successor MICAz has similar properties except that the data rate is
increased to 250 kbps [54] and the packet size can be up to 128 byte using the ZigBee
[273] transceiver CC2420. ZigBee is a short-range, low-power, low-cost, low-data-rate
wireless multihop networking technology standard. It is built upon the Physical (PHY)
and Medium Access Control (MAC3) layers of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [218]. ZigBee
specifies network and application layer, as well as the security service provider. MICA2
2http://wsn.oversigma.com/wiki/index.php?title=WSN_Platforms lists more than 30 different
hardware platforms.
3Note: In this context the abbreviation MAC stands for Medium Access Control and not for Message
Authentication Code. In the remainder of this thesis we use MAC always for Message Authentication
Code.
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Figure 2.2: Berkeley MICA 2 Mote Figure 2.3: Sun SPOT Mote
and MICAz nodes are powered with two AA batteries. The energy requirements of the
MICA2 motes are stated differently in the literature (see Section 2.3 for details). To save
energy, sensor nodes can use different sleep modes. The MICA motes use the TinyOS
[233] operating system that was developed for resource constrained sensor nodes. It is
written in nesC [94], a programming language for deeply networked systems. Table 2.1
summarizes the properties of the MICA2 sensor node.
Clock Signal up to 16 MHz
Word Length 8 bit
Program Flash Memory 128 kbyte
Measurement Flash 512 kbyte
Configuration EEPROM 4 kbyte
Data Rate 38.4 kbps
Table 2.1: MICA2 Hardware [53] with Atmel ATmega128L processor [52]
Another hardware platform called Sun SPOT [228] is developed by Sun Microsystems.
The sensor nodes are equipped with a 180 MHz 32-bit ARM920T processor with 512
kbyte RAM and 4 Mbyte Flash-memory. The radio is a TI CC2420 and is IEEE 802.15.4
compliant. An USB interface is also present. A Sun SPOT node is powered with a 3.7V,
750 mAh lithium-ion battery that is rechargeable via the USB interface. Sun specifies
the operation time up to 7 hours with both CPU and the radio active. By having the
processor in sleep mode and by turning off the radio the operation time is extended.
Figure 2.3 shows a Sun SPOT node.
In this thesis we do not assume sensor nodes with such computational power although
it might enable more sophisticated protocols. However, the increased energy consump-
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tion would result in such a short lifetime of the WSN, that it might not be practically
used in the majority of application scenarios.
2.1.4 Application Scenarios
WSNs can be used in large number of different applications. Originating from military
research projects, WSNs are expected to be used in more civil applications. In testbeds,
a variety of different application scenarios for WSNs have been investigated, e.g.,
• habitat monitoring [161, 229],
• emergency response [158],
• glacier surveillance [164],
• volcano surveillance [245],
• wildlife monitoring [161, 120, 157],
• MarathonNet [182],
• traffic monitoring [50],
• surveillance missions [101],
• structural monitoring [254],
• vehicle tracking [214],
• mobile countersniper system [235].
As this wide variety of different applications shows, WSNs may have totally different
properties and characteristics. WSNs may vary from small networks to large networks
consisting of hundreds or thousands of sensor nodes. The used sensor node hardware
may vary from tiny, battery-powered and extremely resource constrained sensor nodes to
powerful sensor nodes with permanent energy supply that are able to perform extensive
computations. Just as well, the WSN can consist of different types of sensor nodes
where the more powerful sensor nodes are able to perform special tasks. These are only
a few examples of different characteristics and properties of WSNs. We illustrate these
properties of WSNs in detail in Section 2.1.5.
This wide area of application scenarios induces also different security requirements
for the respective scenario. For example, the security requirements for a WSN deployed
for wildlife monitoring may not be as high as for a WSN used in healthcare. Security
certainly is also important for applications such as military or police networks, emergency
response, or safety-critical business operations. For example, after a natural disaster like
a tornado, hurricane, flood, or earthquake, WSNs could be deployed for real-time safety
feedback to assist the rescue teams.
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2.1.5 Properties and Challenges
The different application scenarios presented in the previous section point out, that
WSNs may have very different properties. As a result, it is complicated to develop general
protocols for WSNs. Protocols are often adapted for specific applications and therefore
are less or not suitable for different applications. This is also true for security protocols.
To illustrate the variety of properties, we present a list of the most relevant properties
of WSNs which are also of concern when developing security protocols. The list is a
accumulation of the most commonly used properties in the literature. However, the
list is not exhaustive since for example future WSN application scenarios may introduce
new application specific properties. For each property, we also show the challenges which
have to be solved when developing security protocols.
Resource Constraints. As already mentioned in Section 2.1.3, the used sensor node
hardware may differ in various ways: computational power, memory space, wireless
transmission range, and available energy resources. Furthermore, sensor nodes may be
equipped with different sensor boards to perform measurements about different physical
phenomena. However, it is generally assumed that sensor nodes are severely resource
constrained.
Many application scenarios demand that sensor nodes have to be tiny and cheap.
In the envisioned smart dust WSNs, a sensor node will have the size of a dust particle.
This indicates that Moore’s law is not valid for WSNs, i.e., the available resources remain
nearly constant but sensor nodes will be much smaller and cheaper in the future. Thus,
although the MICA2 motes, presented in Section 2.1.3, are still a research platform and
much larger, we assume that future sensor nodes have similar properties and resources.
As a result, security protocols cannot be developed with the assumption that future
sensor nodes provide higher resources. Thus, the challenge is the development of security
protocols that are working with a small CPU, little memory, short transmission range,
and, most important, are energy efficient.
The CPU of a MICA2 mote has very limited computing power. The 8-bit Atmel
ATmega128L operates at 16 MHz and provides only 16 MIPS. Thus, complex (crypto-
graphic) operations cannot be reasonably realized. Public key cryptography, for example,
may be generally computable on such resource constrained CPUs, as for example [99]
shows. However, such computations require much more time than efficient symmetric op-
erations. For real time applications, computationally intensive cryptographic primitives
are not suitable. More important, such operations extensively require energy and thus,
significantly decrease the lifetime of a sensor node. However, if sparsely used, they may
be applicable for infrequent operations, e.g., being used only once in the initialization
phase of a WSN.
With a size of only 4 kbyte, the RAM must be efficiently used. Application data,
network data, currently processed measurement data, and other middleware data already
occupy the most part of the RAM. Thus, there is not much space left to store data
required for security protocols such as keys, certificates, etc. However, if certain (security
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related) data is currently not required, it may be possible to store this data in the 512
kbyte measurement flash. When needed, this data can be copied to the memory.
Likewise, the range and data rate of the wireless transceiver is very limited. The
energy consumption increases quadratic to the transmission distance. Thus, to con-
serve energy, WSNs communicate in a multihop way using intermediate sensor nodes
as routers to transmit only over short distances. The transmission of data is the most
cost-intensive factor in WSNs (see Section 2.3 for details), and thus, the amount and
size of the transmitted data should be minimized. Therefore, security protocols should
not significantly increase the overhead by introducing many large messages.
Finally, the most important constraint is the limited energy of the sensor nodes. The
above mentioned constraints (small and energy efficient CPU, little memory, short trans-
mission range) are (except of the cost factor) a result of the constraints in terms of energy.
The parts of a sensor node are chosen by a cost to energy-efficiency tradeoff. Mostly,
sensor nodes are powered with batteries with a limited capacity and have no permanent
power source. Because of the limited size of a sensor node and of cost factors, it is not
possible to use arbitrary powerful batteries as power sources. Thus, a major challenge
is energy efficiency. This is crucial to prolong the lifetime of the sensor nodes. It may
not be possible or may be too expensive to exchange the batteries. Alternative power
sources such as solar cells, fuel cells, piezo cells, etc. may be used as additional power
sources to extend the lifetime of the sensor nodes. However, the sole usage may not be
possible in the majority of application scenarios [201]. As a result, security mechanisms
must have low communication and computational overhead to save energy.
In certain scenarios, sensor nodes with more computing power and energy may be
deployed. This may be possible for small-scale WSNs with a very limited number of (re-
usable) sensor nodes. In large-scale WSNs, the increasing costs make this unsuitable.
However, heterogeneous WSNs may be deployed, i.e., the WSN consists of different types
of sensor nodes. Some sensor nodes may have more resources than others and perform
some special tasks. Algorithms and protocols can exploit this heterogeneity to achieve
higher levels of security. But also algorithms and protocols designed for homogenous
WSNs work in heterogeneous WSNs.
Operational Environment and Physical Topology. The application scenarios presented
in Section 2.1.4 have shown that WSNs can be used in different operational environ-
ments. WSNs range from small scale WSNs for indoor usage over mobile WSNs to
large scale WSNs which are deployed in unattended or even hostile environments. The
physical topology of the WSN depends on the size of the network and the operational
environment. In static WSNs, sensor nodes may be either specifically deployed, e.g., by
manually placing the sensor nodes, or randomly deployed, e.g., via aerial scattering. In
this area several important challenges arise.
If sensor nodes are deployed in unattended or even hostile environments, an adversary
is able to physically attack the sensor nodes. He can steal them, simply destroy them, or
compromise them. If a sensor node is compromised, an adversary can try to read data
2.1. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 17
out of the node, manipulate the soft- or hardware, or program the sensor node with its
own code.
The environmental conditions in the operational environment may severely influence
the functionality of the sensor nodes. For example, weather conditions, such as storm
and lightning may disturb the operability of the WSN. As a result, sensor nodes may fail
or the radio transmission is disturbed. Thus, protocols must adapt to these conditions.
If sensor nodes are mobile or are randomly deployed, the position of the sensor nodes
may not be known in advance or even not during the whole lifetime of the network.
Since sensor nodes may fail, the topology may also change. The manual maintenance
of a WSN may not be possible in the majority of cases. Thus, the WSN should operate
autonomously without relying on an infrastructure. Therefore, mechanisms for self-
organization are required, i.e., sensor nodes collaborate to achieve their purposes. This
must be supported by the applied security protocols.
Communication Channel. WSNs typically communicate using radio waves over a wire-
less channel. The communication channel can be either bidirectional, or unidirectional.
Most homogenous WSN have a bidirectional channel. However, in heterogeneous WSNs
some special nodes could be equipped with more powerful transmitters resulting in uni-
directional communication channels. Likewise, unidirectional communication channels
can exist between the sink with a powerful wireless transmitter and the sensor nodes.
The wireless channel can be easily accessed by an adversary. This enables an adversary
to inject, replay, drop, or alter messages. As a result, the sink receives invalid data which
could result in false alarms. By injecting or replaying a large amount of messages, the
adversary could deplete the scarce energy resources of the sensor nodes and perform a
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. Thus, a challenging problem is the protection against
attacks on the wireless channel, e.g., by using appropriate authentication mechanisms.
Routing Topology. As already mentioned, messages in WSNs are routed along multiple
hops. The multihop routing topology can have different forms: star topology (e.g., all
sensor nodes send their data directly to the sink), hierarchical or tree organized (e.g.,
common sensor nodes send their data to aggregation nodes which process the data before
sending the aggregate to the sink), or mesh topology (e.g., two sensor nodes exchange
data using multiple routing paths). Star and hierarchical topology are commonly used
in WSNs.
The mutual dependency of the sensor nodes is a challenging problem in WSNs. A sen-
sor node requires other nodes to forward its messages to the destination. If neighboring
sensor nodes fail or are selfish, messages may not reach their destination.
Routing Protocol. WSNs may use different routing protocols such as Directed Diffusion
[117, 118], Rumor Routing [26], Geographic routing protocols (e.g., Geographic and
energy aware routing (GEAR) [263], and Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR)
[123]), Clustering-based routing (e.g., LEACH [102]), etc.
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Obviously, the functionality of a WSN may be inhibited by disrupting the routing
protocol [122]. We discuss attacks on routing protocols in section 2.2.4. The proposed
protocols of this thesis are independent of the underlying routing mechanisms.
Type of Communication. There are three communication forms in WSNs: Many-to-
one, One-to-many, and Local Communication. In Many-to-one communication, usually
multiple sensor nodes send data such as measurements to the sink or to an aggregation
node. One-to-many communication is used when the sink or a sensor node multicasts
or broadcasts a query or some control information to several sensor nodes. Local Com-
munication between neighboring sensor nodes can use broadcast, multicast, or unicast
to send localized messages to discover and coordinate with each other.
Classical security protocols such as SSL/TLS [67] or IPSec [124] are designed for one-
to-one communication. However, the dominant types of communication in WSNs are
Many-to-one and One-to-many. This makes such protocols unsuitable for the usage in
WSNs4. Thus, efficient protocols for this type of communication are required.
Data Aggregation. To reduce the amount of transmitted data, data aggregation is
often used in WSNs. Thus, either the WSN performs data aggregation, or the whole
data is sent to the sink which analyzes and processes the data.
A challenging problem is the loss of information during the aggregation. For example,
after data aggregation, it is not possible to identify malicious nodes which have sent false
measurements to manipulate the aggregation value.
Dynamic of the network. In general, WSNs are dynamic networks; sensor nodes can
fail, the communication channel can be disrupted, or additional nodes may be added
to the network. The result is a frequently changing network topology. Obviously, the
dynamic in WSNs with mobile sensor nodes is even higher. The dynamic introduces
many challenges.
Self-organization mechanisms are required to cope with dynamically changing topolo-
gies. Consequently, security protocols must be suitable for dynamically changing net-
works. For example, key management and authentication mechanisms have to support
the addition of new sensor nodes.
Sink. Typically, a WSN has one sink. However, in certain scenarios multiple sinks are
also possible. For example, in a sensor-actuator network, multiple distributed actuators
may autonomously react on data received from the sensor nodes.
A challenge is that the sink may be a single-point-of-failure. An adversary jamming
the region of the sink may be able to disrupt the whole functionality of the WSN, since
the sink neither is able to send queries nor receive messages from the sensor nodes.
4Due to the extreme resource requirements, SSL/TLS and IPSec are anyway unsuitable for WSNs.
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Localization. Sensor node localization is an important aspect for WSNs to determine
the origin of the measurements. We distinguish between three types of localization
mechanisms. Sensor nodes can determine their location by themselves (e.g., using a
GPS receiver), in a distributed way (e.g., certain nodes are aware of their position and
broadcast this information, whereupon their neighboring sensor nodes use this informa-
tion to calculate their own position), or centralized (e.g., if sensor nodes are deployed at
specific locations, it may be possible to pre-program the nodes with their location).
The challenging problem is a reliable and secure localization in an unreliable environ-
ment with an active adversary.
Heterogeneity. WSNs can either be homogenous, i.e., all sensor nodes are equipped
with the same hardware, or heterogeneous, i.e., the sensor nodes are equipped with
different hardware. For example, in hierarchical WSNs, some sensor nodes which perform
special tasks may possess higher computational power and a higher transmission range.
The more challenging problem is the development of protocols for homogenous WSNs,
consisting of severely resource constrained sensor nodes. Protocols for homogenous
WSNs can be also used in heterogeneous networks. However, protocols for heteroge-
neous networks may exploit the extra resources of the nodes with additional resources.
Therefore, protocols must support and exploit this heterogeneity to increase the overall
efficiency of the WSN.
Node Identifiers. Even if it is assumed that in most WSNs each sensor node is assigned
with a unique identifier (ID), it is also possible that sensor nodes do not possess any
identifier or possess only a group identifier. The reason for this is that in WSNs with a
large number of sensor nodes it may not be practicable that each single node possesses
its own ID.
If sensor nodes are not assigned an ID, it may be difficult to identify and exclude
maliciously acting sensor nodes.
Radiation. Usually, radio waves propagate in all directions. However, certain nodes
can be equipped with directed antennas to communicate only with certain nodes or to
increase the communication range.
Coping with adversaries which use directed antennas is a challenging problem. By
increasing the communication range, an adversary can achieve inconsistent states in the
network. Furthermore, if an adversary uses a directed antenna, neighboring sensor nodes
may not be able to monitor the activities of this node for suspicious actions.
Activity Cycle. Sensor nodes may operate continuously. However, this is very energy
consuming. To save energy, sensor nodes can use certain sleep modes to put the CPU
in sleep mode or disable the wireless transceiver.
A general challenge is the management of sleep and activity cycles. Certain nodes
may not be reachable during their sleep phase. In terms of security, the realization of a
20 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
monitoring system to detect malicious nodes is challenging, since nodes may not be able
to monitor their neighbors if they are in a sleeping mode.
Size of the Network. The size of a WSN can vary from small scale networks to large
scale networks.
The most challenging problem in this area is the scalability of the applied protocols.
For example, key management must be applicable for large scale WSNs. It may not
be practicable to pre-configure each sensor node with pairwise keys for all other nodes.
Therefore, more sophisticated approaches are required.
Adaptability. WSNs can have a long operation time. Thus, it may be required to
adapt the WSN to changed conditions. Therefore, WSNs have to support reconfiguration
mechanisms or code updates using over-the-air (OTA) programming.
The adaption on new conditions or new code updates must be only performed by
authorized entities. Therefore, appropriate authentication mechanisms are required.
Time Synchronization. It is often required to know the time when a measurement
has been performed. Thus, sensor nodes require some timing device that must be syn-
chronized between the sensor nodes. Therefore, sensor nodes may be equipped with an
accurate clock, or central or distributed time synchronization mechanisms can be used.
If each sensor node is not equipped with an accurate clock, efficient, reliable, and secure
time synchronization protocols are required which work in the unreliable environment,
supporting multihop communication, and which are resistant against an active adversary.
Robustness. Besides attacks, natural events may have negative influence to the oper-
ation of a WSN. For example interferences may jam the wireless channel preventing the
transmission of data. To address such events, WSNs must be robust, i.e., they must
continue to operate even if abnormal events occur. Thus, robustness is a property which
must be addressed in all WSNs; even in non-security-critical WSNs.
2.2 Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
This section gives an overview of security in WSNs. In Section 2.2.1, we introduce
the three major properties which make the design of security protocols for WSNs a
challenging task. Security protocols can address several security goals. In Section 2.2.2,
we discuss the different security goals in the context of WSNs. The goal of an adversary
is the violation of one or more of these security goals. The different classes of adversaries
are discussed in Section 2.2.3. We reason that handling inside adversaries is the most
challenging task in the majority of WSNs. In Section 2.2.4, we give an overview of
attacks in WSNs and discuss them from the viewpoint of an outside as well as an inside
adversary.
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2.2.1 Properties with Major Impact on Security
In Section 2.1.5, we have given an overview of the special properties of WSNs. Some
of these properties have rather little effect on the design of security protocols or are
only relevant in more exotic application scenarios. However, three of these properties
are elementary for nearly all WSN scenarios. These properties differ substantially from
properties of classical computer systems and thus have serious influence on the design
of security mechanisms and protocols. Therefore, these properties and the related chal-
lenges require special attention. These three properties are:
1. Resource Constraints,
2. Operational Environment, and
3. Wireless Multihop Communication.
It is commonly assumed that sensor nodes are highly resource constrained; e.g., the
resources are comparable to the Berkeley MICA motes presented in Section 2.1.3. Thus,
security protocols for WSNs must be executable on the available hardware and especially
must be very efficient in terms of energy consumption and execution time.
The operational environment of most WSNs is assumed to be unattended or even
hostile. Since sensor nodes are usually not assumed to be physically protected by some
tamper-resistant hardware, an adversary is able to compromise sensor nodes. Thus, even
if security mechanisms, such as node-based authentication, are deployed, an adversary
is able to participate in the network since he has access to all data, e.g., cryptographic
keys stored on the node. Thus, security protocols must be able to operate even if sensor
nodes are compromised.
The wireless communication enables an adversary to eavesdrop, inject, drop, or alter
messages or to perform DoS attacks by jamming the wireless channel. In contrast to
most other wireless networks, the communication is performed in a multihop way. This
introduces additional challenges. Compromised nodes may be part of a route, enabling
them to modify forwarded messages, or a compromised node injects a large amount of
false messages to drain the energy resources of all forwarding nodes.
2.2.2 Security Goals
Computer security relies on security goals which specify the requirements of a secure
system. Within this thesis, we focus on the security goals of authenticity, integrity,
confidentiality, and availability [81]. The security goals of non-repudiation and privacy
[81] are not explicitly considered within this thesis.
In WSNs, authentication mechanisms are required to get confirmation about the iden-
tity of sensor nodes or the sink, and the origin of received messages. Integrity covers
two aspects: the integrity of the communication in the WSN and the integrity of the
system of a sensor node (or the sink). In the first case, mechanisms provide assurance
that the received messages are valid, i.e., any unauthorized modification of data will be
detected. This also includes the detection of replayed messages, i.e., the freshness of
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messages. In the latter case, mechanisms provide assurance that the system of a sensor
node is valid, i.e., hardware as well as software modifications will be detected. If sensitive
data is transmitted in the WSN, confidentiality mechanisms are required to ensure that
information is accessible only to authorized entities. Availability means that the WSN
is in a functioning condition and is able to perform its tasks.
Since the security goal non-repudiation cannot be achieved in nearly any WSN, we
do not consider it in this thesis. Non-repudiation means that an entity cannot ex post
repudiate the validity of a performed action, e.g., a sensor node refuses that it has sent
a certain message. To achieve non-repudiation, digital signatures are required, and it
must be ensured that no unauthorized entity has access to private keys. Since public key
cryptography is usually too resource intensive and sensor nodes can be compromised,
this security goal cannot be achieved. The security goal privacy is required if a WSN is
used to monitor personal data, e.g., a WSN deployed in health care. Then, it must be
ensured that either the monitored entity (in this case, the human) is not identifiable, or
the personal data of this entity is not accessible or cannot be associated to the entity.
Since we do not explicitly examine privacy-relevant applications and the privacy topic
itself suffices for a sole thesis, this security goal is also not considered within this thesis.
In addition to the above mentioned security goals, certain application scenarios may
have additional security requirements. For example, some real time monitoring applica-
tions require the timeliness of data, i.e., data arrives in time at the destination.
Which security goals have to be achieved to secure a WSN depends on the application
scenario. For example, consider a WSN which monitors a forest to detect forest fires.
Among the functional requirement actuality, mainly the authenticity and integrity of
the exchanged messages is required to guarantee that the messages are indeed from
sensor nodes of the deployed WSN and that the messages have not been modified. The
confidentiality of these messages might be of minor priority, since no sensitive data is
transmitted. In contrast, however, the WSNs deployed in human health care require
mechanisms that guarantee the confidentiality and privacy of the measured data.
An adversary can try to attack a WSN, so that one or more of the security goals are
violated. Adversaries can be categorized in different classes which we describe in the
next section.
2.2.3 Classes of Adversaries
An adversary can attack a WSN in different ways, depending on the effort for the
adversary, the knowledge of the adversary about the WSN, and the potential damage the
adversary can cause. In this thesis, we basically use the following two general distinctions
of types of adversaries.
Mote-class and Laptop-class Adversary
The first distinction of adversaries is made on the basis of the available resources. We
distinguish between a mote-class and a laptop-class adversary [122].
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• A mote-class adversary has access to one or more sensor nodes with the same or
similar capabilities like the sensor nodes deployed in the network.
• A laptop-class adversary5 may have access to more powerful devices such as laptops
with more resources, e.g., greater battery power, more powerful CPU, greater
memory space, a high power radio transmitter, or a sensitive antenna.
Thus, an adversary with laptop class devices has the advantage of being able to perform
more sophisticated attacks than an adversary with ordinary sensor nodes only. For ex-
ample, an ordinary sensor node might only be able to jam the radio link in its immediate
vicinity, while a laptop-class adversary can jam a much larger area. The laptop-class
adversary is also able to eavesdrop on messages from a much greater distance than a
mote-class adversary.
Outside and Inside Adversary
The second distinction is made based on the knowledge and privileges of the adversary.
We distinguish between an outside adversary and an inside adversary [122].
• An outside adversary has no special access to sensor nodes of the WSN, i.e., he
has no access to data stored on any sensor node and uses only his own devices to
perform attacks.
• An inside adversary has access to data stored on one or more sensor nodes and uses
this data to perform subsequent attacks. These insider attacks can be launched
from either compromised sensor nodes running malicious code or from laptop-class
adversaries using stolen key material, code, and data from legitimate nodes.
An outside adversary can be prevented from performing most outsider attacks by
applying cryptographic mechanisms. For example, authentication mechanisms prevent
an outside adversary from injecting false messages, and encryption mechanisms prevent
an adversary from eavesdropping. Therefore, a single network-wide key which is shared
by all sensor nodes may be sufficient. Alternatively, sensor nodes establish pairwise keys,
e.g., using schemes proposed in [84, 43, 116, 155, 76, 152, 270], and apply mechanisms
to ensure authenticity, integrity, and/or confidentiality, e.g., mechanisms proposed in
[121, 181]. However, an outside adversary is still able to perform jamming attacks which
is a general problem in all wireless communication systems.
The adversary model of an outside adversary is similar to the adversary described
in the Dolev-Yao model [70] which is assumed for classical security protocols such as
SSL/TLS [67] or IPSec [124]. This adversary is often referred to as Man-in-the-Middle
(MitM) adversary. The Dolev-Yao model assumes an adversary who is able to over-
hear, intercept, and generate any message and is only limited by the cryptographic con-
straints, i.e., he is only able to encrypt/decrypt messages if he possesses the proper keys.
Metaphorically speaking, the adversary sits between two communicating entities and
5The case where the adversary modifies the hardware of the compromised sensor node, e.g., by enhancing
the memory of the node, can be seen as a laptop-class attack.
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intercepts all messages exchanged between these two entities, modifies them or replaces
them through new ones, and sends them to the recipient.
However, the Dolev-Yao model is insufficient for WSNs for the following reasons. First,
the communication range is limited which may prevent the overhearing, intercepting, and
generation of any message. This may even be true for a laptop-class adversary. This
property can be exploited by security protocols. For example, sensor nodes detect that
a certain region of the WSN is jammed by an adversary and route messages around this
region.
The major reason why the Dolev-Yao model is insufficient for WSNs is the possibility
of sensor node compromise. Node Compromise is a realistic threat since sensor nodes
of WSNs may be deployed in unattended or even hostile environments and usually are
not tamper-resistant. After a node compromise, an adversary has knowledge of all data,
such as the program code and cryptographic keys, stored on the node. Using this data,
an adversary can perform subsequent attacks as an insider. For example, using the
cryptographic keys he is able to decrypt and encrypt messages. By reprogramming a
sensor node, an adversary is able to launch more sophisticated attacks, such as the
injection of false messages to cause false alarms. Furthermore, several compromised
sensor nodes may collude and exchange data, e.g., they may exchange keys using an
out-of-band channel and then collaboratively perform an attack. This shows that an
inside adversary can cause much more damage than an outside adversary. However, the
effort for an adversary to perform insider attacks is much higher since it requires the
compromise of one or more sensor nodes. In the following, we describe how an adversary
can compromise sensor nodes in order to perform insider attacks.
A node compromise can be performed either by physically accessing the sensor node
or over the wireless channel. Attacks based on physical access can range from simply
connecting a laptop to a programming interface of the sensor node to sophisticated side
channel attacks if in certain scenarios (cf. Chapter 7) sensor nodes are equipped with
tamper-resistant hardware. Side channel attacks are known from smartcards where an
adversary applies techniques such as manual microprobing, laser cutting, focused ion-
beam manipulation, glitch attacks, or power analysis, to extract protected software and
data from the smartcard processor [81, 9, 10, 128]. To compromise a sensor node over the
wireless channel, an adversary can exploit weaknesses in software implementation or in
the applied protocols. If sensor nodes support over-the-air (OTA) programming and the
code update mechanism is not protected by authentication mechanisms, an adversary
may be able to program sensor nodes with its own malicious code. (Security) protocols
which are either incorrectly implemented or have general flaws in protocol design, may
be also exploited by an adversary. This might enable the adversary to access secret
data by sending messages that are non-compliant to the protocol. Likewise, flaws in
software implementation of a sensor node may enable buffer overflow (BO) attacks [81].
By sending manipulated packets, the adversary may be able to cause a BO and get
access to secret data stored on the node. However, the typical way to compromise a
sensor node is by physically accessing the node.
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Based on the intention of the adversary, we distinguish between two types of compro-
mise:
1. Read-only Compromise
2. Read-and-Write Compromise.
In a read-only compromise, the adversary reads out stored secrets, such as crypto-
graphic keys, from the memory of the captured sensor node. Furthermore, the adversary
may read out the program code to analyze the implemented protocols to be able to
use the obtained keys. Afterwards the adversary can only violate the confidentiality by
performing passive attacks such as eavesdropping or traffic analysis (cf. Section 2.2.4).
A read-and-write compromise enables an adversary to perform active insider attacks
such as false data injection. Therefore, the adversary not only reads out data but also
modifies some existing protocols or writes new malicious code to a sensor node. Since
this type of compromise results in a difference in behavior, it may be more easily detected
using for example an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [28].
In both cases, the adversary can perform insider attacks either as a laptop-class or as
a mote-class attack. After a read-only compromise, the adversary may use the obtained
keys on a laptop with a much more powerful wireless receiver unit to eavesdrop on sensor
nodes which are farther away if for example a single network-wide key is used. However,
if the obtained key is only used to encrypt local messages, the attack surface cannot be
expanded by using a laptop class device. A read-and-write compromise however, can be
exacerbated by using a laptop class device. Using a compromised key, modified code,
and a laptop with higher transmission range, an adversary might be able to inject false
messages in different areas of the WSN.
Read and read-and-write compromise can be either performed as on-site or off-site
compromise. In an on-site compromise, the adversary performs the compromise directly
in the deployment area without moving the sensor nodes. An adversary usually performs
an off-site compromise if the compromise requires more time and equipment. Therefore,
the adversary moves the sensor node to its lab or a safe place to perform the compro-
mise. Such a movement may be detected and immediately reported by the moved or a
neighboring sensor node. To cover this, an adversary may perform a jamming attack
while moving sensor nodes to prevent the successful transmission of alarm messages.
In addition to the sole compromise of sensor nodes of the WSN, an adversary can
also perform a Node Fabrication Attack [178, 51, 48] to fabricate new sensor nodes. An
adversary uses the keying material stored on compromised sensor nodes to fabricate
his own new sensors which are added to the WSN to perform attacks. We distinguish
between two types of node fabrication attacks. The first type is known as Node Clone
Attack or Node Replication Attack. After a read-only compromise, an adversary uses
the acquired data to generate identical sensor nodes with the same keys, data, and code
as the compromised sensor node. In the second type, an adversary actively fabricates
sensor nodes that are different from the compromised one. This attack is based on the
fact that current key management schemes (e.g., the random key predistribution and
pairwise key predistribution schemes [84, 43, 116, 155, 76, 215]) store a key pool on the
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sensor nodes and not only the specific keys for this node. Using some of these keys in
combination with either an already used node ID or a newly generated valid node ID,
an adversary can fabricate nodes. The adversary may guess new valid IDs based on the
analysis of the data and code stored on the compromised sensor nodes. The fabricated
nodes are now able to participate in the WSN using the ID and the keys from the key
pool. This is possible since most sensor nodes accept new sensor nodes as valid new
nodes if they can establish pairwise keys with them. The fabricated nodes are able to
establish these keys by using their key pool.
The subsequent insider attacks can be then performed at different layers. On the
physical layer, an adversary may simply jam the wireless channel; however, this attack
is also able as an outsider. Attacks at the medium access control layer may have the
goal to starve sensor nodes by manipulating the random backoff mechanism [35]. On the
network layer, an adversary may drop, replay, or alter routing packets. Attacks on the
application layer include the injection of false data to cause false alarms, manipulation
of time synchronization or localization protocols, etc. In the next section, we present
the different types of outsider and insider attacks in more detail.
2.2.4 Types of Outsider and Insider Attacks
In this section, we give a wide overview of types of outsider and insider attacks in WSNs.
In contrast to previously published work [247, 191, 122, 242, 206, 253, 47, 274], we try to
give a more comprehensive overview and also discuss the attacks from the point of view
of an inside adversary. For this, we consolidate and extend previous work on, amongst
others, routing attacks [122], Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [247, 191], various attacks
[242, 206, 253, 47, 274] or new types of attacks [130, 131].
First, we give a brief description of the attack and which security goals (cf. Section
2.2.2) are violated. Next, we present possible defenses against an outside adversary. After
that, we discuss the impact an inside adversary can cause by performing the respective
attack and which issues should be considered.
We present the attacks following the order of the protocol stack (cf. Section 2.1.2). We
start by presenting generic attacks that can be performed at different layers. After that
we discuss the attacks (and variants of the general attacks) at physical, link, network,
transport, and application layer.
Before we describe the different attacks, we first give a short definition of outsider at-
tack and insider attack based on the definition of outside and inside adversary presented
in Section 2.2.3.
• We define insider attacks as all attacks based on the usage of information, e.g.,
keying material or code, stored on the compromised sensor node. This enables
the adversary to appear as a legitimate node in the network. This differs from
the classical view [249], where an inside adversary may be a person with extensive
knowledge of and privileged access to the target system and is able to attack inside
a system’s perimeter defense, e.g., a former employee of a company.
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• In contrast, outsider attacks are defined as attacks of an adversary who has not
compromised any sensor node and is not in possession of any information stored
on a sensor node. An adversary can only get information by analyzing the data
sent over the wireless channel.
Generic Attacks
In the following, we describe generic attacks that can be performed at different layers.
We do not list these attacks again in the respective sections of the individual layers,
except variants are worth mentioning.
In a Spoofing Attack an adversary successfully masquerades as another sensor node.
This type of attack can influence the link, network, and application layer. For example, at
the link layer, an adversary can spoof the Media Access Control Address (MAC-Address)
of the link layer protocol, e.g., the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC-Address. By claiming a false
identity, an adversary can try to disrupt the routing at the network layer. Likewise,
the adversary can disrupt the correct operation of applications such as data aggrega-
tion. A serious variant of the spoofing attack is the Sybil attack (see Attacks at the
network layer) where an adversary forges multiple identities. An outside adversary can
be impeded from performing this attack by applying authentication mechanisms such as
the link layer authentication mechanisms of IEEE 802.15.4 [205]. An inside adversary
who has performed a read-and-write compromise, however, is able to masquerade as the
compromised node and can inject malicious data. When considering insider attacks,
the applied key management is an important issue. For example, if only one shared
network-wide key is used for the whole WSN, an adversary who has compromised only
a single node may be able to masquerade as any sensor node of the WSN. Thus, the
key management should be robust against node compromise where an adversary cannot
impersonate as an uncompromised sensor node.
In a Data Alteration Attack an adversary deliberately alters bits, frames, packets, or
application data, depending on the layer where the attack is performed. To be able
to detect such attacks from an outside adversary, integrity mechanisms such as digital
signatures or MACs can be applied. However, an inside adversary can circumvent these
mechanisms if he has compromised the corresponding keys. Thus, as with the spoofing
attack, key management also plays an important role. In addition, the resilience to node
compromise also depends on the communication endpoints of the integrity mechanisms.
For example, if the integrity mechanism of a multihop communication is only applied
on a link layer level, a compromised en-route node is able to perform a data alteration
attack. In contrast, if the integrity mechanism is applied on an end-to-end connection,
any modification of an en-route node will be detected by the receiver.
In a Replay Attack, an adversary eavesdrops on a legitimate message sent between two
sensor nodes and replays it at a later time. At the link layer an adversary can replay
data frames, at the network layer data or routing packets, and at the application layer
report data. Defenses against an outside adversary are sequence numbers or timestamps
in combination with an authentication scheme. For example, if the sender assigns a
monotonically increasing sequence number to each packet and a MAC is used to ensure
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its authenticity and integrity, then the receiver rejects packets with a smaller sequence
number that it has already seen or where the MAC is invalid. This also prevents an inside
adversary from replaying messages. However, if an inside adversary is in possession of
the required keys, he can alter the sequence number to a higher number. As in the
attacks described before, the key management issues also apply.
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack is an attack against the availability where an ad-
versary attempts to make the WSN or parts of it unavailable for its intended usage. The
functionality of the WSN can be disrupted temporarily or indefinitely. DoS attacks can
be performed at all protocol layers. At the physical layer, an adversary can jam the wire-
less channel or simply destroy sensor nodes, thereby rendering them permanently non-
operational. For this purpose, the adversary can perform Search-based Physical Attacks
[241, 98] where the adversary walks through the WSN using signal detecting equipment
to locate active sensors, and then destroys them. At the link layer, an adversary can for
example perform a denial-of-sleep attack [27], which prevents the radio from going into
sleep mode exhausting the node’s energy resources. At the network layer, an adversary
can exploit the multihop communication by not forwarding messages or try to disrupt
the routing. At the application layer DoS attacks can target for example localization and
time synchronization protocols. Defenses against an outside adversary and the impact
of insiders are highly dependent on the type of DoS attack and are discussed below.
In an Eavesdropping Attack, an adversary violates the confidentiality of data by over-
hearing the transmitted bits on the wireless channel [250], intercepting messages during
multihop communication, or wiretapping directly at a sensor node. Using knowledge of
the different layers, an adversary can analyze this data. For example, knowing the ap-
plied routing protocols at the network layer enables an adversary to identify and analyze
data packets. Likewise, at the application layer, an adversary can identify and analyze
application specific data such as report data. An outside adversary can be prevented
from eavesdropping by applying encryption mechanisms, e.g., link layer encryption [121].
An inside adversary who has performed a read-only compromise of one or more sensor
nodes, gets access to the keys stored on these nodes. Using these keys, he can decrypt
data which is encrypted with these keys. Data which is encrypted with different keys,
however, cannot be decrypted. Thus, the impact of node compromise depends on the ap-
plied key management. If, for example, a single network-wide key is used, an adversary
needs only to compromise a single node to be able to eavesdrop on all messages.
Table 2.2 summarizes the generic attacks and shows the violated security goals and
which defenses against an outside adversary can be applied.
Attack Violated Security Goals Defenses against outsider
Spoofing Authenticity Authentication
Data Alteration Integrity Digital signatures, MACs
Replay Integrity Sequence numbers, Timestamps
Denial-of-Service Availability Depends on attack characteristics
Eavesdropping Confidentiality Encryption
Table 2.2: Generic Attacks
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Attacks at the Physical Layer
At the physical layer, we distinguish between attacks against the wireless channel and
attacks directed at the hardware of a sensor node.
The wireless channel is susceptible to a Jamming Attack [247] where an adversary
deliberately generates interferences to make sensor nodes unable to communicate. This
attack can be performed either by an outside or inside adversary and can have serious
consequences by influencing the availability of the wireless channel. In WSNs, jamming
attacks cannot be generally prevented. Using mechanisms such as spread-spectrum or
frequency hopping may prevent only limited adversaries from performing jamming at-
tacks. In addition, these technologies are usually not feasible for severely resource con-
strained sensor nodes. One approach is to try to detect and map jammed regions, and
to re-route messages around the jammed region [247, 248]. Sensor nodes in the jammed
area may go into sleep mode to save energy and sporadically wake up to check if the ad-
versary is still active. Further mitigation strategies are presented in [255, 256]. Jamming
attacks must be considered in the design of various security protocols. For example, the
functionality and detection rate of an IDS to detect compromised sensor nodes may be
significantly influenced by successful jamming attacks.
A direct attack of the sensor node’s hardware is possible if an adversary has physical
access to sensor nodes. This enables the Physical Destruction of sensor nodes. As a
result, the destroyed sensor nodes are not available anymore. If a significant number of
nodes are destroyed, the availability of the whole WSN may be at stake. This type of
attack can be performed either by an outside or an inside adversary. One countermeasure
may be the hiding of the sensor nodes or the deployment in protected areas. This would
also prevent sensor nodes from becoming compromised; assuming that a compromise over
the wireless channel, e.g., by exploiting weaknesses in over-the-air (OTA) programming,
is not possible. As a result, insider attacks would be prevented. However, in most WSN
application scenarios this is not possible. In this case, additional mechanisms must be
taken into account, e.g., when an intruder is detected, mechanisms independent from
the WSN are invoked to cope with him.
An adversary can perform a Tampering Attack [247] to compromise a sensor node.
The type of compromise can either be read-only or read-and-write. The adversary may
be able to violate all security goals. Defenses are similar to those discussed for physical
destruction and include secure locations, and detection and reaction to intruders which
try to tamper with nodes. In the latter case, sensor nodes can, for example, delete
their memory to prevent an adversary from accessing the data stored on the node. An
alternative approach is the use of tamper-resistant hardware [9] to prevent unauthorized
access to a sensor node. In this thesis, we propose a tradeoff approach where tamper-
resistant hardware is only used to protect some special sensor nodes (cf. Chapter 7).
However, these defenses are not generally applicable since either the WSN cannot be
deployed in secure locations or cost-containments forbid the use of additional hardware.
In this case, the WSN should provide mechanisms that are resilient to compromised nodes
and an inside adversary, i.e., the WSN can tolerate a certain number of compromised
nodes or sensor nodes are able to detect and exclude compromised nodes from the WSN.
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The detection can be either based on misbehavior detection or on attestation techniques
where the code running on the sensor node is validated.
Table 2.3 summarizes the attacks at the physical layer and shows the violated security
goals and which defenses against an outside adversary can be applied.
Attack Violated Security Goals Defenses against Outsider
Jamming Availability (communication) Only mitigation (e.g., spread
spectrum, region mapping)
Physical destruction Availability (sensor node) Secure locations, detection and
reaction to intruders
Tampering Possibly all Secure locations, detection and
reaction to intruders,
tamper-resistant hardware
Table 2.3: Attacks at the physical layer
Attacks at the Link Layer
The link layer provides channel arbitration for neighbor-to-neighbor communication.
Protocols mostly require cooperation between sensor nodes making them particularly
vulnerable to DoS attacks.
A Collision Attack [247, 242, 274] is a type of DoS attack similar to the jamming
attack. It can be performed by an outside or inside adversary. When a legitimate sensor
node sends a message, the adversary induces a collision by sending his own signal. A
collision in only one byte is sufficient to create a CRC error and to invalidate the mes-
sage. The advantage of the collision attack compared to a jamming attack is the lower
energy consumption for the adversary and the difficulty of detecting the attack since the
only evidence are incorrect messages. If the collision attack is directed at ACK control
messages, it could induce costly exponential backoff in some Media Access Control pro-
tocols. The countermeasures against jamming attacks can also be used to mitigate the
impact of collision attacks. In addition, error-correcting codes can be applied. However,
an inside adversary who has performed a read-and-write compromise can analyze the ap-
plied code and can still corrupt more data than can be corrected. Error-correcting codes
also induce an expensive communication overheard and require additional processing.
Another defense is collision detection. However, an inside adversary may intentionally
and repeatedly deny access to the channel, expending much less energy than in fulltime
jamming. Currently, there is no completely effective defense known [247].
In an Exhaustion Attack [247] an outside or inside adversary exploits some of the
properties of the link layer to waste the scarce energy resources of the sensor nodes. For
example, an adversary repeatedly generates collisions to cause resource exhaustion. A
naive link-layer implementation may continuously attempt to retransmit the corrupted
packets and thus the energy reserves of the transmitting node and those surrounding it
will be quickly depleted. Possible defenses are rate limits to ignore excessive requests.
Furthermore, time-division multiplexing can be used, where each node is allotted a time
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slot in which it can transmit. This eliminates the need for arbitration of each frame and
can solve the indefinite postponement problem in a backoff algorithm. However, it is
still susceptible to collisions.
Another form of exhaustion is an Interrogation Attack [247, 191] where an adversary
exploits the two-way request-to-send/clear-to-send (RTS/CTS) handshake. The adver-
sary can either use a powerful laptop-class device or sacrifice a mote-class device to
exhaust the victim node’s resources by constantly sending RTS messages to elicit CTS
responses from this node. Applying strong link-layer authentication and replay protec-
tion can mitigate the impact an outside adversary can cause since the victim node would
not respond to RTS messages. However, the receiving of the bogus RTS messages still
consumes energy and network bandwidth. An inside adversary is still able to perform
the attack to its full extent.
A Sleep Deprivation Attack [221, 220], also known as a Denial of Sleep Attack [190,
27, 184], is another form of exhaustion attack. The goal of an adversary is to prevent
sensor nodes from entering sleep mode, thereby depleting their energy resources. A
clever denial of sleep attack that keeps the transceiver of a sensor node on would drain
the batteries in only a few days (assuming nodes described in Section 2.1.3). Since
the transceiver consumes more energy than the other components of a sensor node (cf.
Section 2.3), Medium Access Control Protocols are a natural focus for denial of sleep
attacks. Protocols such as Sensor MAC (S-MAC) [262], Berkeley MAC (B-MAC) [186],
or Timeout MAC (T-MAC) [234] are all susceptible to this type of attack [190, 191]. For
example, if S-MAC is used, an adversary can repeatedly send malicious synchronization
packets causing the victim node to stay awake to maintain synchronization with the
adversary. Similar attacks are also possible if T-MAC or B-MAC is used [191]. Mecha-
nisms against an outside adversary include link layer authentication, replay protection,
jamming identification and mitigation, and broadcast attack protection [190, 191]. An
inside adversary who has performed a read-and-write compromise is able to perform a
successful authentication. To cope with an insider, detection and mitigation mechanisms
or tamper-resistance can be applied.
Unfairness [247] is a weaker DoS attack, where an outside or inside adversary in-
termittently performs collision or exhaustion attacks to abuse a cooperative Medium
Access Control layer priority scheme to cause unfairness. This attack could result in
service degradation, e.g., in a real-time Medium Access Control protocol, sensor nodes
miss their deadlines. A possible defense is the use of small frames so that an individual
node can capture the channel for only a short time. However, this technique often re-
duces efficiency and an adversary can still cheat when vying for access, e.g., by instantly
retransmitting instead of randomly delaying.
A Link-layer Jamming Attack [140] is similar to a jamming attack at the physical layer
but an adversary exploits the knowledge of the link layer to perform the attack more
energy efficiently. Although the attack is more difficult to perform than a jamming attack
at the physical layer, there exist only mitigation defenses such as link layer encryption,
use of spread spectrum and TDMA based protocols. Link layer protocol specific defenses
are also described in [140]. Since the encryption provides only weak protection, the
impact an outsider can cause is nearly similar to that of an inside adversary.
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Table 2.4 summarizes the attacks at the link layer and shows the violated security
goals and which defenses against an outside adversary can be applied.
Attack Violated Security Goals Defenses against Outsider
Collision Availability (communication,
battery), integrity (messages)
Error-correcting codes, Collision
detection
Exhaustion Availability (battery) Rate limitation
Interrogation Availability (battery) Authentication, replay
protection
Sleep depravation Availability (battery) Authentication, replay
protection, detect and sleep,
broadcast attack detection
Unfairness Availability (communication) Small frames
Link Layer Jamming Availability (communication) Encryption, spread spectrum,
TDMA
Table 2.4: Attacks at the link layer.
Attacks at the Network Layer
There are several network layer attacks in which an adversary can disturb the routing
functionality.
An adversary can directly attack the routing protocol by targeting the routing in-
formation exchanged between sensor nodes. By Spoofing, altering, or replaying routing
information [122] an adversary may create routing loops, attract or repel network traffic,
extend or shorten source routes, increase end-to-end latency, partition the network, etc.
Defenses against an outside adversary are authentication, replay protection mechanisms,
and mechanisms to verify the integrity of messages, e.g., at the link layer. However, an
inside adversary who has performed a read-and-write compromise, can perform these at-
tacks by reprogramming the compromised sensor nodes using the acquired keys. Thus,
routing protocols must provide resilience to compromised nodes. One general approach
is to use multiple path forwarding [90, 59, 144, 145], hoping that at least on path will be
unaffected by the adversary. The INSENS routing protocol [60, 61, 65] uses this approach
to provide routing between sensor nodes and the sink. Another promising approach to
achieving resilience against compromised nodes is the use of geographic routing proto-
cols where sensor nodes know their own location, e.g., as proposed by Wood et al. in
[246]. Alternatively, a combination of prevention, detection and recovery, and resilience
techniques can be used as proposed in [177].
The multihop communication in WSNs facilitates DoS attacks at the network layer.
In a Selective Forwarding Attack6 [122], compromised sensor nodes on the routing path
refuse to forward certain messages or simply drop them, ensuring that they are not
propagated any further. To reduce the possibility of detection, not all packets are
dropped. The adversary selectively forwards packets, e.g., only packets of certain nodes
6Similar to the neglect and greed attack described in [247].
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are dropped and the remaining traffic is forwarded. If the adversary is able to make
itself part of many routes, he can increase the potential damage he can cause. A spe-
cific form of this attack is the Black Hole Attack, where the adversary simply drops or
refuses all packets. However, this attack runs the risk that neighboring sensor nodes will
decide that this node has failed or is compromised, and choose another route. Defenses
against an outside adversary are link layer authentication and encryption since an ad-
versary is prevented from joining the WSN and cannot selectively drop messages based
on their content. An inside adversary who has performed a read-and-write compromise,
however, is able to perform this attack at the compromised nodes. Mechanisms against
an insider include watchdog mechanisms where neighboring nodes monitor each other,
acknowledgement-based schemes [252], and the above mentioned multiple path forward-
ing of messages. The latter requires the adversary at least to compromise one sensor
node on each path to ensure that the message does not reach its destination.
In a Sinkhole Attack [122], the adversary’s intention is to lure traffic from a particular
area through a compromised node, creating a sinkhole with the adversary at the center.
Wormhole attacks may be used to generate such a sinkhole. Since routing protocols
usually prefer low latency links, the route provided by the wormhole is chosen. Alterna-
tively, an adversary could spoof or replay advertisements for an extremely high-quality
route to the sink. Sinkhole attacks may be used as a preparation for other attacks, e.g.,
selective forwarding attacks. Applying link layer authentication prevents an outside ad-
versary from performing this attack. However, an inside adversary who has performed
a read-and-write compromise is able to perform a successful authentication and thus
can perform the attack. To cope with this attack, routing protocols are required where
this attack is ineffective, e.g., geographic routing protocols such as the above mentioned
protocol by Wood et al. [246].
In a Sybil Attack [73], a sensor node forges multiple identities. The malicious sensor
node behaves as if it is a large number of nodes. Therefore, the node can, for exam-
ple, impersonate other nodes or simply claim false identities. The Sybil attack may
have serious impact on fault tolerance schemes such as distributed storage, dispersity
and multipath routing, and topology maintenance [122]. Furthermore, data aggregation,
voting, fair resource allocation, and misbehavior detection are susceptible to successful
Sybil attacks [170]. Karlof and Wagner point out the threats of the Sybil attack against
routing protocols [122]. For example, in geographic routing [4, 123, 263, 25] a malicious
node could appear in more than one place at once. In general, applying link layer authen-
tication prevents an outside adversary from performing this attack. After performing a
read-and-write compromise, an inside adversary can perform a Sybil attack. However,
the adversary can only forge identities of sensor nodes where he possesses the respective
keys. The possibilities of an inside adversary can be further restricted by maintaining a
list of trusted neighbors, e.g., as in [177]. Further defenses are radio resource testing, ver-
ification of key sets for random key predistribution, registration and position verification
[170].
In a Wormhole Attack [112, 122], an adversary tunnels messages from one part of
the network to another using, for example, two laptop class devices with an out-of-
band channel providing a high transmission range. Thus, the wormhole provides a lower
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latency than the alternatively-used multihop communication. This can be exploited
to perform additional attacks, such as sinkhole attacks. Link layer authentication is
not sufficient for preventing an outside adversary from performing this type of attack.
Although he is prevented from joining the WSN, he is still able to tunnel packets sent
by legitimate nodes in one part of the network to legitimate nodes in another part to
convince them that they are neighbors or send overheard broadcast packets with a laptop-
class device with sufficient power to every node in the WSN. Hu et al. introduced packet
leashes to detect and defend against wormhole attacks [112]. Two types of leashes have
been introduced: geographical and temporal leashes. Packet leashes and mechanisms
using secure positioning, synchronized clocks, or directed antennas [109, 240, 264, 32]
can be used to defend against outside and inside adversaries. Similar to the sinkhole
attack, new geographic routing protocols are also a promising approach for coping with
this attack.
A HELLO Flood Attack [122] can be mounted against many routing protocols which
use HELLO packets to inform one-hop neighbors of their presence. An adversary can use
a laptop-class device with high transmission power to send HELLO packets to nodes in
another area to trick these nodes into believing that they are neighbors of the malicious
node. If the adversary falsely broadcasts a high quality route to the base station, all
of the tricked nodes will attempt to transmit to the attacking node. Since many nodes
are outside communication range, many messages are lost. Alternatively, the adversary
can replay recorded HELLO packets from other sensor nodes to confuse the network.
Defenses against an outside adversary are authentication and the verification of bidirec-
tional links. To perform this attack as an insider, the adversary must authenticate itself
to all victim nodes. If the authentication scheme involves the base station, an adversary
claiming to be a neighbor of an unusually large number of nodes would raise an alarm
[122]. In general, routing protocols such as [246], which do not rely on HELLO messages
or do not keep routing tables, are inherently resistant to this attack.
An Acknowledgement Spoofing Attack [122] can be mounted against routing protocols
which rely on acknowledgements. An adversary can spoof acknowledgements of over-
heard packets destined for neighboring nodes in order to provide false information to
those nodes. For example, to make the sender believe that a weak link is strong or a
dead node is alive. This attack can be used as preparation for a selective forwarding
attack. Authentication is a defense against an outside adversary. Even an inside adver-
sary is severely restricted since he can only send acknowledgements for nodes where he
possesses the cryptographic key.
In addition to the above mentioned attacks, there exist Routing protocol specific at-
tacks [122]. An adversary can attract or repel traffic flows, increase end-to-end latency,
partition the network, create routing loops, extend or shorten source routes, etc. Details
to these attacks can be found for example in [122].
In a Traffic Analysis Attack [63] or Homing Attack [247], an adversary analyzes packet
traffic to deduce the location of critical resources such as the sink or cluster heads. The
adversary may then physically attack them or jam these regions to make the WSN
useless. One defense against an outside adversary is the encryption of both message
header and payload. However, it may still be sufficient for an adversary to analyze the
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traffic volume in various parts of the WSN to identify the location of the sink or cluster
heads. To address this issue, Deng et al. [62] propose the use of dummy packets to
normalize the traffic with the disadvantage of wasted energy. An inside adversary who
has performed a read-only compromise is able to decrypt and inspect the packets where
he possesses the keys. However, if a resilient key management scheme is deployed, an
adversary must compromise a large number of nodes to be successful. This is especially
difficult in large scale WSNs.
Table 2.5 summarizes the attacks at the network layer and shows the violated security
goals and which defenses against an outside adversary can be applied.
Attack Violated Security Goals Defenses against outsider
Spoofing, altering,
or replaying routing
information
Authenticity and Integrity
(routing information),
Availability (communication)
Authentication, replay protection
Selective forwarding Availability (communication) Authentication, multipath
routing
Black hole Availability (communication) Authentication, multipath
routing
Sinkhole Authenticity and Integrity
(routing information)
Authentication
Sybil Authenticity (node identifier) Authentication
Wormhole Authenticity and Integrity
(routing information)
Packet leashes
HELLO floods Authenticity and Integrity
(routing information)
Authentication, verification of
bidirectional links
Acknowledgement
spoofing
Authenticity (routing
information)
Authentication
Routing protocol
specific attacks
Depends on attack type Depends on attack type
Traffic Analysis Confidentiality (message flow,
message content)
Encryption, dummy packets
Table 2.5: Attacks at the network layer
Attacks at the Transport Layer
The transport layer manages end-to-end connections. In classical computer networks
the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) or the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) are
used. However, these protocols have a high resource overhead and are, similar to the
Internet Protocol (IP) at the network layer, (usually) not suitable for WSNs. Because
of the resource constraints, WSNs often do not explicitly use transport layer protocols
although some have been proposed, e.g., in [222] and [237]. In the following, we describe
the two attacks which have been identified at the transport layer [247, 191].
A Flooding Attack [247, 191] causes memory exhaustion by exploiting the fact that
transport layer protocols maintain state at either end of a connection. An adversary
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repeatedly sends new connection requests until the resources of the victim node are ex-
hausted or reach a maximum limit. A defense against an outside and an inside adversary
are client puzzles. The idea is that a connecting client must demonstrate its commit-
ment to the connection by solving a computationally intensive puzzle. Assuming that
an adversary does not have infinite resources, it will be impossible for him to create new
connections fast enough to exhaust the resources of the victim node. A disadvantage
is the higher energy consumption for legitimate sensor nodes, but it is less costly than
wasting wireless transmissions by flooding.
A Desynchronization Attack [247, 191] can disrupt an existing connection between
two endpoints. An adversary transmits forged packets with bogus sequence numbers or
control flags to degrade or prevent the exchange of data. Also sensor nodes may waste
energy in an endless synchronization-recovery protocol. Authentication of all packets,
including all control fields in the transport header can be used as a defense against an
outside adversary. An inside adversary’s ability to desynchronize the connection of two
uncompromised nodes, depends on the applied key management scheme. However, since
the compromised node is certainly able to authenticate itself to some neighboring nodes
(using compromised pairwise keys), the adversary can use the desynchronization attack
to waste the energy of these nodes.
Table 2.6 summarizes the attacks at the transport layer and shows the violated security
goals and which defenses against an outside adversary can be applied.
Attack Violated Security Goals Defenses against outsider
Flooding Availability (communication,
memory)
Client puzzles
Desynchronization Availability (communication,
battery)
Authentication
Table 2.6: Attacks at the transport layer
Attacks at the Application Layer
At the application layer, a plethora of different types of applications can be implemented.
Thus, it is virtually impossible to identify and list all attacks in this section. However,
there exist certain attacks at the application layer which are a threat for the majority of
WSNs. In the following, we describe some more general attacks and attacks on typical
WSN applications.
In a False Data Injection (FDI) Attack [261], an adversary generates and sends reports
for non-existing events. This can result, for example, in false alarms or a data aggre-
gation scheme miscalculates aggregate values. Authentication mechanisms prevent an
outside adversary from performing this attack. An inside adversary who has performed a
read-and-write compromise, however, can use the compromised key(s) to generate valid
report messages. To cope with an inside adversary, usually the redundancy of WSNs is
exploited. Instead of relying on the measurements of a single sensor node, multiple sen-
sor nodes perform a measurement. Then, the decision on a report value can be based on
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a voting scheme or on resilient aggregation schemes (e.g., using the MEDIAN instead of
the AVERAGE). This provides resilience to compromised nodes up to a certain threshold
value. Alternatively, detection mechanisms may enable the detection (and exclusion) of
false data or compromised nodes.
A Path-based Denial of Service (PDoS) Attack [261, 64] shares many similarities with
false data injection and replay attacks. However, the goal of the adversary is different. In
a PDoS attack, an adversary overwhelms sensor nodes by flooding a multihop end-to-end
communication path with either replayed or injected false messages to waste the scarce
energy resources. Thus, the energy of en-route sensor nodes is wasted by forwarding
falsely injected or replayed messages. Since the transmission of messages is the most
cost-intensive factor in WSNs and many nodes may be involved, this is a very severe
attack. The defense against an outside adversary is again the use of an authentication
scheme. Sensor nodes forward only messages from authenticated neighbors. Thus, an
outside adversary can only attack sensor nodes within its transmission range by sending
false messages. All subsequent sensor nodes are protected, since these messages are
not forwarded. An inside adversary, however, is able to authenticate itself and thus all
subsequent nodes also waste their scarce energy resources. En-route filtering schemes
[261, 272] have been proposed to cope with an inside adversary. In this thesis, we
propose a new highly efficient filtering scheme (cf. Chapter 5) which is optimized for
query-response communication [129].
The False-Endorsement-Based DoS (FEDoS) Attack [130, 131] is an insider attack
which can be performed by an inside adversary who has performed a read-and-write
compromise. This attack can be performed against many security schemes addressing
the false data injection attack. The idea behind these schemes is that multiple sensor
nodes collaboratively generate a report, i.e., one node initiates the report generation
and a certain number of neighboring nodes must endorse the report to be valid. This
prevents an adversary from injecting false reports if he has compromised less than a
certain number of neighboring nodes. However, most of these schemes are susceptible
to FEDoS attacks. In a FEDoS attack, an adversary sends a false endorsement to the
report generating node to invalidate the report. As a result, the sink does not accept
this report, although the information of the report is correct. In this thesis, we present
the first general applicable protocols (cf. Chapter 6) to address this issue.
Many WSNs implement some typical applications such as network query, broadcasts
from the sink, data aggregation, localization, time synchronization, and over-the-air
(OTA) programming which all are susceptible to attacks.
By sending a query, the sink requests certain report data from the WSN. The sink
can also send broadcast messages to all sensor nodes, e.g., to distribute new sensing
parameters. Data aggregation is used to reduce the amount of transmitted data. Sensor
nodes preprocess data, e.g., by calculating the average value of some measurements,
and forward only the average value instead of all measurements. Localization and time
synchronization are often required to associate measurements with the accurate time
and location. Using some OTA programming mechanisms, the sink sends new software
to reprogram the sensor nodes.
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An adversary attacking these applications may be able to violate all security goals.
He can inject new messages, manipulate or replay messages, eavesdrop on messages, or
block certain messages (e.g., by jamming or by performing a selective forwarding attack).
Defenses against an outside adversary include the above mentioned (broadcast) au-
thentication, digital signatures, MACs, sequence numbers, timestamps, encryption, and
mechanisms to mitigate DoS attacks. Since confidentiality is usually not a problem in
these applications, there is often no need for encryption which can lead to energy savings.
Defenses against an inside adversary differ between the applications. The applications
network query, sink broadcast, and OTA programming can exploit the property that the
sink is assumed to be uncompromised by applying a broadcast authentication scheme
addressing attacks against authenticity and integrity. Secure data aggregation in the
presence of compromised nodes is a very complex topic and, for example, discussed
by Blass in [19]. Time synchronization and localization protocols are often based on
some special beacon nodes, e.g., equipped with GPS, which send out accurate time
and location values. Thus, the compromise of these nodes may enable an adversary
to seriously disrupt these protocols. The design of localization protocols should also
consider Distance-Bounding Attacks [49] where an adversary pretends to be closer to a
verifier than it is actually the case.
Table 2.7 summarizes the attacks at the application layer and shows the violated
security goals and which defenses against an outside adversary can be applied.
Attack Violated Security Goals Defenses against outsider
False data injection Authenticity and Integrity
(report messages)
Digital signatures, MACs
PDoS Availability (battery),
Authenticity and Integrity
(report messages)
Authentication
FEDoS Availability (report messages),
Integrity (endorsement)
- (insider attack)
Attacks on typical
applications
Possibly all (Broadcast) Authentication,
Digital signatures, MACs,
Sequence numbers, Timestamps,
Encryption
Table 2.7: Attacks at the application layer
Summary
In this section, we discussed attacks in WSNs from the perspective of an outside as
well of an inside adversary. For each attack, we identified the violated security goals
and presented defenses against an outside adversary. Furthermore, we discussed the
impact an inside adversary can cause by performing the respective attack and which
issues should be considered.
The knowledge of possible attacks in WSNs and their impact is required for the devel-
opment of a security architecture. A security architecture should address the application-
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specific threats and risks. By performing a threat and risk analysis, possible attacks and
the corresponding security requirements can be identified. This enables the development
of a security architecture with the appropriate security level for the scenario. However,
we argue that many WSNs have a common basis and that a security architecture should
comprise the following components.
A security architecture for a WSN should provide mechanisms to protect against an
outside adversary as well as an inside adversary. As basis protection, cryptographic
mechanisms such as link layer authentication should be implemented. To minimize the
impact of node compromise, it is important to apply a key management scheme that
is resilient to node compromise and provides graceful degradation [216]. In addition, a
secure broadcast authentication scheme is required to enable the sink to query the net-
work or sensor nodes to perform local broadcast communication. Furthermore, secure
routing mechanisms that can tolerate compromised nodes should be applied. For exam-
ple, multipath routing is preferable over singlepath routing to address attacks such as
selective forwarding although it increases the energy costs [200]. Since DoS attacks may
have detrimental effects on the WSN, mechanisms should at least mitigate the impact of
such attacks. Finally, application specific security mechanisms are required to enable a
secure report generation and minimize the possibility of false alarms. These mechanisms
should also address attacks such as false data injection, PDoS, and FEDoS since they
may have detrimental effects on the functionality of the WSN. For example, a PDoS
attack can damage many more sensor nodes than a local sleep deprivation attack.
In this thesis, we focus on the application layer attacks false data injection, PDoS, and
FEDoS. We propose several protocols to protect against an outside as well as an inside
adversary performing these attacks. Furthermore, we investigate how tamper-resistant
hardware can be used to prevent node compromise and propose two attestation protocols
for this scenario.
2.3 Resource Consumption in Wireless Sensor Networks
When developing security protocols for WSNs, it is important to know how much energy
is consumed by the individual operations. In this section, we give a short overview of
resource consumption in WSNs. We give an introduction to research on the resource
consumption of a sensor node performing public key cryptography, hash functions, sym-
metric key cryptography, and message transmission. We use results of these works to
define an energy model which is used to analyze the performance of our protocols.
2.3.1 Public Key Cryptography
To achieve a high resilience to node compromise, public key cryptography [68] would be
the best solution. Each sensor node could be assigned with a unique public-private key
pair which is signed by a central authority. If an adversary compromises a sensor node,
he can only misuse the individual key pair of this node.
However, public key cryptography has two major drawbacks: the high computational
overhead and the large key length. Public key ciphers such as RSA [197] or ElGamal
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[82] (detailed descriptions can be found, for example, in [167]) require computationally
intensive modular exponentiations and according to the cryptographic key length rec-
ommendation [192], the key length should be at least 1008 bit to achieve security level
3 (i.e, short-term protection against medium organizations, medium-term protection
against small organizations). Newer cryptosystems based on Elliptic Curve Cryptogra-
phy (ECC) [168], such as NTRU [107] and XTR [148], have been proposed to achieve
the same level of security with smaller key sizes and higher computational efficiency. For
example, ECC-160 provides comparable security to RSA-1024 and ECC-224 provides
comparable security to RSA-2048 [99]. In addition to the key size, signature size of ECC
is also less than RSA. For example, ECC-160 has a signature size of 320 bit [58] whereas
RSA-1024 has a signature size of 1024 bit [244].
Public key cryptography in WSNs has been intensively investigated, e.g., in [243, 93,
99, 162, 238, 78, 20, 22, 183, 232, 198, 14]. In the following, we present some results on
resource consumption of public key cryptography in WSNs.
Gura et al. [99] showed the general applicability of ECC on an Atmel ATmega128
[52] running at 8 MHz. Their implementation of the elliptic curve secp160r17 requires
282 byte data memory and 3682 byte code memory. The execution time to perform a
point multiplication is 0.81 seconds. This implies that it would take about 1.62 seconds
to verify an ECDSA signature on this elliptic curve since the dominant operations in
signature verification are two point multiplications.
Wander et al. [238] present energy values for a MICA2dot sensor node. As the MICA2
node, it is also equipped with an Atmel ATmega 128L processor, but the clock speed is
only 4 MHz instead of 8-16 MHz. The sign operation of RSA-1024 requires 304 mJ and
the verify operation 11.9 mJ. ECDSA-160 requires 22.82 mJ for signing and 45.09 mJ
for verifying.
Piotrowski et al. [183] give slightly different values for public key operations. RSA-
1024 signature generation requires 359.87 mJ and takes 12.04 seconds. The signature
verification requires 14.05 mJ and takes 0.47 seconds. For elliptic curve cryptography
they present values for ECC-160. The signature generation requires 26.96 mJ and takes
0.89 seconds. For verifying a signature, 53.42 mJ are required and it takes 1.77 seconds.
Although public key cryptography is generally applicable on WSN hardware, its usage
may not be generally reasonable. Encryption times of several seconds [99, 183] or min-
utes [162] are not tolerable for real-time applications. The dramatically higher energy
requirements of public key cryptography render them useless for regular computations.
However, a well-considered usage in certain scenarios or applications may be reasonable.
For example, each sensor node performs only one public key operation in the initializa-
tion phase of a WSN. After that, only efficient symmetric encryption is used to enable a
long lifetime of the WSN. Another example is a broadcast authentication scheme where
computational and energy intensive signature generations are performed by the sink and
the resource constrained sensor nodes need only to perform much cheaper verification
operations.
7An elliptic curve standardized by NIST/SECG.
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2.3.2 Hash Functions and Symmetric Key Cryptography
In contrast to public key cryptography, hash functions and symmetric key cryptography
are much more efficient. This makes them of particular interest for WSNs.
Hash functions such as MD4, MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160 (descriptions can be, for
example, found in [167]) are cryptographic primitives which are frequently used in secu-
rity protocols for WSNs. Commonly used are Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
[16], also known as keyed hash functions, for message authenticity and integrity. Fur-
thermore, a hash chain construction is often used in security protocols. A hash chain is
a sequence of n hash values, each of some fixed length l generated by a hash function
h : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l. The hash function h is successively applied on a seed value c0
such that cv+1 = h(cv), for v = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1. To achieve confidentiality of transmitted
messages, encryption algorithms such as DES, 3DES, RC4, RC5, IDEA (descriptions
can be, for example, found in [167]) or AES [174] can be used in WSNs.
The resource consumption of hash functions and symmetric key cryptography has
been subject of several works. In addition to the energy consumption of public key
cryptography, Wander et al. [238] present the energy consumption for calculating SHA-
1 hash function and for AES block cipher. The energy consumption for calculating
SHA-1 hash values is states with 5.9 µ J/byte. AES-128 encryption/decryption is stated
with 1.62/2.49 µJ/byte.
In [261, 121] the calculation of one 64-bit MAC or hash value using RC5 [195] is stated
with an energy consumption of about 15 µJ and that a computation takes about 0.5 ms.
In [139], an evaluation framework of block ciphers for WSNs is developed. The frame-
work is used to evaluate Skipjack [173], RC5 [195], RC6 [196], Rijndael/AES [174],
Twofish [207], MISTY1 [166], KASUMI [1] and, Camellia [12] according to their secu-
rity properties and their storage- and energy-efficiency. The result of this evaluation
is that the most suitable ciphers for WSNs are Skipjack, MISTY1, and Rijndael/AES
depending on the combination of available memory, energy, and required security. The
recommended operation mode is Output Feedback Mode for pairwise links (e.g., for mu-
tual authentication between the sink and a sensor node), and Cipher Block Chaining
Mode for group communications (e.g., using a group key to encrypt messages for all
nodes in a cluster).
In [92], the execution times for different ciphers and hash functions are evaluated for
different hardware platforms. The results indicate that the stream cipher RC4 outper-
forms RC5 on an Atmel ATmega 128; a 128 bit encryption requires 86 µs with RC4 and
413µs using RC5. Furthermore, they showed that the hash functions MD5 and SHA-1
require almost an order of a magnitude higher overhead.
2.3.3 Wireless Transmission
The energy consumption of the wireless interface must not be disregarded. Sending and
receiving messages requires a substantial amount of the available energy.
In [261], values for a MICA2 mote with a data rate of 19.2 Kbps are stated. The
transmission costs are 16.25 µJ/byte and the receiving costs are 12.5 µJ/byte.
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Wander et al. [238] present values for a MICA2dot sensor node which has the same
CC1000 transceiver as the MICA2 mote. It operates at 12.4 Kbps. The transmission
costs are 59.2 µJ/byte and the receiving costs are 26.6 µJ/byte.
In [183], different values are stated if the CC1000 of a MICA2 mote operates at 433
MHz or 868 MHz. Operating at 433 MHz, the transmission costs are 2.086 µWs/bit
= 16.688 µJ/byte using the maximum transmission power. The receiving costs are
0.578 µWs/bit = 4.624 µJ/byte. If the CC1000 operates at 868 MHz, the maximum
transmission costs are 1.984 µWs/bit = 15.872 µJ/byte and the receiving costs are 0.750
µWs/bit = 6 µJ/byte.
2.3.4 Comparison
Our short overview has shown that the resource consumption is stated differently in the
literature. Reasons for this are, for example, different measurement methods or different
assumptions of the current draw or the voltage. Blass discusses this issue in more detail
in [19]. However, it can be seen that the most cost intensive factor in terms of energy is
the computation of public key cryptography followed by the transmission of messages.
The least expensive operations are symmetric operations.
Public key cryptography may require approximately between 3,100 to 21,000 times as
much energy than symmetric primitives. Blaß [19] states that the energy consumption
of ECC can be up to 22,000 times more than those of symmetric primitives. Using the
values from [261], one can see that sending one TinyOS packet with 36 byte requires
39 times as much energy than computing one 64-bit RC5 MAC. In [19], a much larger
difference of 190 times as much is stated.
2.4 Trusted Computing
As part of this thesis we developed protocols using tamper resistant hardware, in our case,
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM)8. The TPM is the core of the TCG specifications
[231] and is basically a smartcard that serves as a trust anchor for trust establishment.
The TPM offers protected storage for cryptographic keys and hardware enhanced cal-
culation engines for random number generation, key-calculation, and hash computation.
Although the TPM chip was not specified as necessarily being tamper-resistant, many
hardware vendors offer security mechanisms, such as active security sensors, to prevent
tampering and the unauthorized extraction of protected keys.
The TPM can generate and store cryptographic keys, both symmetric and asymmetric,
and perform asymmetric cryptographic operations. The asymmetric keys can either be
marked as migratable or non-migratable, which is specified when the key is generated.
Non-migratable keys are always protected by the TPM and must not leave their protected
storage.
8The TPM is specified only as tamper-evident. However, many real TPM-chips provide tamper-
resistance since they are based on smartcards.
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The TPM also offers so-called Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) which are
used to store platform-dependant configuration values. These registers are initialized on
power up and are used to store software integrity values. Software components (BIOS,
bootloader, operating system, applications) are measured by the TPM before execution
and the corresponding hash-value is then written to a specific PCR by extending the
previous value:
Extend(PCRN , value) = SHA1(PCRN ||value) (2.1)
SHA1 refers to the cryptographic hash function used by the TPM and || denotes a
concatenation. The trust anchor for a so-called trust-chain is the Core Root of Trust
Measurement (CRTM), which resides in the BIOS and is first executed when a platform
is powered up. The CRTM then measures itself and the BIOS, and hands over control
to the next software component in the trust-chain. For every measured component an
event is created and stored in the Stored Measurement Log (SML). The PCR values can
then be used together with the SML to attest the platform’s state to a remote entity.
To assure that these values are authentic, they are signed with a non-migratable key,
the Attestation Identity Key (AIK). The remote platform can verify the signature and
compare these values with reference values to see if the system integrity is trustworthy.
The TPM also offers a concept called sealing, which allows a data block to be bound
to a specific platform configuration. A sealed message is created by selecting a range of
platform configuration registers, a non-migratable key, and the data block which should
be sealed. The TPM is then able to decrypt and transfer the sealed data block only
if its current platform configuration matches the platform configuration from when the
sealing was executed. Sealing provides the assurance that protected messages are only
recoverable when the platform is in a known system state.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have shown basic background on WSNs and security in WSNs. Fur-
thermore, we gave a short overview of the resource consumption in WSNs and presented
background on trusted computing which we have used in some of our proposed protocols.
Summarizing one can say that securing WSNs is a challenging task. The reasons
for this are the special properties of WSNs: resource constraints, different application
scenarios, wireless multihop communication, and the possibility of node compromise.
The resource constraints allow only the use of efficient security mechanisms and proto-
cols. As a basic mechanism, symmetric cryptographic primitives are preferred in WSNs.
They require significantly less calculation time and energy than public key cryptography.
The use of public key cryptography must be well considered.
Since WSNs can be deployed in many different application scenarios, it is hard to
develop generic security mechanisms and protocols. For example, a protocol can be
suitable for only small-scale WSNs, whereas it cannot be used in large-scale WSNs
because the storage requirements on each sensor node increase with the size of the
network.
44 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
The wireless communication channel enables an adversary to easily perform attacks
such as spoofing, message replay, or eavesdropping. This is a general issue that WSNs
share with all wireless networks. Since the wireless communication relies on multihop
communication, securing WSNs is additionally exacerbated. An adversary that is in
possession of a forwarding sensor node is able to perform additional attacks such as data
alteration or selective forwarding. However, if security mechanisms are deployed, an
adversary must first compromise a sensor node to perform such attacks as an insider.
Node compromise is general possible in WSNs. After compromising a sensor node, an
adversary has access to all stored data and is able to perform subsequent attacks as an
insider. These insider attacks are a serious threat to WSNs.
Especially the insider attacks false data injection, PDoS, and FEDoS can have detri-
mental impact on a WSN. Since existing security mechanisms are not sufficient for certain
scenarios or yet no generally applicable security mechanisms exist, we focus on these at-
tacks in this thesis. Furthermore, we investigate how tamper-resistant hardware can be
used to prevent node compromise and propose two attestation protocols for this scenario.
Before we describe our protocols, we systematically classify different ways to cope
with insider attacks. Until now, different ways to cope with insider attacks have not
been systematically classified. In the next chapter, we present a new classification how
to handle insider attacks in WSNs.
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3 Classification
In this chapter, we propose a new two-tier classification how to handle insider attacks in
WSNs. We argue that mechanisms and protocols can be first classified by the pursued
security strategy. These strategies can be further divided into mechanisms of the same
type which implement the respective strategy. For each type of mechanisms, we identify
related work and discuss open problems. Related work in this section is discussed on a
high level to be able to provide a broad overview. In the subsequent chapters, where
we describe our protocols, we provide a more detailed view on related work with regard
to our proposed protocols. Our proposed protocols address open problems, presented in
this section. They also illustrate all aspects of the different security strategies which can
be pursued.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.1, we introduce the security strategies
and briefly introduce the different types of mechanisms. The detailed description of the
mechanisms, including related work and open problems, is provided in Section 3.2. The
chapter is summarized in Section 3.3.
This chapter shares some material with the previously published work On Handling
Insider Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks [132].
3.1 Security Strategies
A well-known classification, which is also used by Bishop in [18] for “classical” computer
systems, distinguishes between the security strategies (1) Prevention, (2) Detection, and
(3) Recovery. We also use this distinction for our classification w.r.t. WSNs. In the
following, we describe these three classes in detail.
3.1.1 Prevention of Insider Attacks
Prevention means that an attack will fail due to implemented mechanisms which an
adversary cannot override and which are trusted to be implemented in a correct unaltered
way. Mechanisms and protocols which implement a prevention strategy can prevent
compromise of parts of the system. Simple preventative examples for“classical”computer
systems are passwords (which aim to prevent unauthorized users from accessing the
system).
In WSNs, however, sensor nodes can be compromised and the severe resource con-
straints exacerbate the use of the strong cryptographic mechanisms and protocols. Thus,
prevention of insider attacks is hard to achieve or mostly not possible. However, in certain
scenarios it might be possible to use mechanisms that implement a prevention strategy
to prevent an adversary from successfully performing insider attacks. This implies that
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preventative mechanisms protect the keying material stored on a sensor node from being
accessed by an adversary. To achieve this, we distinguish between the following two
types of mechanisms that implement a prevention strategy:
• Mechanisms increasing the effort for node compromise (see Section 3.2.1)
• Mechanisms making node compromise virtually infeasible (see Section 3.2.2)
Mechanisms of the first type are basic mechanisms which can be applied to increase
the effort for an adversary to compromise a sensor node. This prevents only an adversary
with rather limited resources from compromising a sensor node and accessing the keying
material. However, these mechanisms can be used as a basis for more sophisticated secu-
rity mechanisms since they increase the time for an adversary to successfully compromise
a sensor node. For example, if a security mechanism is secure up to a certain threshold
of compromised sensor nodes, these mechanisms can prolong the time until the threshold
is reached.
Mechanisms of the second type make a successful node compromise virtually infeasi-
ble, i.e., even if an adversary has physical access to a sensor node, he is never able to read
keying material out of the node to perform insider attacks. For example, some sensor
nodes, which perform special duties, such as key management, localization, time syn-
chronization, etc., are equipped with tamper-resistant hardware. The tamper-resistant
hardware protects the keys (or even the whole data) stored on the node from being
accessed by an adversary.
3.1.2 Detection of Insider Attacks
Mechanisms that implement a Detection strategy have the goal to determine that an
attack is underway, or has occurred, and report it. This approach is useful when an
attack cannot be prevented, but it can also indicate the effectiveness of preventative
measures. Attacks may be monitored to provide information about their nature, severity,
and results. An example is a mechanism which monitors the login attempts of a user
and reports a warning when a user enters an incorrect password three times. Other
examples are Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) which look for actions or information
indicating an attack. One drawback of detection mechanisms is that they do not prevent
compromise of parts of the system.
Since it is hard or may be impossible to prevent against insider attacks in WSNs,
mechanisms are either based on detection or on recovery (see Section 3.1.3). Mechanisms
that implement a detection strategy enable either the sink, or other sensor nodes, to
detect that an insider attack is underway, or has occurred. After detection, adequate
countermeasures can be applied. Furthermore, detection mechanisms can be used to
indicate the effectiveness of prevention or recovery mechanisms. We distinguish between
two types of mechanisms:
• Mechanisms to detect manipulated data (see Section 3.2.3)
• Mechanisms to detect compromised nodes (see Section 3.2.4)
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The first type enables only to detect that an insider attack has occurred by identifying
manipulated data. Compromised sensor nodes are not directly identified. For example,
the sink detects that a received aggregated value must be incorrect by performing plau-
sibility checks. The sink may only know that one or more of the aggregating nodes are
compromised.
Mechanisms to directly detect compromised nodes are either based on a direct verifi-
cation that a sensor node has been tampered with, or on misbehavior detection.
To detect manipulated data or to directly identify misbehaving compromised sensor
nodes, mechanisms based on Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are used. IDS may
be classified as either host-based or network-based, depending on the data collection
mechanism [28]. Host-based IDS operate directly on the sensor nodes, whereas network-
based IDS operate on packets captured from network traffic. The latter is commonly
used in WSNs. In addition, IDS may be classified based on the detection technique.
In signature-based detection1, any action that matches the pattern of an attack in a
predefined signature is considered as an intrusion. This technique has a low false positive
rate, but does not perform well at detecting unknown attacks, and it might be difficult
to define the characteristics of an attack. The advantage for the application in WSN is
the low computational overhead. For example, a signature to address PDoS attacks (see
Section 2.2.4) could be “A node generating more than 20 reports per minute must be
reported!”. Anomaly-based detection defines a profile of normal behavior. Any activity
varying from this profile is considered as an intrusion. This profile can be updated to
adapt the system to a new “normal” behavior. This technique may detect previously
unknown attacks, but may exhibit a high false positive rate and is computationally
more intensive. For example, the average packet loss rate is defined as the normal
behavior, and if a node drops more packets than the average, this node is assumed to be
compromised. Due to the resource constraints and the unpredictable environment where
WSNs may be deployed, anomaly-based detection is difficult to implement in WSNs.
The environment may change (e.g., the weather conditions) or the conditions in one
area of the WSN differ from other areas. Thus, it is hard to define “normal behavior”. In
specification-based detection, a set of constraints is defined that describes the “intended”
behavior of a program or protocol. The execution of the program or protocol is monitored
with respect to the defined constraints. An alarm is raised if a deviation is detected.
This approach enables the detection of known and unknown attacks and exhibits a low
false positive rate. The disadvantage is that specifications are usually derived manually
from protocol descriptions which may be time-consuming. In addition, specifications
are protocol specific which may require specific specifications for each WSN application
scenario.
3.1.3 Recovery from Insider Attacks
Recovery can be categorized in two forms [18]. The first is to stop an attack and to assess
and repair any damage caused by the attack. An example is a backup system which can
1Signature-based detection is also known as Misuse detection.
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restore a file that has been deleted by an adversary. In this form, the system’s function-
ality is inhibited by the attack and resumption of correct operation is required. In the
second form, the system continues to function correctly while an attack is underway. It
relies on fault tolerance and is typically used in safety-critical systems. The difference
to the first form of recovery is that the system does not function incorrectly. However,
the system may disable nonessential functionality.
In the context of WSNs, the first form of recovery requires the detection of the insider
attack, i.e., either the detection that malicious data has been injected, or that sensor
nodes are compromised. After that, mechanisms stop the adversary from continuing the
attack and/or assess and repair the damage caused by the attack.
The second form of recovery does not necessarily require any detection mechanisms.
Mechanisms implementing the second form are designed in such a way that the sys-
tem automatically recovers itself (within certain boundaries) while an insider attack is
underway to maintain the system’s functionality. For that, techniques such as fault
tolerance [189] and Byzantine fault tolerance [137] as well as security techniques are
used. A typical example for WSNs is the use of the MEDIAN instead of the AVERAGE
in an aggregation scenario. Assume that one node aggregates the temperature values
it receives from a certain number of neighboring sensor nodes. If the AVERAGE is
used, a single compromised node can inject a large value which results in a false average
value. The MEDIAN, however, is resistant against this attack (up to a certain number
of compromised nodes) and provides automatic recovery from such a false data injection
attack.
We distinguish between four types of mechanisms which implement one of the two
forms of recovery:
• Mechanisms to exclude compromised sensor nodes (see Section 3.2.5)
• Adaptable mechanisms (see Section 3.2.6)
• Mechanisms to reprogram (compromised) sensor nodes (see Section 3.2.7)
• Mechanisms tolerating node compromise (see Section 3.2.8)
An adversary can be stopped from continuing the attack by excluding the compromised
sensor nodes from any further participation in the network.
Alternatively, adaptable mechanisms can be used to recover from insider attacks, e.g.,
the threshold value of a security scheme based on threshold cryptography is increased.
Thus, the adversary is stopped from continuing insider attacks unless he has again com-
promised more nodes than the threshold value.
Likewise, the sensor nodes may be reprogrammed to support additional security mech-
anisms, e.g., an IDS system is ex post installed on the nodes. In certain cases it may be
possible to reprogram compromised nodes to remove the malicious code.
Mechanisms tolerating node compromise can be used to implement the second form of
recovery. The above mentioned threshold schemes are typical examples. As long as an
adversary has compromised less nodes than the threshold value, the functionality of the
WSN still remains. It is also possible to consider these mechanisms as preventive since
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they prevent the effect of the insider attack. However, the insider attack by itself is not
prevented.
Additional mechanisms may be necessary, e.g., new nodes must be added to regain
coverage in areas where many nodes have died or have been excluded. Thus, deployed
security mechanisms, such as key management, must support the addition of new sensor
nodes during runtime of the WSN. Furthermore, it may be necessary that the sink
sends new queries after the detection of invalid reports and exclusion of the responsible
compromised nodes.
3.2 Detailed Description of Security Mechanisms
In this section, we describe the security mechanisms implementing the above mentioned
security strategies in detail, give an overview of related work, and present the most
challenging open problems in the respective area.
3.2.1 Mechanisms Increasing the Effort for Node Compromise
Mechanisms increasing the effort an adversary has to spent to successfully compromise
sensor nodes can be seen, similar to system hardening [81] of operating systems, as a
basic principle in securing WSNs. These mechanisms exacerbate the access to hardware
and software components of a sensor. The goal is to maximize the required time, cost,
knowledge, technical resources etc.
The required effort to access the sensor node hardware can be increased by some ba-
sic mechanisms. First, a cover, which is difficult to remove, protects the sensor board.
Next, mechanisms are applied which prevent an adversary from misusing the program-
ming interfaces (e.g., USB, serial, or JTAG (Joint Test Action Group)) to read/write
data from/to the node. Therefore, interfaces have to be removed, disabled, or protected,
e.g., by passwords. Likewise, the bootstrap loader is protected by mechanisms such as
passwords. Another way to access a sensor node is over-the-air (OTA) programming
which could also be exploited by an adversary. Thus, OTA has to be disabled if not
required, or mechanisms such as authenticated code updates have to be applied. Fur-
thermore, software-based mechanisms can prevent an adversary from learning from a
node compromise to facilitate future node compromises. For example, if all nodes store
the cryptographic keys at the same location in the memory, then an adversary just has
to read out this specific location after identifying it once.
These mechanisms may be sufficient to prevent an adversary with rather limited re-
sources to compromise a sensor node. In addition, even a powerful adversary requires
some time to compromise a sensor node. This enables security mechanisms to assume a
secure initialization phase [270, 8] and enable a practical use of threshold schemes.
Related Work
Hartung et al. [100] showed that it is possible to compromise a sensor node in less than
one minute if no precautions, such as disabling the programming interfaces, are taken.
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Becher et al. [15] investigate physical attacks on sensor nodes and present countermea-
sures, such as disabling the JTAG interface. In [5], a code obfuscation mechanism for
WSNs is proposed to improve the resilience to node compromise. The goal is a diversi-
fied key protection scheme for WSNs that diversifies data and code segments by creating
different and obfuscated data and code segments for each sensor node in the network.
Thus, compromising one node does not decrease the time to compromise another node.
Open Problems
Currently available hardware are mostly research platforms and are not designed with
security in focus. The nodes provide interfaces which are easy to access and which allow
a fast (re-)programming making them unsuitable for many real applications with high
security requirements. Future sensor platforms have to be designed with considering
node compromise and provide mechanisms that increase the effort for an adversary. The
most challenging problem is to realize this at a very low price. Obfuscation techniques
are also only able to slightly increase the effort for an adversary [13].
Although sensor nodes should be as cheap as possible, in certain scenarios it may be
worthwhile to equip the sensor nodes (or at least a few of them) with tamper-resistant
hardware. This might be reasonable in scenarios such as health care, where only a
limited number of sensor nodes are used and there is a high demand for security. Further
research is required to investigate the applicability of tamper-resistant hardware, such
as the TPM (see Section 2.4) in WSNs.
3.2.2 Mechanisms Making Node Compromise Virtually Infeasible
An adversary can be prevented from successfully performing insider attacks by making
node compromise virtually infeasible. Without the cryptographic keys stored on a sensor
node, an adversary cannot appear as a legitimate node of the WSN. Thus, mechanisms
are required which protect these keys.
In general, an adversary must be impeded from recovering the keys either by perform-
ing attacks over the wireless channel and/or by physically compromising sensor nodes.
The former requires that the applied software and protocols are not susceptible to
malware or buffer overflow attacks. Furthermore, potentially applied OTA programming
mechanisms must be secured to prevent unauthorized access to sensor nodes. In addition,
the applied cryptographic mechanisms and key length must be appropriate to achieve
the desired security level for the application scenario of a WSN.
The latter requires a physical protection of sensor nodes. This could be easily achieved
by deploying sensor nodes in a physically protected area. If the sensor nodes cannot be
accessed by the adversary, they cannot be compromised. An example is a mobile WSN
in a harbor where the sensor nodes are deployed inside locked containers. An adversary
needs to break into a container before he is able to compromise a sensor node.
However, this approach is not possible in the majority of cases since sensor nodes
are often deployed in unattended and hostile areas where an adversary can physically
access the nodes. To prevent an adversary from compromising the sensor nodes, tamper-
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resistant hardware, which is resistant to side channel attacks [81, 9, 10, 128], can be used.
This hardware can either protect the whole sensor node or only parts of the node. Since
the protection of all components of a sensor node is extremely difficult and occasions large
costs, only security relevant parts may be protected. For example, the TPM (cf. Section
2.4) can be used to provide secure storage for cryptographic keys, and a secure execution
environment for cryptographic operations. Thus, an adversary that has “compromised”
a sensor node cannot misuse this node to perform insider attacks since he has no access
to the keys. However, since TPMs are too cost-intensive, they cannot be used in many
WSN scenarios. Especially in large scale WSNs, it is not reasonable to equip all sensor
nodes with a TPM. In certain scenarios, however, it might be reasonable to equip only
a few nodes which perform some special tasks and require additional protection with a
TPM.
Alternatively, hardware which provides tamper-resistance up to a certain extent may
be used in certain scenarios. This may be achieved in scenarios where the lifetime of
a WSN is shorter than the time an adversary requires to compromise some unknown
proprietary hardware. For example, the MarathonNet [182] presented in Section 2.1.4
is used only for a couple of hours during the marathon. The design and development of
the sensor hardware is specifically conducted for this purpose. Thus, an adversary has
only the limited time of the marathon to analyze the hard- and software and to create
a code image with its malicious code. However, if the same hardware is used again in
the future and the adversary steals one of the sensor nodes, the adversary has sufficient
time to prepare his attack for the future.
Related Work
Building tamper-resistant hardware, attacks on it, and protection techniques have been
intensively investigated especially in the area of smartcards, e.g., [9, 10, 128]. However,
only little research has been performed on using tamper-resistant hardware in WSNs.
In an unpublished work [87], Ganeriwal et al. propose to equip some of the nodes in a
WSN with a TPM for secure key management.
Open Problems
Most cryptosystems used in WSNs are in general resistant to cryptoanalysis. However,
the research community currently assumes a key length of 64 bit for symmetric encryp-
tion/decryption, MAC computation, and hash calculations. Using 64 bit for symmet-
ric encryption/decryption provides a level 2 protection, i.e., very short-term protection
against small organizations, as defined in [192]. To resist until year 2010, one may con-
sider a key size of at least 75 – 80 bit for symmetric systems [192]. Thus, WSNs that
have a longer operation time should use longer key sizes as the usually used 64 bit al-
though it increases the energy consumption. Therefore, the recommendations presented
in [147, 146] or [192] should be taken into account.
Hash functions are commonly used as security primitives in WSNs. In general, a hash
function provides three properties: (1) preimage resistance, (2) second-preimage resis-
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tance, and (3) collision resistance [167]. According to [192], the minimum size of a hash
in the year 2010 should be 155 bit. This is much higher than the usually assumed 64 bit
in WSNs. However, the collision resistance property is often not required. A successful
attack on collision resistance does not break the security of the applied mechanisms or
protocols. As a result, a shorter bitlength of the hash values can be assumed. Hash
functions providing collision resistance have hash values roughly twice the bitlength of
one-way function providing only preimage and second-preimage resistance [167]. Thus, if
only preimage and second-preimage resistance is required, half of the bitlength as stated
in [192] can be used2.
We argue that the key length depends on the desired level of security and the operation
time of the WSN. A WSN for disaster recovery that is deployed only for a few hours
may use short key sizes since an adversary may not have enough time to break the keys.
The major problem of tamper-resistant hardware is the higher costs. In large scale
WSNs it might be possible to equip only some of the sensor nodes with tamper-resistant
hardware which requires new security protocols for heterogeneous WSNs. Likewise;
new efficient security protocols for small scale WSNs are required, where all nodes are
equipped with tamper-resistant hardware.
Another area of future research is the development of mechanisms that do not require
additional tamper-resistant hardware. For example, sensor nodes can detect by them-
selves that they are removed from the WSN by an adversary and then delete all stored
cryptographic keys. However, this does not protect from on-site compromise and is not
applicable in mobile WSNs or when sensor nodes can be moved.
3.2.3 Mechanisms to Detect Manipulated Data
In certain scenarios it might not be possible, or desired, to directly detect compromised
sensor nodes. Instead, the detection of insider attacks relies on the detection of manipu-
lated data using some IDS techniques (see Section 3.1.2). For example, in an aggregation
scenario the information which node has sent which measurement is lost after the aggre-
gation. However, it might still be possible to detect that an insider attack has occurred
by performing plausibility checks. Another example is a WSN that is deployed to send
alarm messages in case of a certain event. The lifetime of such a WSN is usually very
long and it is relatively unlikely that sensor nodes will be compromised since the WSN is
not a typical target for an adversary. Thus, the detection of compromised sensor nodes
is not (yet) desired since a constant monitoring would be to resource intensive. False
alarms are accepted, and if a false alarm occurs, unnecessary reactions, e.g., firefighters
react on a fire alarm, are also accepted. Only after the false alarm a detection pro-
cess is triggered to identify the compromised sensor node(s). After identification, the
compromised nodes are excluded.
2This assumption should only be made in such resource constrained systems such as WSNs. In non-
constrained systems, collision-resistant hash functions with the appropriate bitlength should be used.
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Since for most scenarios the detection of compromised nodes is more advantageous,
most works in the area of detecting insider attacks concentrate on this aspect (see Section
3.2.4).
Related Work
The detection of manipulated data introduced by adversaries is particularly relevant
in data aggregation schemes. Once the sink receives aggregated data, it verifies their
validity through mechanisms such as sampling or redundant sensor nodes. Yang et
al. [259] propose SDAP: A Secure Hop-by-Hop Data Aggregation Protocol for Sensor
Networks. The basic idea is that the sink can detect anomalies in the aggregates. After
the detection of an anomaly, the sink identifies the potentially compromised sensor nodes
and these nodes must send their measured data and aggregates directly to the sink. So
the aggregation is cancelled ex post. The aggregation schemes presented in [188, 44, 75,
108] are additional examples that detect malicious data but cannot identify where the
malicious data is introduced and which node is responsible for it.
The Statistical En-Route Filtering Scheme [261], used to cope with PDoS attacks,
enables en-route nodes to verify that the data has been tampered with and to filter
these manipulated data out.
Open Problems
Since insider attacks are not stopped by mechanisms that only try to detect manipulated
data, additional mechanisms are required to identify the compromised nodes and to
choose an appropriate recovery strategy.
3.2.4 Mechanisms to Detect Compromised Nodes
In Section 2.2.3 we distinguished between two types of node compromise: (1) Read-only
Compromise and (2) Read-and-Write Compromise. The type of compromise strongly
affects the difficulty to detect compromised nodes.
The detection of a read-only compromise is very difficult since the node neither has
been modified nor seems to behave maliciously. Mechanisms could exploit the actions
of the adversary during the compromise, e.g., neighboring nodes detect that a node has
been removed, turned off for reprogramming or has been deployed at a different location.
However, these approaches may only be applicable in stationary WSNs.
The detection of a read-and-write compromise is more likely. A less practicable method
is a direct physical verification of the sensor nodes in the deployment area by verifying if
a sensor node has been tampered with. However, this might only be possible for certain
scenarios and very small WSNs. Other possibilities are either based on misbehavior de-
tection or on attestation mechanisms. Misbehavior-based detection uses IDS techniques
to identify compromised nodes. Attestation techniques address node compromise at its
root by directly detecting that the code on a sensor node has been modified. Both ap-
proaches could be combined to achieve higher detection accuracy and lower false positive
rate, e.g., misbehavior detection may trigger code attestation.
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Node compromise detection can be performed by neighboring nodes, the sink, or
designated nodes such as cluster heads or aggregation nodes. The designated nodes
may also be equipped with tamper-resistant hardware. Since misbehavior detection
mostly relies on direct observations, typically neighbors monitor each other to detect
node compromise. However, some mechanisms may also enable the sink or a designated
node to detect that a certain node is misbehaving. Detection mechanisms based on
attestation may be performed by any node. However, some approaches work only reliably
if a neighboring node performs the attestation.
Related Work
In the context of attestation in WSNs, a number of software-based approaches have been
presented that rely on optimal program code and exact time measurement [211, 210, 209,
208]. A highly optimized program verification routine is executed to verify the memory
of a sensor node. The routine is invoked by the attestor by sending a pseudo-random
number as a challenge to calculate a hash value by traversing the memory space in a
pseudo-random fashion. The probability is very high that a modification in the memory
will be detected. The hash value computed on a compromised node will either be wrong,
or the execution time of the routine will be longer than normal. Thus, a compromised
node is detected. In [213] a similar approach is presented that relies on code obfuscation
and time measurement. A randomized attestation routine is sent to a sensor node to
traverse its memory. If an adversary analyzes and modifies the routine, this would take
much longer and thus, a compromised node would be detected.
Park et al. propose a Program-Integrity Verification (PIV) protocol [176]. It uses
PIV servers (PIVS) that verify the integrity of the program of the sensor. For each
verification a PIVS creates a new randomized hash function and sends it to the sensor
node in a PIV code (PIVC). The PIVC computes a hash value on the program and sends
it back to PIVS which verifies the hash value. The protocol also requires a certain time
threshold for the attestation. Chang et al. propose an extension to PIV in [45]. They
propose a distributed authentication protocol to reduce the communication traffic and
the energy consumption for authenticating the PIVSs. Yang et al. propose two schemes
for distributed software-based attestation in [260]. Problematic with the approaches
presented by Park, Chang, and Yang is the possibility of a simple attack if the sensor
hardware is based on a Harvard Architecture3. Due to the fact that code and data
segment are separated and the data segment is much larger than the code segment,
an adversary may easily copy the entire original program to the data segment, add its
own malicious code to the code segment and perform a successful attestation using the
original program code stored in the data segment. If no exact time measurement is
performed, like in the above mentioned works, the adversary is always able to perform
a successful attestation.
Misbehavior-based detection has been intensively investigated. Many schemes have
been proposed to detect compromised nodes attacking the routing infrastructure in wire-
3Nearly all currently available sensor platforms are based on a Harvard Architecture, e.g., the Berkeley
Mica Motes.
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less ad-hoc networks, e.g., Watchdog [163], Control Messages [143], Neighborhood Watch
[30], Statistical Anomaly Detection [268], or Local Intrusion Detection System [6]. Some
of these mechanisms are also used in WSNs, especially Watchdog has been often proposed
to use in WSNs. IDS in WSNs have been investigated in [57, 199, 165, 175, 2, 85, 11, 171].
Lee et al. propose an alternate path routing scheme that is also able to detect and ex-
clude sensor nodes performing a selective forwarding attack [145]. A reputation-based
framework for sensor networks, where nodes maintain reputation for other nodes and
use it to evaluate their trustworthiness, is presented by Ganeriwal et al. in [88]. Another
general framework for identifying compromised nodes is proposed by Zhang et al. [265].
It utilizes an alert-based detection where sensor nodes report alerts to the sink. The
sink evaluates the alerts using an observability graph to decide whether a node is com-
promised or not. The detection of node replication or node clone attacks is addressed
in [178, 51, 48]. A protocol to detect compromised beacon nodes for secure location
discovery is proposed in [154]. A possible approach to detect read-only compromise is
proposed by Song et al. [219]. They assume that an adversary is not able to deploy a
compromised sensor node back to the original position. Thus, the detection of location
change will become an indication of a potential node compromise.
Open Problems
Although a lot of research has been performed in detecting compromised sensor nodes,
there still exist much room for improvement. The reasons for this are the severe resource
constraints of the sensor nodes and the unreliable wireless channel. As a result, detection
schemes, especially based on misbehavior detection, are very unreliable. In addition,
these schemes usually require intensive monitoring of neighboring nodes which is very
energy consuming, e.g., neighboring nodes permanently monitor each other’s message
forwarding behavior to detect selective forwarding attacks. Thus, new concepts are
required to efficiently detect compromised nodes without wasting energy by intensive
monitoring. Furthermore, mechanisms for misbehavior detection nearly always address
only specific attacks since they are signature-based. Thus, they do not support the
detection of unknown attacks. An attestation approach, however, addresses arbitrary
node compromise at its root by verifying that a sensor node has been tampered with.
However, the proposed software-based attestation techniques [211, 210, 209, 208, 213]
rely on optimal program code and exact time measurement. These approaches are not
applicable in multihop WSNs, since they require an authenticated communication chan-
nel between the verifier and the attestor, and rely on minimal time fluctuations. The
multihop communication and external influences, e.g., weather conditions, may seriously
influence the time to send the attestation messages between the entities performing the
attestation. The approaches proposed in [176, 45, 260] are additionally susceptible to the
above mentioned copy attack. Furthermore, all software-based attestation approaches
do not work if the adversary modifies the hardware by, e.g., attaching more memory, or
a more powerful CPU. Likewise, all approaches are not resistant against relay attacks,
where an adversary relays the attestation requests to a more powerful machine.
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The software-based attestation techniques and the direct physical verification have
an additional drawback. If an adversary knows the schedule of the verifications, he
may reprogram the nodes with the original code just before the verification, and later
reprogram the nodes with the malicious code. However, in large scale WSNs this might
not be practicable for the adversary.
3.2.5 Mechanisms to Exclude Compromised Sensor Nodes
After a sensor node is identified as being compromised, this node should be excluded from
the network to stop this node from causing damage to the WSN. Therefore, mechanisms
are required to revoke the (symmetric) cryptographic keys of compromised sensor nodes
and remove the nodes from the routing tables.
Key revocation protocols can be divided in two types: centralized or distributed key
revocation protocols [39]. In the centralized approach, upon detection of a compromised
node, the sink broadcasts a revocation message to all sensor nodes that need to exclude
the compromised node. The revocation message either contains the node identifier of
the compromised node, or the entire key ring that have to be removed. In distributed
revocation, the revocation decision is made by the neighbors of a compromised node.
Therefore, a voting scheme can be applied to decide whether to revoke a given node
or not. Advantageous of distributed revocation is the lower overhead, i.e., only local
broadcast messages are required which results in a faster exclusion of a compromised
node, and the absence of a single point of failure. However, this approach is more
complex and error prone. In general, key revocation protocols must solve two major
challenges. First, since they are carried out in the presence of active adversaries, the key
revocation protocol has to achieve revocation of sensor nodes that are compromised by an
adversary despite the active participation of that adversary in the protocol. Second, the
protocol must be efficient w.r.t. energy, i.e., rely on very simple cryptographic operations.
After the keys of a sensor node are revoked, the routing tables of the sink and the
remaining sensor nodes are updated by removing the node identifier of the compromised
node. If necessary, new routes are calculated. Thus, the compromised node is nei-
ther chosen as a forwarding node, nor packets from this node are accepted for further
processing.
Related Work
In contrast to key distribution, key revocation has not been investigated intensively.
Centralized revocation schemes are presented by Eschenauer and Gligor [84], and Dini
and Savino [69]. A distributed revocation scheme is proposed by Chan et al. [43].
In [39], Chan et al. present an overview of key-distribution methods in WSNs, e.g.,
[43, 155, 76, 84, 152], and their salient features to provide context for understanding
key and node revocation. They define basic properties that distributed sensor node
revocation protocols must satisfy and present a protocol for distributed node revocation
that satisfies these properties under general assumptions and a standard attacker model.
In [160], several techniques, structures and algorithms for key revocation are presented.
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Kim et al. propose a key revocation scheme for mobile WSNs [125]. In [266], Zhang et
al. propose a group re-keying scheme for filtering schemes such as [261, 272] to exclude
compromised key rings.
Lee et al. propose SeRINS (a Secure alternate path Routing IN Sensor networks) to
detect and isolate compromised nodes which try to inject inconsistent routing informa-
tion [145].
Revocation messages are usually broadcasted. To achieve authenticated broadcasts,
an asymmetric mechanism is required, i.e., only the sender can sign messages, and the
receiver can only verify messages. This prevents an adversary from impersonating the
sink and from successfully injecting false revocation messages. This can be achieved
either by digital signatures or by µTESLA [181] and its variations.
Digital signatures are usually generated using public key cryptography such as ECC
[127] or RSA [197]. Continues efforts have been performed to improve ECC for WSNs,
e.g., [99]. However, as already mentioned in Section 2.3, asymmetric cryptographic
mechanisms are significantly more computationally expensive than symmetric ones. In
[212], [193] and [194], broadcast authentication schemes based on public key cryptogra-
phy are proposed that are adapted to the resource constraints of WSNs. However, they
still require significantly more energy than symmetric approaches. Alternatively, digi-
tal signatures can be based on one-time signature (OTS) schemes. Luk et al. present
a broadcast authentication protocol in [159] that enable immediate authentication of
broadcast messages and is based on Merkle-Winternitz OTS. Another scheme based on
OTS is presented in [46]. The scheme proposed in [42] enables broadcast authentication
in hierarchically organized networks by building hash-trees where sensor nodes collabo-
ratively verify broadcast messages by recomputing the hash-tree.
The µTESLA protocol, proposed by Perrig et al. [181], uses only efficient symmetric
primitives and achieves asymmetry by a delayed disclosure of cryptographic keys. It is
based on TESLA [180, 179] and adapted to the special properties of WSNs. Extensions
to µTESLA have been proposed, e.g., in [151, 153, 156] and [106]. A similar scheme
based on delayed disclosure is presented in [97]. Schemes for local broadcasts between
neighboring sensor nodes based on µTESLA are proposed in [126] and [74]. A variant
of µTESLA that enables immediate authentication of the broadcast messages sent at
regular and predictable times is proposed in [159].
Protocols to mitigate DoS attacks on broadcast authentication schemes based on
digital signature schemes such as ECDSA are proposed in [79, 239, 71]. Ning et al.
[172] introduce message-specific puzzle to mitigate DoS attacks on signature-based and
µTESLA-based broadcast authentication.
Open Problems
The major problems of key revocation lie in the area of efficient, reliable, and secure
broadcast. An adversary who jams or delays broadcast messages may interrupt the re-
vocation messages to some part of the network and remain active there. Simply flooding
[91] the WSN in an authenticated way may be a solution, which however, introduces a
large communication overhead. This approach may only be possible in scenarios where
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revocation events are rare, such that the costs associated with simple flooding are com-
pensated with the security benefits of node revocation.
Already proposed broadcast authentication protocols have all their advantages and
disadvantages. Digital signatures such as ECDSA provide a high resilience to node
compromise. On the other hand they are computational much more intensive which
requires much more energy than mechanisms based on symmetric primitives. They are
also susceptible to DoS attacks where an adversary sends false broadcast packets to force
sensor nodes to perform expensive signature verifications. Digital signatures based on
OTS and symmetric primitives require fewer computations but inherit a large signature
size which requires more energy in message transmission. Efficiently, only very short
(about 8 bit) messages can be signed. Thus, these schemes cannot be used in every
scenario. µTESLA-based broadcast authentication has the advantage of being very
efficient. However, it does not support immediate authentication. DoS attacks are also
possible where an adversary forces sensor nodes to perform expensive packet forwarding
by injecting many false broadcast messages.
The proposed different approaches of key revocation all have their advantages and
disadvantages. The centralized approach requires the sink to broadcast a revocation
message. The forwarding of the message requires some time and is energy consuming.
In addition, the sink may be a single point of failure. In contrast, distributed revocation
should be faster, as it requires predominantly only local broadcast messages, and avoids
a single point of failure. However, it is inherently more complex and prone to design
errors than centralized revocation.
Mechanisms using a centralized approach to exclude compromised nodes have the
disadvantage that the exclusion process is not immediately. For example, if the sink
receives information about potentially compromised nodes, invokes a decision process,
and finally broadcasts a revocation message, this takes some time. In contrast, however,
if exclusion of sensor nodes is locally decided, compromised nodes can be immediately
excluded.
3.2.6 Adaptable Mechanisms
Recovery can be achieved by using adaptable mechanisms. These mechanisms can be
either used to adapt to expected conditions, or to react on different or changed condi-
tions. For example, a threshold-based mechanism is adapted to the expected application
scenario and conditions, e.g., the threshold value is adapted to the expected number
of node compromises. However, if the conditions change, it may be necessary to adapt
the threshold value, e.g., increasing it after the detection of insider attacks. Thus, the
adversary might be impeded from continuing the insider attack; at least as long as he
has not compromised more nodes than the threshold value again.
Furthermore, it may be necessary to deploy new sensor nodes to react on node failures.
Thus, security mechanisms, such as key management, must be adaptable to new or
mobile sensor nodes.
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Related Work
Most threshold schemes, e.g., [261, 272, 258, 257, 267, 129] may be adapted by broad-
casting new parameters using one of the broadcast authentication schemes presented
in Section 3.2.5. Key management schemes such as [181, 84, 43, 155, 76] support the
addition of new nodes directly.
Open Problems
The major problem is a secure and reliable ex post adaption. Authenticated broadcast
mechanisms (with the issues mentioned in Section 3.2.5) are required to prevent an
adversary from injecting false reconfiguration messages. However, due to the wireless
multihop communication, an adversary may be able to drop messages or jam the wireless
channel to prevent nodes from receiving the messages.
3.2.7 Mechanisms to Reprogram (Compromised) Sensor Nodes
In many WSNs the program code of the sensor nodes is pre-configured and not changed
during the lifetime of the network. However, in certain scenarios, e.g., health care with
only a limited number of expensive sensor nodes, it might be reasonable to perform
a code update of the sensor nodes. A manually code update is often not possible for
many reasons, e.g., there are too many sensor nodes, some sensor nodes are mobile, or
the exact location of the nodes is not known. Thus, sensor nodes are reprogrammed
over the air (OTA) by broadcasting the code update to all sensor nodes. Since the code
update may be relatively large, this is very energy consuming. However, in WSNs with a
long lifetime, a code update may be reasonable to react on new conditions. For example,
if the WSN was developed without considering the occurrences of insider attacks and
now insider attacks happen, a code update containing an IDS module may be installed
on the sensor nodes. The code update mechanisms must be secure, i.e., the authenticity,
integrity, and, where required, confidentiality of the code update must be provided. This
prevents an adversary from misusing the OTA programming to inject his own malicious
code. Furthermore, mechanisms to “heal” sensor nodes by performing a code update to
remove malicious code are desired.
Related Work
In the area of code update in WSNs, a number of protocols have been proposed. These
protocols include Deluge [115] which is the de facto TinyOS [233] network program-
ming system, Multihop Over-the-Air Programming [230], Trickle [149], Infuse [134], and
Multihop Network Reprogramming Service [135]. However, these approaches have been
developed in the context of efficiency and reliability and assume a trustworthy envi-
ronment. Deng et al. attempt to secure code updates by using Merkle hash trees and
hash chains to authenticate the code distribution [66]. Sluice, proposed by Lanigan et
al. [138], also uses hash chains to secure the code update. In [80], Dutta et al. pro-
posed an approach to secure Deluge. However, these approaches only address the issue
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of authenticating the code updates from the sink at the receiver side. Seshadri et al.
proposed SCUBA [209] to enable the sink to verify that the receiver indeed applied the
code update. SCUBA enables the detection of compromised nodes and either repairs
them through code updates, or revokes the compromised nodes. Strasser et al. [224]
proposed an autonomous and distributed recovery algorithm. The algorithm enables
code update, reset, or shutdown of failed or malicious nodes.
Open Problems
The major issue of all reprogramming mechanisms is the required energy to forward
the code update along multiple hops to all nodes in the network and the required time
to perform the code update. However, if updates are only performed infrequently, this
approach is still reasonable.
Future research is required in the area of healing or self-healing of sensor nodes from
node compromise. The SCUBA protocol is a first step in this direction. However, an
active adversary who is aware of the protocol may prevent a successful code update with
the original code. Thus, new approaches must be developed, e.g., using tamper-resistant
hardware.
3.2.8 Mechanisms Tolerating Node Compromise
The term tolerance is known from fault tolerance [189] or Byzantine fault tolerance
[137, 37]. Fault tolerance describes the property that a system is able to continue op-
erating, possibly at a reduced level (also known as graceful degradation), rather than
failing completely, when some part of the system fails. For example, in a classical com-
puter system the throughput of a server is reduced or the response time is increased.
Thus, the system as a whole is not stopped due to failure of parts of the system. A
Byzantine fault tolerant system is able to defend against a Byzantine failure, i.e., an
arbitrary failure. However, failures can be also caused by intruders. In the context of
wired networks, intrusion tolerant mechanisms have been studied, e.g., based on thresh-
old public-key cryptography [251, 31]. However, these mechanisms cannot be directly
transferred to WSNs because of different properties and threats in WSNs. The scarce
resource constraints inhibit intensive usage of public-key cryptography, and the wireless
channel enables an adversary to eavesdrop, modify packets, inject packets etc. However,
certain properties of WSNs enable efficient mechanisms which tolerate node compromise
and the resulting insider attacks.
In general, mechanisms tolerating node compromise have the goal to mitigate the
impact of node compromise, i.e., the resulting insider attacks have only little or no
impact on the functionality of the WSN. Mechanisms based on threshold schemes are
commonly used which exploit the redundancy property of most WSNs. For example,
messages are sent along multiple paths to the sink, i.e., even if a compromised en-route
node drops certain messages, there is a high probability that the message still reaches
the sink using a different route. Thus, even in the presence of an active adversary,
the WSN is able to perform its tasks. However, these schemes are only secure up to a
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certain threshold of compromised sensor nodes. Alternatively, graceful degradation can
be achieved by restricting the possibilities of a sensor node. Thus, an adversary can only
exploit these possibilities. For example, if a sensor node is only able to generate valid
reports for its local position, an adversary cannot misuse this node to generate reports
appearing from other locations in the WSN. Thus, the impact of a node compromise is
limited to the region of the compromise.
Another simple example for a threshold-based intrusion tolerant mechanism is the
above described use of the MEDIAN instead of the AVERAGE in an aggregation sce-
nario. The MEDIAN provides resistance against false data injection attacks up to a
certain threshold of compromised nodes. This threshold depends on how many values
are used to generate the MEDIAN.
Toleration mechanisms have the advantages that they are often easier to implement
and that they require less resources than more sophisticated techniques such as detection
mechanisms. In addition, they might be easily adaptable to different requirements, e.g.,
the threshold value of a threshold scheme can be adjusted according to the number of
compromised sensor nodes. Toleration mechanisms are also a good candidate to be used
to extend other more sophisticated mechanisms to increase the overall achieved level of
security.
Related Work
Key management is of great importance to build mechanisms tolerating node compro-
mise. If a single network wide key is shared by all sensor nodes, a single node compromise
would break the entire security of the WSN. Ideally, a sensor node stores only the keys
for its own links. This could be realized either by using public key cryptography (where
the adversary gains only access to the private key of that node) or a Key Distribution
Center (KDC) based approach, e.g., [181], where the symmetric keys are established
through a trusted base station similar to Kerberos [223] (where the adversary gets only
access to the symmetric keys related to the compromised node). However, both ap-
proaches are very resource intensive. We discussed the resource consumption of public
key cryptography in Section 2.3.1 and obviously, the KDC approach introduces a signifi-
cant communication overhead. Thus, key management schemes make a tradeoff between
node compromise tolerance and security by storing additional keys on a node to facili-
tate key establishment. In PIKE [41], other nodes are used as trusted intermediaries to
perform key establishment between neighboring nodes. Many schemes rely on key pre-
distribution [24], i.e., sensor nodes are pre-configured with some keys in such a way that
neighboring or each potential group of nodes share a common key. Deterministic key
predistribution schemes are proposed in [142, 38]. The random key pre-distribution pro-
tocols [84, 43, 116, 155, 76, 215] rely on probabilistic key sharing among nodes enabling
a shared-key connectivity with high probability. However, an adversary compromising
one node also gets access to keys from other nodes and links in different areas of the
WSN. Thus, the adversary can perform attacks, e.g., eavesdropping, also on these links.
Nevertheless, these schemes still provide intrusion tolerance, but at a reduced level. A
different way to tolerate node compromise is used in the LEAP protocol proposed by
62 CHAPTER 3. CLASSIFICATION
Zhu et al. [270, 271]. Multiple keying mechanisms are used to establish four different
keys. Depending on whom the sensor node is communicating with, the appropriate key
is used. The protocol mitigates the impact of a node compromise to the immediate net-
work neighborhood of the compromised node, i.e., an adversary may get only access to
keys which a node shares with neighboring sensor nodes. Overviews of key management
can be found for example in [36] and [39].
To address false data injection and PDoS attacks many schemes have been proposed
[261, 272, 258, 257, 267]. A threshold scheme is used in [261, 272, 258] where [258]
and [267] additionally mitigate the impact of a node compromise to the location of the
compromise.
The One-Time Sensors [17, 86] concept also addresses false data injection attacks to
deceive the sink. The basic idea of this concept is to allow a sensor node to send only
one single report to the sink. After that, this node acts only as a router and forwards
messages of other nodes. Thus, an adversary compromising one node is only able to
inject one false message.
Secure aggregation is addressed for example in [188, 21, 23, 19]. The framework pre-
sented in [188] has the goal to ensure that the aggregated result is a good approximation
to the true value in the presence of a small number of compromised nodes. In [21],
ESAWN is proposed which implements a security-energy trade-off and is able to tolerate
multiple compromised nodes.
Compromised sensor nodes can easily affect the routing in WSNs. Thus, routing
mechanisms should be able to tolerate a certain number of compromised sensor nodes.
For example, to address selective forwarding attacks, [90], [62] and [59] use multipath
routing where a message is sent along multiple paths to achieve a high probability that
the message reaches the sink. Likewise, INSENS [60, 61, 65] uses redundant multipath
routing and bypasses malicious nodes.
Open Problems
Key management is still the key issue in building mechanisms tolerating node compro-
mise. The contradictory terms, efficiency and resilience to node compromise need to be
harmonized. Public-key cryptography would provide a perfect resilience to node com-
promise but is (still) too inefficient. Currently proposed mechanisms sacrifice resilience
to node compromise to achieve greater efficiency.
One major drawback of many protocols is the requirement of threshold schemes. The
security of these schemes totally breaks down if an adversary compromises greater or
equal nodes than the threshold value. Thus, new mechanisms are required that minimize
the benefit for an adversary for a successful node compromise without relying on a
threshold scheme. For example as realized in the One-Time Sensor scheme [17, 86]
addressing false data injection attack.
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3.3 Summary
Insider attacks are a serious threat in WSNs and require sophisticated approaches to
cope with them. In this section, we have systematically classified the different ways
to cope with insider attacks in WSNs. For this purpose, we have introduced a new
two-tiered classification. The approaches have been classified based on the pursued
security strategy. We distinguish between prevention, detection, or recovery strategy.
The strategies can be implemented by different types of mechanisms. We have classified
these types of mechanisms based on their key characteristics. The current state of
research has been integrated in our classification to identify challenging open problems
and areas of future research.
The major problem of mechanisms implementing a prevention strategy is that re-
source constraints, the possibility of node compromise, and cost factors make preven-
tative mechanisms very difficult to realize in WSNs. Mechanisms increasing the effort
for node compromise are only basic mechanisms and can only prevent a very limited
adversary from compromising a sensor node. To prevent an adversary from successfully
performing insider attacks, he must be impeded from accessing the cryptographic keys
stored on the node. The only reliable way to achieve this are mechanisms that make
node compromise infeasible, e.g., using tamper-resistant hardware. However, because of
the increasing cost, this approach is not possible in the majority of applications. In large-
scale WSNs it is not possible to equip all sensor nodes with tamper-resistant hardware.
In general one can state that in WSNs prevention is hard to achieve and predominantly
mechanisms implementing a Detection or Recovery strategy are used in WSNs. However,
some form of Prevention can be achieved by Detection and Recovery mechanisms. For
example, if a compromised node performing an insider attack is detected and excluded
by its neighboring nodes, further insider attacks are prevented. But the node compro-
mise and the initial insider attacks are not prevented a priori and thus, we classify this
as Recovery since a “healing” process is invoked.
The properties of WSNs also complicate the development of mechanisms implementing
a detection strategy. Misbehavior-based detection usually requires intensive monitoring
of neighboring sensor nodes. This is very energy consuming since sensor nodes must
overhear many messages and cannot go into sleep mode during monitoring. Thus, more
sophisticated mechanisms are required enabling detection without intensive monitoring.
An additional problem of misbehavior-based detection is that in WSN usually only known
attacks are detected. To overcome this shortcoming, attestation-based mechanisms can
be used. However, current software-based attestation techniques are not suitable for
multihop communication and are also susceptible to certain easy to perform attacks.
Thus, new attestation techniques for WSNs are required.
Recovery is often achieved by implementing mechanisms tolerating node compromise.
For this purpose, threshold schemes are used that are secure up to a certain number of
compromised sensor nodes. If the threshold is reached, the security totally breaks down.
Furthermore, many recovery mechanisms to exclude compromised nodes do not provide
immediate exclusion of compromised nodes. Thus, efficient exclusion mechanisms based
on local decisions are required.
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Additional research is required in the area of efficient, reliable, authenticated broad-
cast. Current mechanisms require too much energy, are susceptible against certain DoS
attacks, or are only applicable in certain application scenarios.
In the next chapters, we present the main contributions of this thesis. Based on the
results of our classification, we propose several protocols addressing identified problems.
We consider two areas in this thesis.
First, we consider resource constrained WSNs which perform the principle application
of a WSN: a query is sent to the WSN, according to the query is a measurement of
some physical phenomena performed, a report is generated, and the generated report
is transmitted back to the sink. For this scenario, we propose several protocols to
address the application layer insider attacks false data injection, PDoS, and FEDoS (cf.
Section 2.2.4) while considering the above identified problems. The proposed protocols
implement mechanisms which pursue detection and recovery strategies. The protocols
are presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
Second, we examine how to achieve prevention (and detection) of insider attacks for
high-security WSN scenarios with lower cost constraints. To achieve prevention, we
propose to equip a minority of sensor nodes with tamper-resistant hardware in hybrid
WSNs. These specially protected sensor nodes are used to perform special tasks such as
key management, localization, time synchronization, etc. Furthermore, we propose two
efficient attestation protocols for these hybrid WSNs enabling “ordinary” sensor nodes
(which can be multiple hops away) to detect that an adversary has tried to tamper with
a special node. Just like the software-based attestation protocols, our approach also
addresses node compromise detection at its root by directly detecting software manipu-
lations on the sensor node. In contrast to software-based attestation, our protocols are
also able to perform detection if sensor nodes are multiple hops away. Our results are
presented in Chapter 7.
Before we describe our proposed protocols in detail, we present the system model we
assume for our proposed protocols in Chapter 4.
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4 System Model
In this chapter, we describe the system model which we assume for our proposed pro-
tocols when not stated otherwise. The assumptions of our system model are similar to
related work to enable a comparison of our protocols with existing protocols. First, we
describe the assumed hardware devices for sink and sensor nodes and their respective
properties. After that, we describe the assumption of the network which consists of one
sink and several sensor nodes. Finally, we describe the different types of adversaries
in our adversary model. The adversary model is used to evaluate the security of our
protocols provide against these different types of adversaries.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.1, we describe the device model and
in Section 4.2 the network model. The adversary model is introduced in Section 4.3.
Finally, the chapter is summarized in Section 4.4.
4.1 Device Model
In the device model, we distinguish between a model for sensor nodes and for the sink.
We refer to user, task manager node, and sink (cf. Section 2.1.1) collectively as sink.
Sensor Node Model We assume sensor nodes with comparable properties and resources
as the MICA motes described in Section 2.1.3. Although it has been shown that public
key is in principle applicable in WSNs [99, 238], we assume that such operations cannot
be generally performed to enable a long lifetime of the WSN. However, certain efficient
public key-based broadcast authentication schemes can be used where the signature
verification operations for sensor nodes are cheap and only signature generation for
the sink is resource-intensive. In general, sensor nodes are able to perform some basic
operations, like computing hash functions, symmetric encryption, XOR operation, etc.
Security protocols can occupy a fraction of the available 4 kbyte EEPROM and the
512 kbyte flash memory. Frequently used data can be stored in the EEPROM whereas
rarely used data can be stored in the flash memory.
The communication is done via bidirectional wireless links, i.e., all sensor nodes have
the same transmission range. Communication with nodes outside the transmission range
is performed in a multihop fashion.
Sensor nodes are battery-powered and have limited energy resources. Our assumptions
of the energy consumption of (cryptographic) operations are based on results presented
in Section 2.3. We introduce the necessary details on energy consumption and available
energy resources in the respective sections of our energy analyses.
Sensor nodes are not equipped with tamper-resistant hardware and can be compro-
mised. However, we assume that certain mechanisms increasing the effort for node
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compromise (cf. Section 3.2.1) are applied. This enables the assumption, similar as for
instance in [270, 8, 258], that the system bootstrapping phase is secure and nodes cannot
be compromised during this phase. In this phase, a sensor node can securely perform
some initial procedures. It is assumed that the time to perform the initial procedures
Test is less than the lower bound to compromise a sensor node Tmin, i.e., Test < Tmin.
To protect against eavesdropping, a single network wide key can be used to protect the
initially exchanged messages. This key is erased before Tmin is reached.
Sink Model We assume that the sink is unconstrained in its computational, storage
and energy resources. The sink is equipped with sufficient storage space to store any
required data, e.g., unique symmetric keys with each sensor node. Furthermore, the
computational resources enable the sink to perform resource-intensive operations such
as public-key cryptography. However, the communication capabilities are similar to the
sensor nodes, i.e., the sink cannot use a unidirectional link to reach sensor nodes located
farther away. In contrast to the sensor nodes, the sink is assumed to be trustworthy and
that it cannot be compromised.
4.2 Network Model
We assume a large scale, static WSN consisting of one sink and a great number of sensor
nodes with the aforementioned properties. The network is densely deployed, so that the
same or similar physical phenomena can be detected by multiple sensor nodes. Sensor
nodes do not know their immediate neighboring nodes in advance, i.e., they can be
deployed randomly (e.g., via aerial scattering). Because of the limited communication
capabilities, the devices communicate in a multihop fashion using bidirectional wireless
links.
After the deployment of the sensor nodes, we assume that each pair of neighboring
nodes establishes a pairwise key in a secure bootstrapping phase using existing tech-
niques. These keys are used by security mechanisms as basic protection against an out-
side adversary to ensure authenticity, integrity, and freshness of the exchanged messages
between neighboring nodes.
We assume that an adversary has physical access to the deployment area of the WSN
and is able to compromise sensor nodes. Thus, an adversary is able to perform both
outsider and insider attacks and can perform them either as mote-class or laptop-class
adversary. In the following section, we discuss our considered adversary model in detail.
4.3 Adversary Model
To evaluate the security of a protocol, an adversary model must be defined which is
used as the basis of the security analysis. The Dolev-Yao model [70], which we briefly
introduced in Section 2.2.3, is widely accepted as the standard by which cryptographic
protocols should be evaluated. However, this model is too rigid to be used to evaluate
security protocols for WSNs. In the Dolev-Yao model, the adversary is assumed to be a
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legitimate user of the network and has full control over all messages that are sent through
the network. Thus, the adversary is able to overhear, analyze, or modify messages, as
well as to generate new messages and sent these messages to any user of the network.
The adversary is only bound by the applied cryptographic mechanisms which he cannot
circumvent without knowing the required keys. However, the Dolev-Yao model does
not involve entity compromise. Furthermore, in most WSNs it is unrealistic that an
adversary has such communication power to intercept all messages of the whole network.
Therefore, our adversary model consists of different types of adversaries with different
capabilities as we will explain later. This enables an adaption to different scenarios and
different security requirements.
Before we describe our adversary model in detail, we briefly introduce two adversary
models ([111] and [7]) that have been proposed in the context of routing in ad-hoc
networks. We argue that these models are not generally applicable in WSNs. However,
our adversary model shares some parts with these models.
The adversary model presented in [111] formalizes an active-n-m adversary, where n is
the number of compromised insiders that hold keying material, and m is the total number
of adversary nodes in the network. All adversary nodes have the same capabilities
as non-malicious nodes. In addition, the nodes are able to distribute compromised
keys to all other m-1 nodes. This approach has the disadvantage that the number of
nodes that are able to perform insider attacks is hard to determine since it is unclear
how many new nodes of the adversary are successfully added to the network using
compromised keying material. Furthermore, an adversary is able to deploy more powerful
nodes with additional resources. Thus, our adversary model comprises only a number of
compromised nodes. This number includes potentially fabricated or cloned nodes where
an adversary compromises only a few nodes and uses the captured keys to fabricate new
“legitimate” nodes with new identities. To mitigate this issue, key management schemes
that are resilient to node fabrication attacks, such as [113], should be used. In addition,
our model considers malicious nodes that are equipped with additional resources, e.g.,
more energy capacity or a transceiver with higher transmission range.
In [7], the authors propose an adaptive threat model for secure ad-hoc routing pro-
tocols. They consider the strength of an attacker, communication capability, insider or
outsider, and the goal of an attacker on route integrity. This model is appropriate for
evaluating routing protocols for ad-hoc networks. However, to evaluate security pro-
tocols for WSNs additional aspects must be considered. For example, many security
mechanisms for WSN use threshold schemes which must be considered in the assumed
adversary model.
Thus, we define our own adversary model for WSNs to evaluate our proposed security
protocols. Our adversary model is based on the different classes of adversaries described
in Section 2.2.3. Table 4.1 gives an overview of our adversary classification for WSNs.
We first make a distinction between outsider (type I) and insider (type II) adversaries.
Although the main focus of our work are inside adversaries, for the sake of completeness
we also consider the damage an outside adversary can cause. An outside or inside
adversary can try to perform the attacks described in Section 2.2.4. However, as already
mentioned above, an outside adversary can be easily impeded from performing most of
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these attacks by cryptographic means. The relevant attacks, such as a jamming attack,
which an outsider is still able to perform, are considered in all analyzes.
We further refine outsider and insider adversaries by their computational and com-
munication capabilities, i.e., we distinguish between mote and laptop class. Thus, we
have the following four sub-categories: I.1 (Outsider, Mote Class), I.2 (Outsider, Lap-
top Class), II.1 (Insider, Mote Class), and II.2 (Insider, Laptop Class). A mote class
adversary has the same or similar resources as an already deployed sensor node. The
resources of a laptop class adversary can have different characteristics. The laptop class
device can have only slightly increased resources, e.g., only increased energy resources or
an increased receive radius of the wireless transceiver. However, a laptop class adversary
can have resources comparable to the Dolev-Yao adversary, i.e., he might be able to re-
ceive and transmit messages in any part of the network. Such a powerful adversary, even
if he is an outsider, may be able to jam the whole WSN. However, such an adversary
is unrealistic in most scenarios since a wireless signal quickly drops to low levels with
growing distances. Thus, an adversary must either be close to the target or use extreme
high levels of transmission power.
Each of the four types of adversaries are further refined by the number of nodes m the
adversary owns. In the case of a type I adversary (Outsider), we distinguish in each case
(type I.1 or type I.2) if the adversary owns only one node or owns m > 1 nodes; i.e., type
I.1.1 (Outsider, Mote Class, 1 Node), I.1.2 (Outsider, Mote Class, m > 1 Nodes), I.2.1
(Outsider, Laptop Class, 1 Node), I.2.2 (Outsider, Laptop Class, m > 1 Nodes). For
example, a type I.1.1 adversary can jam only a very limted area of the network whereas
a type I.2.2 adversary may be able to jam the whole WSN.
The type II.1 (Insider, Mote Class) and II.2 (Insider, Laptop Class) adversaries are
each further refined in three subcategories specifying how many sensor nodes the adver-
sary has compromised. We distinguish between 1, 1 < m < T , and m ≥ T , where T
specifies a threshold value if a threshold scheme is applied. Thus, we distinguish between
the following types of adversaries: type II.1.1 (Insider, Mote Class, 1 Node), type II.1.2
(Insider, Mote Class, 1 < m < T Nodes), type II.1.3 (Insider, Mote Class, m ≥ T ), type
II.2.1 (Insider, Laptop Class, m = 1 Node), type II.2.2 (Insider, Laptop Class, 1 < m <
T Nodes), and type II.2.3 (Insider, Laptop Class, m ≥ T Nodes).
In addition, we make the following general assumption of an adversary:
• As in the Dolev-Yao model [70], we assume perfect cryptography, i.e., an adver-
sary cannot break any cryptographic mechanism if he is not in possession of the
cryptographic keys. This includes the inability of encrypting/decrypting messages,
generating/verifying MACs, finding preimages1 or second preimages2 of one-way
functions3, etc.
1Given a one-way function h, and y = h(x) it is computational impossible to find any preimage x˜ such
that h(x˜) = y.
2It is computational infeasible to find a second preimage x˜ 6= x such that h(x) = h(x˜)
3Note that our protocols do not require collision resistance, i.e., it is computational infeasible to find
any two disjoint inputs x, x˜ which hash to the same output such that h(x) = h(x˜).
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Outsider/
Insider
Available Re-
sources
Number of nodes m Adversary Category
Outsider
Mote Class
m = 1 I.1.1
m > 1 I.1.2
Laptop Class
m = 1 I.2.1
m > 1 I.2.2
Insider
Mote Class
m = 1 II.1.1
1 < m < T II.1.2
m ≥ T II.1.3
Laptop Class
m = 1 II.2.1
1 < m < T II.2.2
m ≥ T II.2.3
Table 4.1: Adversary Classification
• By misbehaving in the execution of the security mechanisms applied between neigh-
boring nodes, an adversary cannot obtain the used cryptographic keys.
• If a sensor node is compromised, all data, such as the cryptographic keys, can be
accessed by the adversary.
• An adversary is able to combine cryptographic keys of multiple compromised sensor
nodes. Therefore, the nodes can exchange this data either locally (e.g., a mote
class adversary that has compromised neighboring sensor nodes) or globally (e.g.,
a laptop class adversary that establishes a wormhole to another compromised node
farther away).
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have described the system model consisting of device, network, and
adversary model for our proposed protocols. The device model specifies the properties
and assumptions for sink and sensor nodes whereas the network model specifies the
general assumptions of the network itself. The adversary model is used to evaluate the
security of our proposed protocols.
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5 Addressing PDoS Attacks
In Section 3.2.8 we have argued that recovery strategies using mechanisms that tolerate
node compromise are usually based on threshold schemes. Thus, if an adversary compro-
mises more nodes than some threshold value, the security is broken. It is a challenging
problem to design a security protocol for WSNs that provides recovery for an arbitrary
number of compromised nodes.
In this chapter, we present a protocol that applies the second form of recovery by using
a mechanism that tolerates compromised nodes and adaptable mechanisms to protect
against PDoS and false data injection attacks. The protection against PDoS attacks
does not rely on a threshold scheme and is able to tolerate an arbitrary number of
compromised sensor nodes. A threshold scheme is used to protect against false data
injection attacks. However, if the threshold scheme is broken, the adversary is limited to
the immediate region of the compromised nodes. Focus of this protocol is the protection
against PDoS attacks whereas the protocols presented in Chapter 6 focus on false data
injection (and FEDoS) attacks.
This chapter shares some material with the previously published work STEF: A Secure
Ticket-Based En-route Filtering Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks [129].
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we introduce and motivate the
problem which we address in the proposed protocol. We distinguish our protocol from
related work in Section 5.2. In contrast to Chapter 3, we provide more details specific for
this context. The specific assumptions are presented in Section 5.3 before we describe
our proposed protocol in detail in Section 5.4. The security of our protocol is discussed in
Section 5.5, and a theoretical performance analysis is presented in Section 5.6. In Section
5.7, we give a short overview of the implementation and the performed simulations of
the performance of our proposed protocol. Finally, the chapter is summarized in Section
5.8.
5.1 Introduction
PDoS and False Data Injection Attacks (see Section 2.2.4) are two serious types of
attacks. A successful PDoS Attack may prevent a large number of sensor nodes from
performing their tasks for a certain time period by overloading them with a large amount
of false messages. Much worse, a successful PDoS Attack can result in a totally exhaus-
tion of the energy resources of the nodes which makes them unusable. No less serious
are false data injection attacks which may enable an adversary to deceive the sink. This
can for example result in false alarms.
To protect against such attacks, it is necessary to filter most of the false messages
as early as possible, because sending and receiving messages is the most cost-intensive
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factor in WSNs. The few overlooked false messages should be further rejected at the
sink. Therefore, en-route nodes must be able to detect false or replayed messages, and
drop them. Several security approaches [261, 272] have recently been proposed for this
purpose. To achieve the en-route filtering, a symmetric key sharing approach is used,
where the keys for generating and verifying Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are
the same. As a consequence, verification keys can be misused to generate reports. This
limits the resilience to node compromises. In [257], an approach based on commutative
ciphers is presented which eliminates the problem. However, appropriate commutative
ciphers are all based on public key cryptography, e.g., RSA [197], which requires more
resources than available in most WSNs.
We propose a Secure Ticket-Based En-route Filtering Scheme (STEF) that is resistant
against false data injection and PDoS attack. The protocol neither requires symmetric
key sharing among sensor nodes nor expensive cryptographic operations.
STEF exploits the typical operation mode of query-response in WSNs. Many appli-
cation scenarios expect WSNs that process, store and provide the sensed data to the
network users upon their demands. Thus, as a common communication paradigm, the
network users are expected to issue queries to the WSNs through the sink before obtain-
ing the information of their interest. In this scenario, our protocol provides protection
against PDoS attacks even if an adversary is able to compromise an arbitrary number of
sensor nodes. However, in scenarios where sensor nodes are expected to autonomously
generate messages (e.g., alarm messages if a certain temperature value is reached), STEF
is not applicable. As we already stated, it is often not possible to develop generic security
protocols for WSNs which are applicable in all application scenarios. During the work
on this thesis, we also developed a generic variant of STEF where sensor nodes are able
to autonomously generate messages [83]. In contrast to STEF, however, the resilience
to node compromise is limited in this approach.
The main idea of STEF is to forward messages to the sink only if they contain a valid
ticket. A ticket is issued by the sink, within a query, to a specific sensor node which
enables the node to generate a valid response. A query message is authenticated and
cannot be forged or replayed by an adversary. The response message contains the ticket
which is verified by en-route nodes. Only response messages which contain a valid and
fresh (i.e., it has not been used before) ticket are forwarded. False or replayed messages
are filtered out. The requirement of a valid and fresh ticket for each message prevents
an adversary from injecting as many messages as desired to perform a successful PDoS
attack even if he has compromised several nodes. Furthermore, the impact of node
compromises is limited to the region of the compromise. Unlike other protocols (e.g.,
[261, 272]), an adversary cannot generate valid reports appearing from arbitrary locations
within the network if he has compromised a certain threshold of nodes. The analyses
show that our proposed protocol can achieve a good level of security, and is very effective
in filtering false messages. Due to the fact that false messages are filtered after one hop
and the low processing overhead, STEF shows remarkable energy savings.
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5.2 Related Work
In this section, we present related work in the area of filtering false data. These works
have already been briefly introduced in Chapter 3. In contrast, we provide now a more
detailed view and distinguish our work from these works.
The first proposals for filtering false data in WSNs are SEF [261] and IHA [272].
The basic idea of these two proposals is that en-route nodes share symmetric keys with
member nodes in a sensor node group or cluster. Multiple member nodes endorse reports
by generating a MAC for the reports using these keys. En-route nodes can verify MACs
before forwarding packets. In SEF, the member nodes and en-route nodes use randomly
pre-distributed keys from different key partitions to generate and verify MACs. There is
a high probability that en-route nodes share keys with the member nodes, and thus can
verify endorsements to filter false messages. However, there are several problems with
SEF. First, as SEF uses a probabilistic approach, it cannot guarantee that every false
packet will be filtered out on its way to the sink. Additionally, a false packet will be
forwarded for a certain number of hops before it is filtered out which wastes resources.
Second, SEF remains only safe if an adversary cannot compromise more keys than a
certain threshold value. If the threshold is exceeded, the adversary can forge reports
appearing from anywhere in the WSN. In IHA, member nodes and en-route nodes set
up interleaved keys, using randomly pre-distributed keys. These interleaved keys and
the hop-by-hop authentication ensure that the sink will detect any false data when no
more than a certain number of nodes are compromised. Otherwise, an adversary can
forge arbitrary data reports.
In [258], the authors of SEF present an improved protocol, where the keys are bound
to geographical locations, thus limiting the scope for which an adversary can misuse
compromised keys. A report is forwarded inside a beam from the source to the sink.
However, the protocol is still probabilistic, with the problems mentioned above. Fur-
thermore, an adversary compromising a certain number of nodes within a beam may
forge reports appearing from arbitrary locations within the beam.
In [257], a commutative cipher-based filtering mechanism is presented that drops fab-
ricated reports en-route without symmetric key sharing. A source node establishes a
secret association with the base station on a per-session basis, while the intermediate
forwarding nodes are equipped with a witness key which is used to verify the authenticity
of reports without knowing the original session key. However, all appropriate commuta-
tive ciphers are based on public key cryptography. We adopt the idea of using the query
response operation mode and the separation of verification and generation means in our
protocol. In contrast to the proposed mechanism, STEF uses only lightweight one-way
functions, which is much more efficient.
In [267], a comprehensive set of location-based compromise-tolerant security mech-
anisms for WSNs is presented. The idea of location-based keys (LBKs), which bind
private keys of individual nodes to their ID and geographic location, is proposed. An
LBK-based neighborhood authentication protocol and a method to establish pairwise
keys is presented. Furthermore, a location-based threshold-endorsement (LTE) protocol
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is proposed to filter bogus messages. In this approach, sensor nodes are assumed to have
much more computing power and are able to perform public key cryptography.
The protocol presented in [266] uses SEF to filter false messages. Furthermore, a
method is presented for excluding compromised nodes, after they have been identified,
by updating a group key on the uncompromised nodes. A family of predistribution
and local collaboration-based group rekeying protocols is proposed. The design of these
protocols is based on the ideas that future group keys can be preloaded to the sensor
nodes before deployment, and neighbors can collaborate to protect and appropriately
use the preloaded keys.
In [269], two protocols for false report filtering are presented, which separate the
generating keys and verification keys by using one-way hash chains (OHCs). In the
first protocol, sensor nodes signal events using OHCs, which enables en-route nodes
to verify the authenticity of reports based on commitments of detecting sensor nodes,
but prevents them from forging events. This protocol is not suitable for high density
networks, since the storage requirements for OHC and commitments become excessive.
The second protocol extends the first protocol to a collaborative filtering protocol by
using commitment predistribution, which makes it more adaptable for mobile and high-
density sensor networks. Both protocols use a probabilistic approach, meaning there
is no guarantee that every false packet will be filtered out on the path to the sink.
Additionally, a false packet will be forwarded for a certain number of hops before it is
filtered out.
The work in [64] presents a solution to prevent PDoS attacks using OHCs to protect
end-to-end communications. This work focuses on preventing en-route nodes or outsiders
from performing PDoS attacks. Insider attacks from report generating nodes are not
considered.
5.3 Setting
We assume the system model described in Chapter 4. In addition, we make the following
assumptions.
We assume a reactive setting of the WSN, i.e., the network is queried by the sink and
sensor nodes do not autonomously generate messages. Query messages are sent from
the sink to sensor nodes in the area of interest. We assume that the response message is
forwarded along the reversed path that the query message traverses. This assumption is
reasonable, because the probability that the route changes is very small since the time
between query and response is rather short. In cases where the route for a response
message is different from the route for the corresponding query message (e.g. because of
en-route node failure), the sink has to send a new query message after a certain period
of time.
A (broadcast) authentication scheme is used to prevent an adversary from injecting or
replaying query messages. Sensor nodes are able to immediately verify the authenticity
of query messages and drop false or replayed query messages. Appropriate schemes
are, for example, proposed in [99, 194, 42]. In [58], we proposed an efficient signature
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scheme which is also appropriate for this purpose in certain scenarios. In addition to
the authentication scheme, mechanisms to protect against DoS attacks on signature
verification can be used [172, 79, 239, 71].
Furthermore, we assume that appropriate localization mechanisms exist to enable
each node to obtain its location after deployment, e.g., [141, 204, 40, 33, 34, 77]. Most
monitoring applications require such location-awareness to determine the location of
events.
5.4 Protocol Description
In this section, we present STEF. First, we describe the basic protocol for en-route
filtering supporting authenticity and integrity of transmitted data. We then show how
our protocol can be easily modified to support the confidentiality of queries and reports
in response messages.
5.4.1 Basic Protocol
The main idea of STEF is that reports from sensor nodes are forwarded towards the sink
only if they contain a valid ticket. The ticket concept is realized with a query-response
communication which is a typical operational mode in sensor networks. Sensor nodes
can act in three different roles: (1) En-route node (EN ), (2) cluster head (CH ), and (3)
cluster node (CN ). The sink randomly selects a node in the area of interest which acts
as the current CH for this query-response communication and sends the query including
the ticket via the EN s to it. CH builds a dynamic cluster with its CN s, i.e., its direct
neighbors. The ticket is specific for CH , i.e., it can be used by this CH only. Before
sending a response to the query, CH generates a report according to the query which
must be endorsed by multiple CN s and attaches the ticket to the report. The report is
sent back towards the sink, and the EN s are able to verify the correctness of the ticket.
Messages including no or invalid tickets are immediately dropped.
STEF consists of five phases: Initialization, Queries from Sink, Report Generation,
En-route Filtering, and Sink Verification. These five phases are presented below.
Initialization
The initialization phase is performed only once to configure the sensor nodes before
deployment, and to execute some initialization procedures directly after deployment.
This phase is assumed to be secure as mentioned above.
Each sensor node Si for i = 1, . . . , n has a unique identifier IDSi and is preloaded with
a unique key KSi shared with the sink, henceforth called personal key. An error range ε
is preconfigured within which CN s accept reports from CH and generate endorsements.
After the nodes are deployed, they obtain their location and report it to the sink.
To decrease the communication overhead, the location reports can be aggregated or
piggybacked in other messages. Furthermore, each sensor node establishes pairwise keys
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Figure 5.1: Query message sent from the sink to CH
with its one-hop neighbors as stated in the network model described in Section 4.2. After
the initialization phase, the network can be queried by the sink.
Example 5.1 Figure 5.1 shows an example WSN consisting of ten sensor nodes. The
three en-route sensor nodes EN1, EN2, and EN3 forward messages from the sink to the
cluster head CH and vice versa. CH initiates a report generation and generates a report
with the help of the neighboring cluster nodes CN1, . . . , CN6.
Queries from Sink
After the initialization phase, the WSN is initialized and the sink is able to send queries.
Each query message from the sink includes a ticket. The ticket concept is realized as
follows: The sink generates a random value c ∈R {0, 1}l of a certain length, e.g., l = 64
bit. Next, a one-way function h : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l that provides preimage and second
preimage resistance, e.g., a hash function [167], is applied to the value c, so that c′ = h(c).
Preimage resistance means that for any given x, it is easy to compute y = h(x), but given
a value y, it is not feasible to compute a value x˜ such that y = h(x˜). Second preimage
resistance means that it is computational infeasible to find a second preimage x˜ 6= x such
that h(x) = h(x˜). Note that our protocol does not require collision resistance1 which
enables a much shorter bit length of the hash values2.
The sink knows the location of all nodes in the area of interest, and randomly selects
one node as CH and sends a query message to it. The message contains a unique query
identifier QID, the value c′, the query Q representing the interest of the user expressed
in multiple attribute-value pairs, and the value c encrypted with the personal key KCH
shared between the sink and CH representing the ticket. Thus, the query message has
the following form:
Sink→ CH : QID, c′,Q, {c}KCH (5.1)
1Collision resistance means that it is computational infeasible to find any two disjoint inputs x, x˜ which
hash to the same output, i.e., such that h(x) = h(x˜).
2Compare also Section 3.2.2.
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The sink stores QID, c, c′,Q, IDCH for further verification purposes. En-route nodes
can verify the ticket in the response message later in the en-route filtering phase using
the value c′. For each query message, a new value for c is randomly chosen and the
appropriate c′ value is calculated. The message is authenticated by an authentication
scheme which supports immediate authentication as mentioned above.
Example 5.2 In the example shown in Figure 5.1, the sink sends out a query message.
A query Q might look like ”What is the temperature at location X?”. The whole query
message is forwarded hop-by-hop to CH . All en-route nodes EN1, EN2, and EN3 store
the tuple (QID, c′) for future verification purposes.
Algorithm 5.1 describes the actions of an EN when receiving a query message. EN
stores the tuple (QID , c′) in the data structure QList .
Algorithm 5.1 ENQuery(QID, c′, QList)
1: if received Query is authentic then
2: add (QID, c′) to QList
3: forward message
4: end if
Report Generation
CH performs the initial measurement of the physical phenomena and initiates the report
generation. However, CH cannot generate a valid report for the sink by itself. CH
requires the help of t neighboring CNs which endorse the measurement. An endorsement
is only sent from a CN if it agrees on the measurement within a certain error range. A
CN generates an endorsement by computing a MAC on the received report R using its
personal key.
First, we explain the report generation by continuing Example 5.2. Afterwards, we
describe the actions of CH and the CN s in general.
Example 5.3 When CH receives the query message, it generates a report R according
to the query; e.g., ”The temperature at location X is 23◦C.” and sends this report to its
neighbors. In Figure 5.1, CH sends R to nodes CN1, . . ., CN6. Each sensor node that
agrees on the report within a certain error range, uses its personal key to generate a MAC
(the endorsement) on R, and sends the MAC to CH. The authenticity and integrity of
these messages is ensured using the pairwise keys shared between the nodes and CH. In
Figure 5.2, all cluster nodes CN1, . . ., CN6 agree on the report and calculate the MAC
as follows for i = 1, . . . , 6
MACCNi = MAC(R,KCNi) (5.2)
and send the generated MACs to CH. CH also generates a MAC, and additionally,
chooses t different MACs randomly, where t is a system parameter, and compresses them
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Figure 5.2: Response message sent back from CH to the sink
to one SMAC by bitwise XOR operation. Assume that t = 3, thus SMAC is generated
by t + 1 = 4 different MACs. CH chooses the MACs from CN2, CN3, and CN6 and
calculates SMAC which can be later verified by the sink as follows:
SMAC = MAC(R,KCH )⊕MAC(R,KCN2)⊕MAC(R,KCN3)⊕MAC(R,KCN6) (5.3)
Next, CH decrypts c from the query message and generates the final report containing
QID, R, c, SMAC, its own identifier IDCH and the identifiers of the t endorsing nodes
IDCN2, IDCN3, and IDCN6. Figure 5.2 shows the response message sent by CH to the
sink:
CH → Sink : QID, R, c,SMAC, {IDCH , IDCN2 , IDCN3 , IDCN6} (5.4)
The actions of CH are shown in Algorithm 5.2. To simplify matters, we assume that
CH receives s ≥ t MACs from CNs, where t is the number of required endorsements.
Algorithm 5.2 CHRepGen(t, KCH )
1: if received Query is authentic then
2: Generate R
3: Send R to all CNs
4: SMAC = MAC(R,KCH )
5: V = {IDCH }
6: randomly select t distinct MACs (MACf1 , . . . ,MACft) from s received MACs
7: for i = 1 to t do
8: SMAC = SMAC ⊕ MACfi
9: add node identifier fi to V
10: end for
11: D({c}KCH ,KCH ) = c
12: Sendto(Sink) : QID, R, c,SMAC, V
13: end if
First, CH verifies the authenticity of the query, generates the appropriate report R
for the query, and sends R to all CNs. Next, CH calculates MAC(R,KCH ) and receives
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s MACs from CNs which agree on the report R. CH randomly selects t MACs and
compresses them together with its own MAC to one SMAC. The node identifiers of CH
and the t CNs whose endorsements have been used to generate SMAC are stored in a
data structure V . CH decrypts the ticket value c and generates the response message
consisting of QID, R, c,SMAC, and V .
Algorithm 5.3 describes the actions of a CN when it receives R from CH to endorse
(or not to endorse) a report. CN first performs its own measurement R′. If R′ matches
R within the preconfigured error range ε, CN generates a MAC and sends it to CH.
Algorithm 5.3 CNRepEnd(KCN , R, ε)
1: Generate R′
2: if R′ − ε ≤ R ≤ R′ + ε then
3: MACCN = MAC(R,KCN )
4: Sendto(CH ) : MACCN
5: end if
En-route Filtering
To protect against PDoS attacks, each en-route node verifies the ticket value included
in the response message. This enables false messages to be filtered out immediately at
the next hop. Since the verification involves only one hash computation, this can be
performed very efficiently. We first continue the examples from above and then present
an algorithm which describes the actions of the en-route nodes.
Example 5.4 The response is forwarded along the reversed query message path, i.e.,
from CH over EN3, EN2, and EN1 to the sink. Each EN checks if it has stored the
appropriate QID and the value c′. If not, the report is dropped. Otherwise, the node
checks if c′ ?= h(c). If the equation holds, the ticket is valid and the message is forwarded
to the next hop and the tuple (QID, c′) is deleted.
Algorithm 5.4 describes the actions of an EN. First, EN checks if its QList contains a
tuple (QID, c′) where the QID matches the QID in the response message. If there exists
such an entry, EN verifies if the ticket value c is valid by calculating c′ ?= h(c). If this
is the case, the message is forwarded to the next hop and the tuple (QID, c′) is deleted
from QList . If any of the verifications fail, the message is dropped.
Not considered in the shown algorithm is the case that query or response messages
might have been lost during transmission. In this case, EN will never receive the response
message to a stored tuple and waste memory. To cope with that, an EN deletes a tuple
if a response message to a query does not arrive within a certain period of time. The
length of the time period can be preconfigured and, if necessary, adjusted by the sink by
broadcasting new values.
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Algorithm 5.4 ENResponse(QID, c, QList)
1: if QID ∈ QList then
2: if c′ = h(c) then
3: forward message
4: delete (QID, c′) from QList
5: else
6: drop message
7: end if
8: else
9: drop message
10: end if
Sink Verification
The sink performs the final verification. We first continue the examples from above and
then present an algorithm which describes the actions of the sink.
Example 5.5 When the sink receives the message, it first checks if QID matches a
recently sent query message and if the value c is valid. Next, the sink verifies that the
message contains the node identifiers of CH and t CNs and that the CNs are indeed
in the local neighborhood of CH and their location matches the location of the report.
Finally, the sink verifies the correctness of the SMAC by calculating MAC ′CH , MAC
′
CN2
,
MAC ′CN3, and MAC
′
CN6
over R using the respective personal keys of CH, CN2, CN3,
and CN6. These MACs are XOR-ed to calculate SMAC ′ which is compared to the
received SMAC. If all verifications have passed, the report is accepted. Otherwise, the
sink can send out a new query message to another node in this area.
Algorithm 5.5 describes the actions of the sink to verify a received response message.
Algorithm 5.5 SinkVerify(QID, R, c,SMAC, V )
1: result = reject
2: if QID and c are valid then
3: if V contains IDCH and t additional node identifiers then
4: if location verifications pass then
5: SMAC ′ = MAC(R,KCH )
6: for i = 1 to t do
7: SMAC ′ = SMAC ′ ⊕MAC(R,KCNi)
8: end for
9: if SMAC ′ = SMAC then
10: result = accept
11: end if
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
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The sink checks if QID and c are valid, the set V contains IDCH and t additional node
identifiers, and the known locations of these nodes are nearby the stated location of the
report. Then, the sink uses the locally stored personal keys of CH and the endorsing
CNs to calculate the reference SMAC ′ and compares it with the received SMAC.
The whole protocol is illustrated in Protocol 5.1. CNj are all CNs of CH and CNi are
all nodes that agree on the report and send a MAC back to CH.
Protocol 5.1 The STEF protocol
1. Initialization:
• All sensor nodes have a unique identifier and shared key with the sink.
• Each sensor node has established pairwise keys with its neighbors.
• The sink is aware of the approximate locations of the sensor nodes.
2. Protocol steps:
1a Sink → EN (1): QID, c′,Q, {c}KCH
1b EN : verify authenticity
1c EN : store (QID, c′)
1d EN → CH : QID, c′,Q, {c}KCH
2a CH : generate R
2b CH ∗→ CNj : send R to all CNj
2c CNj : generate R′
2d CNj : verify R′ − ε ≤ R ≤ R′ + ε
2e CNi: calculate MACCNi = MAC(R,KCNi)
2f CNi → CH : send MACCNi
2g CH : calculate MACCH = MAC(R,KCH )
2h CH : calculate SMAC using MACCH and t distinct MACCNi
2i CH : generate V
2j CH : decrypt D({c}KCH ,KCH ) = c
2k CH → EN : QID, R, c,SMAC, V
3a EN : verify c′ ?= h(c) related to QID
3b EN → Sink: QID, R, c,SMAC, V
3c EN delete (QID, c′)
4a Sink: verify c′ ?= h(c) related to QID
4b Sink: verify V contains IDCH and t additional node identifiers
4c Sink: verify locations
4d Sink: calculate SMAC ′, verify SMAC ′ = SMAC
(1) To simplify matters, EN represents all en-route nodes forwarding the messages.
The symbol
∗→ denotes that a message is sent to all CNj of the cluster.
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5.4.2 Confidentiality Enhancement
Some sensor network applications may need confidentiality of the queries and responses.
Since en-route nodes do not need to know the contents of Q or R to filter false messages,
these values can be encrypted before transmission. In the query message, Q is also
encrypted with the shared key between the sink and the CH. Thus, the query message
has the following form:
Sink→ CH : QID, c′, {Q, c}KCH (5.5)
Before CH sends the response to the sink, it encrypts the report R using its pairwise
key shared with the sink. For the example shown in Figure 5.2, CH sends the following
message to the sink:
CH → Sink : QID, {R}KCH , c,SMAC, {IDCH , IDCN2 , IDCN3 , IDCN6} (5.6)
This enhancement introduces only marginally increased overhead for the CH by per-
forming one symmetric encryption operation. En-route nodes are not affected by this
enhancement.
5.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security of STEF. We perform our analysis according to
our adversary model presented in Section 4.3 and refer to the protocol steps listed in
Protocol 5.1. As our work focuses on the security threat of false data injection and
PDoS attacks to either deceive the sink by forging events or to waste the scarce energy
resources, we first show the efficacy of STEF against these attacks. In addition, we
discuss additional attacks an adversary can perform to prevent the sink from receiving
a (valid) response message.
5.5.1 Resilience against False Data Injection Attacks to Deceive the Sink
To successfully perform a false data injection attack to deceive the sink, an adversary
has to generate a valid response message. The sink accepts only a response message
containing a valid ticket value c and a valid SMAC generated by t+1 nodes (CH and t
CNs), and where the locations of the sensor nodes match the location stated in R (cf.
steps 4a - 4c). Furthermore, the ticket value c must be valid such that ENs forward the
message towards the sink (cf. steps 3a and 3b). Thus, an adversary has to generate a
valid message of the following form (cf. steps 2k and 3b):
CH → EN → Sink : QID, R, c,SMAC, V.
and send it along the reversed path that the query message traverses or directly to the
sink. In the following, we discuss how the different types of adversaries specified in the
adversary model can try to perform a false data injection attack to deceive the sink.
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Any type I adversary (Outsider) cannot successfully perform a false data injection
attack, since he is not in possession of pairwise keys to authenticate himself. Messages
from an outside adversary are immediately dropped. To be able to send valid messages to
neighboring nodes, an adversary requires valid pairwise keys. Since an outside adversary
has no access to keys stored on sensor nodes, he can only analyze overheared messages
or misbehave in the execution of the security mechanisms to expose keys. The former
violates the assumptions that the applied cryptosystem cannot be broken, the latter the
assumption that misbehaving in the execution of the security mechanism does not result
in the exposure of keys (cf. Section 4.3).
Now we assume that no security mechanisms are applied to ensure authenticity, in-
tegrity, and freshness of the exchanged messages between neighboring nodes. Even then,
an outside adversary cannot successfully deceive the sink. We show this by discussing
type I.1 and I.2 adversaries separately.
We assume a type I.1 adversary (Outsider, Mote Class) who cannot reach the
sink directly but is able to send a valid response message which is forwarded hop by hop
towards the sink. Thus, according to protocol step 3a
EN: verify c′ ?= h(c) related to QID.
this message must contain a valid ticket value c to be forwarded by ENs in step 3b.
There are two alternatives for the adversary to get in possession of a valid ticket value.
First, we assume that the adversary has intercepted a query message and has calculated
c (or a second preimage) from c′ or by decrypting the encrypted value of c. The first
case violates our assumption that h is a preimage and second preimage resistant one-way
function wheras the latter violates the assumption that the adversary is unable to break
cryptography.
Second, we assume that the adversary replays a beforehand recorded ticket value from
a valid response message. Since a ticket is only valid once (cf. step 3c), the message
of the adversary would be immediately dropped. Now we assume that the adversary
is able to intercept a currently sent response message while preventing the subsequent
ENs from receiving this message. In this case, the adversary can use the ticket from
the valid response message in his own response message which is then forwarded to the
sink. However, the sink would not accept this message since it does not contain a valid
SMAC. We discuss this in the following.
We assume a type I.2 adversary (Outsider, Laptop class) who is able to reach
the sink directly3 and possesses a valid ticket value c. According to protocol step 4d
Sink : calculate SMAC ′, verify SMAC ′ = SMAC,
the response message is only accepted when it contains a valid SMAC collaboratively
generated by CH and t CNs (cf. step 4b). Thus, the adversary requires either to forge
t+1 MACs or convince CH and t CNs to generate MACs for his false event. Forging
MACs violates our assumption that the adversary is unable to break cryptography. Since
3We also consider a type I.1 adversary that is only one hop away from the sink.
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CNs (and CH believing to be a CN for another CH ) generate only a MAC if the received
report R matches their own measurement within a certain error range (cf. step 2d), they
do not generate a MAC for false events. In case that security mechanisms are applied
between neighboring nodes, no CN would send a MAC to the adversary because the
authentication would fail.
Now we consider adversaries of type II.1.1 and II.1.2 (Insider, Mote Class,
1 ≤m < T Nodes), which have compromised m < t+1 nodes in one region. We
directly discuss the case that the adversary is in possession of a valid ticket value. For
example, the sink has chosen one of the compromised nodes as the actual CH (cf. step
1a). Assume the adversary has generated a valid response message containing a valid
SMAC generated with t+1 distinct personal keys (cf. step 2h). The adversary is in
possession of m < t+1 keys. Thus, he requires t+1-m additional keys or must guess
valid MACs. However, this is in contradiction to our assumption the adversary is unable
to break cryptography. Thus, even if a false response message is not filtered out because
of an invalid ticket value, the sink will eventually detect the invalid SMAC and will not
accept the false message (cf. step 4d).
Adversaries of type II.2.1 or II.2.2 (Insider, Laptop Class, 1 ≤m < T Nodes)
are just as the type II.1.1 and II.1.2 adversaries unable to deceive the sink since they are
unable to generate a valid SMAC.
Now we consider adversaries of type II.1.3 or II.2.3 (Insider, Mote or Laptop
Class, m ≥ T Nodes), which have compromised m ≥ t+1 sensor nodes in one region.
We distinguish between the case where CH is uncompromised and the case where CH is
one of the compromised nodes.
In the former case, we assume that the adversary has intercepted a currently sent re-
sponse message and was able to prevent the subsequent ENs from receiving this message.
Although this attack is difficult to perform and requires exact timing of the adversary,
we consider it, since it represents the worst case. As a result of the attack, the adversary
is in possession of a valid ticket value and he can inject his own response message which
is forwarded towards the sink. In addition, the adversary is able to generate a SMAC
from t+1 MACs. However, in step 4b, the sink verifies that the SMAC contains the
MAC generated by CH. Since forging this MAC is in contradiction to our assumption
the adversary is unable to break cryptography, he is not able to successfully deceive the
sink.
In the latter case, the adversary can inject one false response message which would be
accepted by the sink for each received query. Thus, the number of false response messages
the adversary can inject is limited by the number of received queries. In addition, since
in step 4c the sink verifies that the location stated in R matches the location of the sensor
nodes, the adversary cannot generate reports appearing from arbitrary locations in the
WSN. The impact of node compromise is limited to this specific region. Furthermore,
if the sink detects that reports originating from this CH or region are not plausible, it
can easily exclude this CH or region by no longer sending queries there. If the adversary
does not receive any queries, he cannot successfully inject false messages to deceive the
sink even if he has compromised m ≥ t+1 sensor nodes in one region.
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5.5.2 Resilience against PDoS Attacks
In this section, we describe the resilience of our protocol against PDoS attacks. Note
that PDoS attacks are performed at the application layer (cf. Section 2.2.4 and [191]).
STEF does not directly address attacks at lower levels such as denial-of-sleep attacks
which prevents a victim node from going into sleep mode.
To perform a PDoS attack an adversary can either try to inject a large amount of false
query messages or false response messages. In our work, we concentrate on the latter
and rely on existing authentication schemes which support immediate authentication
and replay protection to secure query messages. Such authentication schemes exploit
the property that the sink cannot be compromised and is not resource constrained.
Using such a scheme to protect the query message prevents an adversary of any type
from performing a successful PDoS attack. Each node is able to verify that a query
message originates from the sink, and immediately filters false queries out. However,
an adversary could exploit some inherent properties of the authentication schemes to
perform some general attacks which we briefly discuss in the following.
In principle, a sensor node must receive and verify a message to decide if it is valid
or not. Thus, an inside adversary may repeatedly send a query message to force the
next EN to waste energy by receiving (step 1a) and verifying (step 1b) the message. By
sending a large amount of such messages, the adversary may drain the energy resources
of this node. However, all subsequent sensor nodes are protected since false queries are
immediately filtered out. Furthermore, the energy consumption of the verifying node is
lower than in an unprotected network since the total energy required for reception and
verification is lower than the energy for reception and transmission (see Section 2.3).
The authentication schemes have the property that all nodes in the WSN can verify
the authenticity of a query message originating from the sink. When receiving a query
for the first time, a sensor node usually accepts and forwards it (unless additional ver-
ifications such as invalid timestamps preclude it from doing so). Thus, an adversary
could try to distribute a valid query message to a large amount of sensor nodes prepar-
ing multiple disjoint return paths. On each path, the adversary could inject one single
response message. Hence, in the worst case, the adversary is able to distribute the query
once to all nodes of the WSN and inject one response message to all nodes. However,
since sensor nodes accept and forward only messages from authenticated neighbors, an
adversary must compromise a large number of sensor nodes to be successful. In this case,
the adversary has compromised so many nodes, that the WSN is presumably unusable
anyway. Even if the adversary could perform this attack without compromising many
nodes, the impact of the attack is rather limited since the adversary can distribute each
query only once.
The protection against an adversary that tries to perform a PDoS attack by injecting
false response messages is realized in STEF with the ticket concept. A valid response
message must contain a valid ticket c (cf. steps 2k and 3b). The response message is
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forwarded along the reversed path that the query message traverses. Each EN has stored
a verification tuple (QID, c′) and verifies c according to protocol step 3a:
EN: verify c′ ?= h(c) related to QID.
before forwarding it (cf. step 3b). After a successful verification EN deletes the verifi-
cation tuple (QID, c′) (cf. step 3c) and any replayed message containing an old ticket
is immediately filtered out. Messages injected in other areas of the WSN, are likewise
filtered out since nodes in this area of the WSN are not in possession of an appropriate
(QID, c′) tuple. To perform a successful PDoS attack, an adversary would require a
large amount of valid tickets since a ticket can be used only once. In the following, we
discuss how the different types of adversaries specified in the adversary model could try
to perform a PDoS attack.
Any type I adversary (Outsider) cannot successfully perform a PDoS attack, since
he is not in possession of pairwise keys to authenticate himself. Messages from an outside
adversary are immediately dropped. To be able to send valid messages to neighboring
nodes, an adversary requires valid pairwise keys. Since an outside adversary has no access
to keys stored on sensor nodes, he can only analyze overheared messages or misbehave
in the execution of the security mechanisms to expose keys. The former violates the
assumptions that the applied cryptosystem cannot be broken, the latter the assumption
that misbehaving in the execution of the security mechanism does not result in the
exposure of keys (cf. Section 4.3).
We consider an adversary of type II.1 (Insider, Mote Class) that has compromised
one or more sensor nodes. We first consider the case where neither of the compromised
nodes is chosen as CH. Thus, the adversary does not receive any ticket values. Fur-
thermore, the adversary cannot find preimages or second preimages and cannot decrypt
encrypted messages and thus, is not able to access any valid ticket values currently used
in the WSN. As a result, any message sent by the adversary is filtered out at the next
hop by the next EN (cf. step 3a). All other EN behind the filtering node are protected
and do not receive any injected message. However, the adversary can attack the filtering
EN by sending a large amount of false response messages. The filtering EN receives and
verifies each message from the compromised node. This consumes energy for message
reception and ticket verification. However, all other ENs on the route behind the filter-
ing EN are not affected. Furthermore, the resources of the filtering EN decrease slower
than in an unprotected network where the node simply forwards messages. The reason
is the much lower energy cost for computing hash functions to verify the ticket values
compared to the energy required to send the message to the next sensor node. Thus,
the energy resources of the attacked EN will last much longer than in an unprotected
network. We show this in our theoretical performance analysis (see Section 5.6) and in
our simulations (see Section 5.7).
Even if one or more of the compromised sensor nodes are chosen as CH, the adver-
sary cannot perform a successful PDoS attack. A successful PDoS attack requires the
adversary to inject a large amount of messages. In contrast, however, the adversary is
only able to sent exactly one message for each received ticket value. Thus, the number
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of injected messages depends on the number of queries the sink sends to one of the
compromised CH. As a result, an adversary cannot increase the global overall normal
network traffic. However, he is able to attack the next EN as described above.
An adversary of type II.2 (Insider, Laptop Class) may be able to use a higher
transmission power to send messages to sensor nodes farther away. However, since sensor
nodes have no corresponding verification tuple (QID, c′), such messages are immediately
dropped. Anyway, sensor nodes accept only messages received from neighboring nodes
with which they have established pairwise link keys. Thus, messages are directly dis-
carded at the link layer. An adversary could only try to use two or more compromised
nodes to establish a wormhole and attack intermediate nodes. For example, assume the
setting shown in Figure 5.1 and that nodes EN1 and CH have established a wormhole
and collaborate with the goal to drain the energy resources of nodes EN2 and EN3. Af-
ter CH has received a valid query from the sink, it generates a valid response message
that EN3 and EN2 forward to EN1. After forwarding, they delete the verification tuple.
Thus, no state is saved about already processed responses. EN1 and CH could try to
replay the query and the response again and again to drain the energy of EN2 and EN3.
However, since the authentication scheme used to protect the query message provides
replay protection, e.g., by using sequence numbers or timestamps, the replayed query
message is dropped by EN2 and the subsequent nodes (in this example only EN3) are
protected. More promising than this attack are attacks at lower levels, e.g., a denial-of
sleep attack by sending packets to all nodes in its communication range. However, as
we already stated above, STEF does not address such attacks. Therefore, additional
measures must be taken into account.
In this section, we showed the resilience of STEF against PDoS attacks. STEF is inde-
pendent of any threshold value of compromised nodes, i.e., the filtering power remains,
even if an adversary has compromised an arbitrary number of sensor nodes.
5.5.3 Additional Attacks
The STEF protocol is designed to provide protection against false data injection and
PDoS attacks to enable a secure report generation and transmission in WSNs which
use query-response communication between sink and sensor nodes. In the previous
sections, we have discussed the resilience of our protocols against these two attacks. We
showed that only a type II.1.3 or II.2.3 (Insider, Mote or Laptop Class, m ≥ T Nodes)
adversary who has compromised the actual CH can perform a false data injection attack.
In addition, we showed that STEF provides resilience against PDoS attack against any
type of adversary. However, an adversary can try to perform attacks with the goal
of preventing the sink from receiving (valid) reports. In this section, we discuss how
an adversary could achieve this by performing one or more of the attacks described in
Section 2.2.4. However, we do not address these attacks directly since these are well-
known attacks on wireless multihop communication. We discuss these attacks in the
context of the STEF protocol for the sake of completeness and briefly introduce possible
countermeasures.
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To prevent the sink from receiving (valid) reports, an adversary can either disrupt the
receiving of messages or invalidate messages.
Message receipt can be disrupted by DoS attacks that prevent query, response, or
endorsement messages from arriving at their destination. By performing a jamming
attack, an adversary can prevent that a query, response, or endorsement message reaches
its destination. Thus, either CH cannot generate a valid report since it does not receive
sufficient endorsements, a query does not reach CH, or the response message does not
reach the sink. In either case, the sink does not receive a report. Depending on the
number of nodes and the range of the wireless transceiver (Mote Class or Laptop Class
adversary), the affected area of the WSN might vary. Jamming attacks are a general
problem of all wireless communication systems and can only be mitigated (cf. Section
2.2.4). On the STEF protocol itself, DoS attacks have no negative impact since non-
receiving of messages has no negative consequences, e.g., a CH is not excluded from the
network if the sink does not receive a response message. However, a DoS attack may
have negative consequences for the WSN application if for example time-critical alarm
messages do not arrive (in time) at the sink.
Alternatively, an adversary can try to perform attacks on the routing protocol to
force route changes during a query-response communication. As a result, the message
is dropped and does not reach the sink. Also an EN can perform a selective forwarding
or blackhole attack and drop query or response messages. To cope with attacks on
the routing protocol, multipath routing schemes (cf. Section 2.2.4) could be used in
combination with STEF. By setting up multiple paths where each query-response is
sent along, one can tolerate a certain number of en-route nodes performing a selective
forwarding or blackhole attack. Alternatively, protocols based on IDS such as [144,
145] can be used to detect nodes performing selective forwarding or blackhole attacks.
However, since ENs, that apply the STEF protocol, filter injected false messages out,
an IDS may falsely identify a filtering EN as a node performing a selective forwarding
attack. This issue must be considered when using such protocols.
An adversary can also try to invalidate the report the sink receives. A malicious
EN can perform a data alteration attack and modify query or response messages before
forwarding them. A modification of the query message, however, would be immediately
detected by the next EN which would drop the message. As a result no response message
would be generated. An EN can also flip some bit in the response message. As long as
QID and c have not been modified, the message is forwarded to the sink but not accepted
since at least one of the verifications fail. Likewise, a malicious CH can send an invalid
response message. Multiple path routing and detection and exclusion of malicious nodes
are typical countermeasures against such an adversary.
A CN is able to invalidate the response message by performing a FEDoS attack. The
mechanism used by the STEF protocol to protect against false data injection attacks
enables FEDoS attacks. However, this is not a specific problem of STEF; other protocols,
e.g., [261, 272, 258, 257], are also susceptible to this attack. In STEF, CH receives t
endorsements of neighboring CNs in form of a MAC. However, CH is not able to verify
the MACs since they are generated using a shared key known only by the CN and the
sink. Thus, a malicious CN can send a false MAC value to invalidate the collaboratively
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generated report. The calculated SMAC is invalid, since one of the MACs is false. As
a result, the sink does not accept the received report. Due to the XOR operation, the
sink is not able to distinguish if the report generating node has tried to perform a false
data injection attack or if one of the endorsing nodes has sent a false MAC. As part of
this thesis, we developed protocols to address this issue. These protocols are presented
in Chapter 6.
5.6 Theoretical Performance Analysis
In this section, we theoretically evaluate the performance of STEF. First, we evaluate the
storage requirements on the sensor nodes. Second, we perform an energy saving analysis
for the main energy consumers to show how much energy STEF could save by filtering
false reports. For the sake of completeness, we finally show the additional overhead for
STEF which affects the energy consumption only marginally. In all our analyses the
resources of the sink are assumed to be unlimited and are therefore not considered. The
results of this analysis are verified by implementing the STEF protocol and performing
simulations which is discussed in Section 5.7.
5.6.1 Storage Requirements
The storage requirements introduced by STEF can be divided into two parts: (1) the
storage overhead generated directly by STEF, and (2) the overhead generated by usage
of existing techniques.
STEF requires each sensor node Si to store its node identifier IDSi and the key KSi
shared with the sink. To verify the correctness of received response messages, each sensor
node stores the tuple (QID, c′) for each query message. These tuples are deleted after
the appropriate response message has been forwarded or if the response message does
not arrive within a certain period of time.
STEF uses existing authentication and key establishment schemes. The authentication
scheme is used to authenticate the query messages sent by the sink. Such a scheme can
also be used to authenticate periodical, necessary broadcast messages. Since the storage
requirements depend on the particular authentication scheme and usage scenario, we
neglect the storage requirements for the authentication scheme in the analysis. Further-
more, each node establishes pairwise keys with its neighboring nodes to authenticate the
exchanged messages during the report generation phase.
To quantify the storage requirements let Ln, Lk, Lq, and Lh denote the bit length of a
node identifier , a symmetric key , a QID, and a hash value respectively. Let the average
number of stored (QID, c′) tuples be v and the average number of neighbors of a node
be w. A sensor node Si has to store its own node identifier IDSi , its personal key KSi ,
w pairwise keys shared with its neighbors, and v tuples (QID, c′). Thus, the storage
requirements SR for a sensor node are:
SR = Ln + Lk · (w + 1) + v · (Lq + Lh). (5.7)
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Example 5.6 For example, suppose each sensor node has 6 neighboring nodes on aver-
age, and has to store 5 (QID, c′) tuples on average. The bit length of each key and hash
value is 64 bit and the length of a node identifier is 10 bit. A sensor node has to store 6
node identifiers, 7 keys and 5 hash values, resulting in a total of 103.5 byte on average.
The Berkeley Mica2 Motes offer 4KB of SRAM. Therefore, the storage requirements of
STEF are suitable for current sensor nodes.
5.6.2 Energy Savings
We analyze how much energy can be saved by filtering false messages using STEF.
In our protocol, sensor nodes consume energy in two ways: (1) to send and receive
messages, and (2) to verify response messages by computing hash values. Although
computing hash values increases energy consumption only marginally [181], we consider
the computational overhead, since in STEF, every node verifies each response message.
We use an analysis model similar to that in [261] and [257] to quantify the energy
consumption. In addition to the notion used in Section 5.6.1 let Lr and Lm denote
the length of a regular report, and a MAC respectively. A response message in STEF
contains the regular report (including the node identifier of the CH ), the QID , the
ticket c, the SMAC, and the identifiers of the t endorsing nodes. Thus, the length of a
response message in STEF is L′r = Lr + Lq + Lh + Lm + t · Ln. Let H be the number
of hops a report travels, and the normalized legitimate traffic and malicious traffic be
1, and β respectively. We use e1 = e1s + e1r to denote the energy consumed in sending
and receiving 1 byte, and e2 to denote the energy for one hash computation to verify a
response message.
Without STEF, the legitimate traffic and the injected traffic is sent (and received)
along all H hops. This results in an energy consumption:
Er = H · Lr · e1 · (1 + β) (5.8)
Using STEF, a legitimate response message is never dropped and is forwarded along
all H hops. The ticket within this message is verified at each hop. A fabricated response
message injected by a compromised node is received from an uncompromised node at
the next hop. This node verifies the included ticket and drops the message. The injected
message is filtered out after one hop. This results in an energy consumption:
E′r = H · (L′r · e1 + e2) + β · (L′r · e1r + e2) (5.9)
Example 5.7 Figure 5.3 compares the energy consumption for message transmission
with and without STEF, when the length of a regular report is Lr = 24 byte, of a QID
or node identifier is Lq = Ln = 10 bit, of a hash value or MAC is Lh = Lm = 64
bit, and H = 100 Hops. As the overhead affected by the choice of t is only marginal
(resulting only in a slightly larger message containing more small node identifiers), we
plot the energy consumption only for different values for β and hold t constant to 5 for
the sake of simplicity. We use the results presented in [261] to quantify e1s = 16.25 µJ
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Figure 5.3: Energy consumption depending on the injected traffic ratio β.
for sending, e1r = 12.5 µJ for receiving, and e1 = 28.75 µJ for sending and receiving
one byte using Mica2 nodes. The energy consumed for performing one hash (or MAC)
computation using RC5 [195] block cipher is e2 = 15 µJ and takes about 0.5 ms. We
can see that the dashed curve, showing the energy consumption E′r of STEF, is extremely
slowly growing. At the intersection of both curves STEF begins to save energy, i.e., STEF
saves energy when the amount of malicious traffic starts to exceed the legitimate traffic
and demonstrates increasingly remarkable energy savings. For example, when β = 2 or
5, STEF saves more than 32% or 65% of energy, respectively.
In most WSN applications, legitimate traffic occurs only when some events of inter-
est appear in the sensor network. In contrast, to increase the impact of their attacks,
adversaries often inject a large amount of bogus traffic into the network, which is often
several orders of magnitude greater than that of legitimate traffic [261]. STEF is partic-
ular useful for these scenarios in saving a great deal of energy by early filtering of false
messages.
The average path length also has impact of the energy-saving performance of STEF.
The further the false messages are injected away from the sink, the greater the energy
savings that can be achieved by STEF. Injected messages distant from the sink are more
detrimental than those injected in the sink’s vicinity because their transmission involves
many more intermediate nodes. Therefore, it is reasonable for an adversary to inject
false messages far away from the sink.
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Figure 5.4: Energy Consumption depending on the average number of hops for β = 5.
Example 5.8 Figure 5.4 illustrates the impact of the path length for a fixed value of
β = 5. The remaining variables are set according to Example 5.7.
5.6.3 Additional Overhead
STEF introduces some additional overhead which affects the energy consumption only
marginally. For the sake of completeness we present this overhead in this section.
When CH receives a query message, it generates a report which must be endorsed by t
neighboring nodes. Therefore, CH sends the report to its w neighbors. If a neighboring
node agrees on this report, it endorses the report by generating a MAC as described in
Section 5.4.1 and sends it back to CH . Assume all w neighboring nodes agree on the
report. CH has to send one local broadcast message containing the report which all
w neighboring nodes receive. Each of the w nodes (and CH ) computes a MAC on the
report. CH has to receive w MACs which are sent by the w neighboring nodes. This
results in a local communication and computational overhead:
El = (e1s + w · e1r) · Lr + (e1r + e1s) · w · Lm + (w + 1) · e2 (5.10)
Example 5.9 Assuming the values from the previous examples this results in an energy
consumption of El = 3.675 mJ which adds an additional overhead of about 2.6%.
STEF produces some additional overhead in the query message by adding the value
c′ and the encrypted value c to the message.
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Example 5.10 Continuing the example from above, this results in an overhead of 128
bit in this message. Therefore, the energy overhead for one node forwarding the query
message is 460 µJ which is negligibly small.
Furthermore, the query message is authenticated using authentication schemes sup-
porting immediate authentication. Such an authentication is necessary in almost all
scenarios and is therefore neglected in our analysis. Evaluations of the additional over-
head can be found in the respective publications.
5.7 Implementation and Simulation
To perform a deeper analysis of the performance of the STEF protocol, a simulation
environment called STEF-Sim has been implemented [169]. STEF-Sim enables the
visualization and evaluation of different scenarios with and without STEF. Simulations
can be adjusted by a set of parameters to show the impact on the energy and storage
consumption of the protocol. The parameters include number of sensor nodes of the
network, number of regular query-responses, number of compromised nodes, behavior
of a compromised node, required energy for sending and receiving, required energy for
cryptographic computations, transmission range etc. Sensor nodes and the sink can be
generated with the desired properties and placed at the desired locations. Figure 5.5
shows the main window of the simulation environment running a simulation with 200
sensor nodes and one attacking sensor node.
Figure 5.5: Main Window of STEF-Sim
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The main focus of the simulation environment is the evaluation of PDoS attacks.
Nevertheless, the collaborative report generation is considered in the energy and storage
consumption. To evaluate the performance of STEF under active attacks, the adversarial
behavior of a sensor node can be adjusted in different ways. The time when a sensor node
gets malicious can be set and how a compromised node performs a PDoS attack. Based
on the different settings, simulations can be performed with or without the use of STEF
to get indications of the effectiveness of STEF. The energy and storage consumption of
the whole network and each individual sensor node can be visualized and exported in
Gnuplot [95] files.
Simulations have been performed for different scenarios ranging from networks with
200 sensor nodes and one compromised sensor node to networks with 1000 sensor nodes
and 100 compromised nodes. Regular traffic is simulated by setting different values for
the number of regular queries (and the related responses). Injected traffic is simulated by
setting different values for the number of adversarial nodes which inject one message per
second. The simulation time is set to 60 seconds and each sensor node is configured with
a fixed amount of available energy. Each setting is simulated with STEF activated and
STEF deactivated. The simulations have been evaluated and the energy consumptions
have been plotted. The evaluations include the number of nodes which died from energy
exhaustion, the overall number of sent messages, the overall remaining energy, and the
maximum storage requirements. These values have been compared to show the number
of dead nodes, the number of filtered messages, and the saved energy. The results have
shown that even a single compromised node can cause serious damage and force many
sensor nodes to waste energy if STEF is not used.
In Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 we illustrate this issue by exemplarily showing simulation
results of a network consisting of 200 sensor nodes and one adversarial node. The figures
show the energy consumption of sensor nodes 31 and 152. Each node forwards different
parts of the regular traffic of 20 queries and responses. Furthermore, they forward
injected traffic by the adversarial node. This node is in direct range of node 31 but can
reach node 152 only via node 31. Figure 5.6 shows the change of the available energy of
nodes 31 and 152 during the simulation when STEF is not used. At the beginning of the
simulation, the available energy of each sensor is 1000 mJ . Both sensor nodes receive
and forward the same amount of injected messages, but since node 31 forwards more
queries and responses than node 152, its energy consumption is higher. Nearly at the
end of the simulation time, the energy resources of node 31 are totally exhausted. Figure
5.7 shows the energy of the two nodes if STEF is used. Since node 31 filters the injected
messages of the adversarial node, the available energy of node 152 is much higher at the
end of the simulation time. Furthermore, since node 31 saves the energy for sending the
injected messages, it still has remaining energy at the end of the simulation.
Further information on the developed simulation environment STEF-Sim and the
performed simulations can be found in [169].
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Figure 5.6: Available Energy without STEF
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Figure 5.7: Available Energy with STEF
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5.8 Summary
In this chapter, we presented STEF, a protocol that applies the second form of recovery
by using a mechanism that tolerates compromised nodes and adaptable mechanisms to
protect against PDoS and false data injection attacks. Exploiting the typical query-
response communication paradigm of many WSNs, STEF achieves recovery from PDoS
attacks without relying on a threshold scheme, i.e., the security of STEF is not broken
if a certain threshold number of nodes are compromised. To protect against false data
injection attacks, a typical threshold-based approach is applied.
The STEF protocol relies only on lightweight cryptographic operations which are
applicable in resource constrained WSNs. The ticket concept enables a the filtering of
injected false messages of an adversary that tries to perform a PDoS attack. Messages
to the sink are only valid if they contain a valid ticket. Each en-route node which
forwards a message is able to verify the validity of the ticket and drops the message if
the ticket is invalid. Hence, a false message can be filtered out immediately. The ticket
concept enables the separation of report generation with sink verification, and the en-
route filtering, without the need for symmetric key sharing between sensor nodes. This
results in a high resiliency against node compromise. Even if an adversary compromises
several nodes, he is not able to inject as many messages as desired to perform a successful
PDoS attack because he does not possess the necessary tickets. If a region is under
suspicion to be compromised, it can be easily excluded by simply not sending query
messages containing valid tickets there. Furthermore, node compromises are limited to
the immediate vicinity of the compromised nodes and do not affect the whole network.
The theoretical performance analysis and the simulation results show that STEF is
able to significantly reduce the energy consumption by immediate filtering of false re-
ports. STEF’s energy savings increase with the number of injected false messages and
with the distance to the sink where an adversary injects false messages. Furthermore,
the storage requirements in the sensor nodes is very low, and thus, STEF is applicable
in high density networks, and leaves room for further security mechanisms.
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6 Addressing False Data Injection and
FEDoS Attacks
In Section 5.5.3, we have argued that many protocols (including our proposed STEF pro-
tocol) are susceptible to False-Endorsement-Based Denial of Service (FEDoS) attacks.
By compromising a single sensor node, an adversary may be able to invalidate many
valid reports.
In this chapter, we present a basic and an enhanced protocol to address both false
data injection and FEDoS attacks. The protocols apply a detection strategy by detecting
compromised sensor nodes that perform a FEDoS attack. Our protocols do not require
intensive monitoring of neighboring sensor nodes to detect the FEDoS attack. After
detection, the first form of recovery (see Section 3.1.3) is applied by using mechanisms
to exclude the compromised nodes. Immediately after detection, compromised sensor
nodes are locally excluded to prevent them from continuing the attack.
This chapter shares some material with previously published work Defending against
False-Endorsement-Based DoS Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks [130] and An En-
hanced Scheme to Defend against False-Endorsement-Based DoS Attacks in WSNs [131].
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1 we introduce the problem of FEDoS
attacks. In Section 6.2, we present related work. Setting and notation are described in
sections 6.3 and 6.4. Our proposed basic endorsement protocol is described in Section
6.5. The security of our proposed protocol is analyzed in Section 6.6 and the performance
is evaluated in Section 6.7. Next, we describe and analyze our enhanced endorsement
protocol in Section 6.8. Implementation and simulation results of both protocols are
shown in Section 6.9. Finally, we summarize the chapter in Section 6.10.
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, we have described our proposed STEF protocol and showed in Section 5.5.3
that STEF and many other protocols using similar mechanisms to cope with false data
injection attacks are susceptible to False-Endorsement-Based Denial of Service (FEDoS)
attacks (cf. Section 2.2.4). In a FEDoS attack, an adversary sends a false endorsement
to the report generating node, to invalidate the message for the sink. As a result, the
sink does not accept this message, although the information of the message is correct.
For example, in STEF and the protocols proposed in [272, 269, 257], the adversary can
send a false MAC to the report generating node. This MAC is compressed together with
the MACs of the other endorsing nodes using bitwise XOR. The sink does not accept this
message since the verification of the endorsements fails. Due to the XOR operation, the
sink is not able to distinguish whether the report generating node has tried to perform
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a false data injection attack or one of the endorsing nodes has sent a false endorsement.
Furthermore, the report generating node cannot verify the received endorsements since
it does not possess the cryptographic keys to verify the MACs.
The first approach to handle FEDoS attacks has been proposed in [150]. Their prob-
abilistic voting-based filtering scheme (PVFS) is an extension of [261] and requires that
all endorsements (MACs) are attached to the message for the sink. The scheme is resis-
tant against FEDoS attacks up to a certain threshold of compromised nodes but is not
capable to identify a false endorsing node.
In this chapter, we present a basic and enhanced protocol to cope with FEDoS attacks.
They can be used as an extension of STEF or for example the protocols proposed in
[272, 269, 257] to cope with all three types of attacks: false data injection, PDoS, and
FEDoS. The protocols prevent an adversary compromising less than a certain threshold
of sensor nodes, to inject false reports. Furthermore, the protocols enable the report
generating node to verify if a neighboring node has sent a false endorsement. Therefore,
an endorsing node has to prove at a later point in time, that the sent endorsement
was correct. If the proof fails or the node does not perform the proof, the malicious
node is locally excluded to prevent further damage by the report generating node and
if necessary, a new report for the sink is generated. In addition, our protocols induce a
low processing and transmission overhead. Only cheap and fast to perform operations
are required, and the local communication overhead is significantly low. In particular,
the message sent to the sink is very short since it does not require attaching multiple
MACs.
6.2 Related Work
The protocols addressing false data injection and PDoS attacks presented in Section 5.2
are all susceptible to FEDoS attacks.
The first work considering FEDoS attacks is presented by Li et al. in [150]. They
refer to the FEDoS attack as false vote on real event attack. A probabilistic voting-
based filtering scheme is proposed as an extension to the Statistical En-Route Filtering
Scheme proposed in [261]. A node endorses a report by sending a vote, which is basically
a MAC generated with a symmetric key. Each node is randomly assigned with a certain
number of keys from a key pool. The message sent to the sink contains multiple MACs.
If an en-route node possesses one (or more) key(s) used to generate a MAC, it can verify
the MAC. Two binary sequences are used where the verifying en-route nodes record the
total number of verified MACs and the verified valid MACs. If a predefined threshold
of invalid MACs has been reached, the message is dropped. Thus, if a malicious node
tries to inject a false message, then multiple MACs have to be forged. This will be
detected in a probabilistically manner and the message is filtered out on the way to
the sink. Furthermore, if a malicious node tries to send a false vote, then the message
can still reach the sink, since only one MAC is wrong and the threshold has not been
reached. The proposed scheme has the drawback that it requires to attach all MACs
to the message sent to the sink. Since this communication involves multiple nodes this
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is not very efficient. Furthermore, a distinction between FEDoS or false data injection
attack cannot be made and the report generating node cannot detect and exclude a false
endorsing node. In addition, the scheme does not consider malicious en-route nodes
which try to invalidate the message by rating some MACs as false.
6.3 Setting
We assume the system model described in Chapter 4. In addition, we make the following
assumptions.
We assume that our protocols are used in combination with a protocol that addresses
PDoS attacks as mentioned above. To simplify matters, we assume that our protocols
are used in combination with the STEF protocol presented in Chapter 5.
Furthermore, we assume that the sensor nodes are loosely time synchronized as in
µTESLA [181]. To achieve this time synchronization, protocols such as [89, 226, 227, 203]
can be used. Time synchronization is necessary in many scenarios to have a link between
the measured data and the time of measurement.
The WSN is organized in clusters. One node within each cluster acts as cluster head
(CH ) for the other cluster nodes (CNs). The report generation for the sink is initiated
by the CH by performing the initial measurement of the physical phenomena. In our
protocol, this measurement must be endorsed by t neighboring CNs which sense the same
or similar physical phenomena, where t is a system parameter. The parameter t can be
adjusted according to the density of the network, the resistance to node compromise
etc. Clusters can either be static (meaning the CHs do not change, e.g., as in [133])
or dynamic (meaning the nodes acting as CHs can change during the lifetime of the
network, e.g., as in the STEF protocol). Reports can be generated either reactively (by
reacting to queries from the sink as in the STEF protocol) or actively if a pre-defined
event (e.g., the temperature exceeds a certain threshold) occurs (as in [261]). Broadcast
messages from CH can be overheard by all CNs.
6.4 Notation
We present our protocol by means of a cluster C consisting of one cluster head CH and
several cluster nodes CNj , j = 1, . . . , u.
Applying a cryptographic hash function h on data m is denoted with h(m). A one-way
hash chain [136] stored on CH , or CNj is denoted with CCH = cCH0 , . . . , c
CH
τ , or C
CNj =
c
CNj
0 , . . . , c
CNj
τ respectively. The hash chain is a sequence of τ hash values, each of fixed
length l, generated by a hash function h : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l by applying the hash function
h successively on a seed value cτ , such that cν = h(cν+1), for ν = τ − 1, τ − 2, . . . , 1, 0.
In other words,
c0 = hτ (cτ ) = h ◦ h ◦ . . . ◦ h︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ times
(cτ )
As in the STEF protocol, the hash function must provide only preimage and second
preimage resistance; collision resistance is not required (compare Sections 3.2.2 and
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5.4.1). Note that the hash chains are generated from cτ to c0 but used in reversed order.
For the sake of simplicity, our protocol is presented by means of such simple hash chains.
However, more efficient hash chain constructions should be used, such as Sandwich-chain
or Comb Skipchain [110]. These constructions requires less storage space and enable a
fast resynchronization, i.e., a verifier can verify a chain value on a distant trusted chain
value efficiently without requiring to apply the hash function on each single intermediate
hash value.
6.5 Endorsement Protocol
Our proposed protocol enables a collaborative report generation. It is resistant against
false data injection up to t+1 compromised sensor nodes and is resistant against com-
promised CNs which perform a FEDoS attack. By using our protocol as an extension
to STEF or one of the protocols presented in [272, 269, 257], one obtains the resistance
against PDoS attacks.
The main idea of our protocol is that after a certain time span an endorsing CN must
prove to CH that the sent endorsement was correct. If CH detects that one or more CNs
do not prove the correctness of their endorsement or the prove fails, then it excludes this
node(s) from its communication. If required, a new report for the sink can be generated
without the malicious node(s). All subsequent reports are also generated without the
malicious node(s).
Endorsements are generated by using values of a hash chain stored on each node. A
value is only valid for a certain time span. Like in µTESLA [181], the hash values are
disclosed at a later point in time, which enables CH to verify the previously received
endorsements. Since the hash values are invalid at this point in time, a malicious CH
cannot misuse them to inject a false report.
The protocol is divided in three phases, Initialization, Report Generation, and Verifi-
cation. The initialization phase is performed only once whereas report generation and
verification phase are always performed when a report for the sink is generated.
6.5.1 Initialization
The initialization phase is performed to configure the sensor nodes before deployment,
and to execute some initialization procedures directly after deployment. This phase is
assumed to be secure as mentioned above.
CH and CN1, . . . ,CNu are assigned with a unique identifier IDCH and IDCN1 , . . . , IDCNu ,
and are preloaded with a hash chain CCH and CCN1 , . . . , CCNu .
After the nodes are deployed, each sensor node establishes pairwise keys with its
one-hop neighbors using some existing protocols and exchanges the verification values
cCH0 and c
CN1
0 , . . . , c
CNu
0 , respectively. Since we assume that our protocol is used in
combination with the STEF protocol where each sensor node could be chosen as a CH ,
all nodes store the verification values of all other nodes in the cluster and establish
pairwise keys with all other nodes in the cluster. In scenarios with a static setting where
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Figure 6.1: Cluster C consisting of CH , CN1, CN2, CN3, CN4, CN5, and CN6
CH does not change, it is sufficient that only pairwise keys are established between CH
and each CN , and that only CH stores the verification values of all CNs.
Adding new nodes at a later point in time is not integral part of our proposed protocols.
However, an additional mechanism similar to Kerberos (cf. related work in Section 3.2.8)
where the sink acts as a trusted intermediary could be used to distribute verification
values and to establish pairwise keys. The sink stores all hash values of all hash chains
and is able to distribute the required verification values for the specific time to newly
deployed sensor nodes and their neighbors. Likewise, pairwise keys can be established.
Example 6.1 Figure 6.1 shows a cluster C consisting of CH and CN1, CN2, CN3, CN4,
CN5, and CN6. The nodes have exchanged the verification values and have established
a symmetric key with each other node. Thus, CN1 stores cCH0 , c
CN2
0 , c
CN3
0 , c
CN4
0 , c
CN5
0 ,
cCN60 and the pairwise keys. According to this, CH and the other CNs store verification
values and keys.
6.5.2 Report Generation
CH performs the initial measurement of the physical phenomena and initiates the report
generation. However, CH cannot generate a valid report for the sink by itself. CH
requires the help of t neighboring CNs which endorse the measurement. An endorsement
is only sent from a CN if it agrees on the measurement within a certain error range.
An endorsement is generated by using the values of the hash chain stored on each CN .
A hash value is only valid within a certain time interval. For this purpose, we introduce
time intervals Iλ, λ = 1, . . . , τ . In interval Iλ, the hash values c
CNj
λ of each CNj are valid
to endorse a report. Thus, in interval I1 hash values c
CNj
1 , in interval I2 hash values
c
CNj
2 , and so on, are used to endorse a report. CH uses the values c
CH
λ from its own
hash chain to generate its own “endorsement”. The parameter τ can be either adjusted
to the lifetime of the WSN or the size of the hash chains. In the latter case, new hash
chains need to be generated which are valid from interval Iτ+1.
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Figure 6.2: Exemplary time bar: CH performs a measurement at time TM in interval I2. The report
generation ends by sending the report message to the sink at time TS . This message is received by the
sink at time TR in interval I3. The hash values c2, which are used to generate the endorsements in
interval I2 are disclosed at time T2 at the beginning of interval I4.
As in µTESLA [181], the hash values are disclosed at a later point in time to enable
the detection of false endorsing CNs in the verification phase.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the whole report generation is completed
before the end of one interval. This is the common case, since our protocol only involves
local one-hop communications and operations are cheap and fast to execute. If CH
detects that the interval is nearly at its end, CH waits until the beginning of the next
interval. Furthermore, we assume that the used hash chains last for the whole lifetime
of the network, i.e., in the last interval Iτ the seed values cCHτ and c
CNj
τ are valid.
First, we explain the report generation by continuing Example 6.1. Afterwards, we
describe the detailed protocol steps in general by means of two algorithms describing
the actions of CH and the CNs.
Example 6.2 We consider the cluster shown in Figure 6.1 and the chronological order
shown in Figure 6.2. The report generation is initiated by CH in interval I2 with the
measurement of the physical phenomena at time TM . We set t = 2, i.e., CH requires
endorsements from two CNs to generate a valid report for the sink.
At time TM , CH performs a measurement of some physical phenomena and generates
the related report R and associates the time of measurement TM with the report. CH
sends a local broadcast message1 to all CNj , j = 1, . . . , 6 in the cluster containing R and
TM
CH ∗→ CNj : R, TM (6.1)
which is also shown in Figure 6.3.
After a CN has received this message, it checks the interval of validity of TM by
verifying if the measurement has been performed in the current interval I2, and if the
report R received from CH matches its own measurement R′ within a certain range ε.
We assume that these verifications fail on nodes CN5 and CN6. However, on nodes CN1,
CN2, CN3, and CN4 the verifications pass, i.e., these nodes generate an endorsement.
CN1, CN2, and CN3 calculate
EndCNi = h(c
CNi
2 ||R||TM ) (6.2)
1The symbol
∗→ denotes a local broadcast message.
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Figure 6.3: CH broadcasts R and TM to all CNj , j = 1, . . . , 6.
Figure 6.4: CN1, CN2, CN3, and CN4 send endorsements to CH . The endorsement of CN4 is invalid.
for i = 1, . . . , 3 and send endorsements EndCNi to CH. We assume that CN4 is com-
promised and tries to perform a FEDoS attack by sending EndCN4 6= h(cCN42 ||R||TM ).
Figure 6.4 illustrates this. CH temporarily stores all received endorsements for future
verification purposes.
Likewise, CH calculates EndCH . It chooses two of the four received endorsements,
e.g., EndCN1 and EndCN4, and calculates
SEnd = EndCH ⊕ EndCN1 ⊕ EndCN4 . (6.3)
Then, CH sends the following message to the sink
R, TM ,SEnd, {IDCH , IDCN1 , IDCN4} (6.4)
containing the report R, the time of measurement TM , the compressed endorsements
SEnd, and the set of node identifiers of the endorsing nodes.
In Algorithm 6.1 and Algorithm 6.2, we describe the general protocol steps of CH and
the CNs in detail.
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Algorithm 6.1 shows the actions of CH . First, CH generates R and TM and sends
these values to all CNj . Each CNk where the verifications pass sends an endorsement
back to CH . The remaining CNs do not send an endorsement. CH maintains a set F ,
containing all node identifiers of trusted CNj whose endorsements are accepted. Directly
after the initialization phase, F contains the node identifiers of all CNj in the cluster
C. Each endorsement, received from a trusted CNk, is temporarily stored for future
verification. CH calculates h(cCHλ ||R||TM ), selects t endorsements it has received from
trusted CNs, and compresses them to one SEnd. The node identifiers of CH and the t
CNs whose endorsements have been used to generate SEnd are stored in a data structure
V . The final message to the sink consists of R, TM ,End , and V .
Algorithm 6.1 CHRepGen(t, cCHλ )
1: Generate R and TM
2: Send R, TM to all CNs
3: while Receiving Endorsements do
4: if getID(EndCNk) ∈ F then
5: store EndCNk
6: end if
7: end while
8: EndCH = h(cCHλ ||R||TM )
9: End = EndCH
10: V = {IDCH }
11: randomly select t distinct endorsements Endf1 , . . . ,Endft
12: for i = 1 to t do
13: End = End ⊕ Endfi
14: add node identifier fi to V
15: end for
16: Sendto(Sink) : R, TM ,End , V
Algorithm 6.2 describes the actions of a CNj when it receives R and TM from CH
to endorse (or not to endorse) a report. CNj first checks if the measurement has been
performed in the current interval. Next, it performs its own measurement R′. If R′
matches R within a certain error range ε, CNj generates an endorsement and sends it
to CH .
Algorithm 6.2 CNRepEnd(cCNjλ , Iλ, R, TM , ε)
1: if TM ∈ Iλ then
2: Generate R′
3: if R′ − ε ≤ R ≤ R′ + ε then
4: EndCNj = h(c
CNj
λ ||R||TM )
5: Sendto(CH ) : EndCNj
6: end if
7: end if
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6.5.3 Verification
The verification phase is twofold. In the Sink Verification the sink verifies that CH and
t of the neighboring CNj have collaboratively generated the report. This prevents an
adversary from performing a false data injection attack to deceive the sink, if he has
compromised less than t+1 nodes. The CH Verification enables CH to verify if one or
more CNk have sent a false endorsement in the report generation phase.
Sink Verification
Since the sink knows all values of each node’s hash chain, it can easily verify the received
report. We first continue the examples from above and then present an algorithm which
describes the actions of the sink.
Example 6.3 The sink receives the message at time TR in interval I3 (see Figure 6.2).
First, the sink verifies that the message is fresh, i.e., R, TM ,SEnd, V has not been re-
played. Then the sink verifies that the message contains the identifier of CH and t=2
additional node identifiers. The verification passes since the message contains the set of
identifiers {IDCH , IDCN1 , IDCN4}. Next, the sink identifies the interval Iλ in which the
message was generated by means of TM ; in this case I2. Now the sink verifies that the
used hash values cCH2 , c
CN1
2 , and c
CN4
2 have not been disclosed yet by verifying that
TR + Tδ < T2 (6.5)
where Tδ is the maximum synchronization error and T2 is the time where the hash values
used in interval I2 are disclosed (see Figure 6.2). This verification also passes and thus,
the sink verifies SEnd by calculating
SEnd ′ = h(cCHλ ||R||TM )⊕ h(cCN1λ ||R||TM )⊕ h(cCN4λ ||R||TM ) (6.6)
and compares SEnd ′ with the received SEnd
SEnd ′ ?= SEnd. (6.7)
Since CN4 has sent a false endorsement, this verification fails and the sink does not
accept the report. The sink is not able to distinguish whether a compromised CN has
sent a false endorsement or a compromised CH has tried to perform a false data injection
attack by guessing some endorsements. In contrast, however, CH is able to verify the
received endorsements and to detect the false endorsing CN4 which CH excludes from
any of its further report generations. Since the protocol is used in combination with
the STEF protocol, reports are generated reactively and the sink sends a new query to
CH . The new report generation without the malicious CN4 is initiated after CH has
performed the CH Verification. If our protocol is used in scenarios where reports are
generated actively, CH autonomously initiates a new report generation after detecting
that a false endorsement has been used to generate the message for the sink.
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Algorithm 6.3 describes the actions of the sink to verify the received message. V
denotes the set of the node identifiers of CH and the t endorsing nodes. The first
verification ensures that the message is fresh using TM as a unique timestamp for R
and V . Then it is verified that V contains the identifier of CH and t additional node
identifiers. Next, the function getInterval returns the interval in which the report
was generated. The following verification ensures, that the hash values used to generate
the report have not been disclosed yet. If the verifications pass, the reference SEnd ′ is
calculated using the hash values stored at the sink. The function getHash returns the
corresponding hash values from the memory of the sink. Finally, the calculated SEnd ′
is compared with the received SEnd and if they are equal, the report is accepted.
Algorithm 6.3 SinkVerify(R, TM ,SEnd, V, t, TR, Tδ, Tλ)
1: result = reject
2: if R, TM , V fresh then
3: if V contains IDCH and t additional node identifiers then
4: Iλ = getInterval(TM )
5: if TR + Tδ < Tλ then
6: for i = 0 to t do
7: cλ = getHash(V [i], Iλ)
8: SEnd ′ = h(cλ||R||TM )⊕ SEnd ′
9: end for
10: if SEnd ′ = SEnd then
11: result = accept
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
15: end if
CH Verification
To detect false endorsing CNk, a second verification is performed when the endorsing CNk
discloses their used hash values cCNkλ . The values are disclosed at time Tλ = (λ+ ∆) ·TL
where TL denotes the length of an interval and ∆ specifies the delay before the hash
values are disclosed. To prevent a powerful adversary from performing a false data
injection attack, ∆ should be adjusted in such a way that the sink has already received
the message before the hash values are disclosed. This prevents an adversary from
collecting hash values to generate a false message and transmitting it to the sink using
a faster communication channel, e.g., a wormhole [122]. If a CNk does not disclose the
used hash value, it is assumed that the node has been compromised and is excluded
by CH from any further report generation. In this case, a new message for the sink is
generated by performing the report generation again, but without the malicious CN.
We first continue our examples and afterwards present an algorithm which describes
the actions of CH to detect a FEDoS attack.
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Example 6.4 At time T2 (see Figure 6.2) CN1, CN2, CN3, and CN4 disclose the hash
values cCN12 , c
CN2
2 , c
CN3
2 , and c
CN4
2 . First, CH checks if the hash values are valid by
verifying for k = 1, . . . , 4
h(cCNk2 )
?= cCNk1 . (6.8)
If CH has missed some of the previously disclosed hash values or no reports have been
generated and therefore, some hash values have not been disclosed, CH can apply the
hash function multiple times to resynchronize; i.e., given a trusted value cp, it can verify
the validity of cq, where q > p, by verifying that Hq−p(cq) = cp. As mentioned in
Section 6.4, we propose to use efficient hash chain constructions which enable efficient
resynchronization without the need to apply the hash function q − p times. Especially if
q − p is large, this is important to save energy and to enable fast verifications.
We assume that all endorsing nodes disclose the correct hash value (even the false
endorsing node CN4). Since CH has stored all received endorsements in the report
generation phase, it is able to verify them now. CH calculates for k = 1, . . . , 4
End ′CNk = h(c
CNk
2 ||R||TM ) (6.9)
and compares it with the already stored EndCNk , k = 1, . . . , 4
End ′CNk
?= EndCNk (6.10)
The verification of EndCN4 fails, since CN4 has sent a false endorsement in the report
generation phase. Thus, CH excludes CN4 from any of its future report generations.
Since the message sent to the sink contains the endorsement of CN4, a new message
for the sink needs to be generated. Since the protocol is used together with the STEF
protocol, CH waits for a new query from the sink. If reports are generated actively, CH
autonomously starts a new report generation.
If the endorsement from CN4 has not been used in the generation of the SEnd, the
fraud is anyway detected by CH but no new report needs to be generated.
Algorithm 6.4 describes the verifications of CH. Before the algorithm is executed, CH
removes all CNk which do not disclose the hash values used to generate an endorsement
from the set F . If a CN is removed from F , CH can delete the pairwise key and the
verification value of this CN to save memory space. If an endorsement of any of these
CN k has been used to generate SEnd, a reaction is necessary since presumably the report
has been invalidated by these nodes. In case that only query-response communications
between sink and CH is used, CH waits for a new query from the sink. In an active
setting, CH initiates a new report generation. For each of the remaining CNs Algorithm
6.4 is executed.
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First, the disclosed hash values are verified on their validity. If the verification fails,
CNk is removed from F . In case that an endorsement of one of these nodes has been used
to generate the report message, appropriate reactions as described above are performed.
If the verification passes, CH calculates the endorsement of CNk and compares it with
the temporarily stored endorsement, received in the report generation phase. Again, if
this verification fails CNk is removed from F and if necessary appropriate reactions are
performed.
Algorithm 6.4 CHVerify(R, TM , V, IDCNk ,EndCNk , c
CNk
λ , c
CNk
λ−1 , G)
1: if h(cCNkλ ) 6= cCNkλ−1 then
2: F = F \ IDCNk
3: if IDCNk ∈ V then
4: reaction
5: end if
6: else
7: End ′CNk = h(c
CNk
λ ||R||TM )
8: if End ′CNk 6= EndCNk then
9: F = F \ IDCNk
10: if IDCNk ∈ V then
11: reaction
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
In the listing of Protocol 6.1, we summarize the whole protocol for our cluster C. If the
role of CH changes, it is required that all nodes establish pairwise keys and exchange
the verification values. Furthermore, we show only the relevant aspects of our protocol.
To use the protocol in combination with the STEF protocol additionally requires that
each node stores a symmetric key shared with the sink. The possibly required reaction
depends on the setting. In a reactive setting (as in the STEF protocol), reactions are
initiated by the sink by sending new queries. In an active setting, CH initiates a reaction
by initiating a new report generation after detecting that a FEDoS attack has been
performed and the endorsement has been used to generate the sink message.
The listing contains the respective numbers of the protocol steps, the interval or point
in time where a protocol step is performed, the involved sensor nodes, and the transmit-
ted message or the performed action.
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Protocol 6.1 Protocol to detect FEDoS attacks
1. Initialization:
• Each sensor node has a unique identifier.
• Each sensor node stores a hash chain.
• CH has established pairwise keys with its neighboring CNj .
• CH stores verification value(s) cCNj0 for each CNj .
• CH maintains a set F of trusted CNj .
2. Protocol steps:
1a TM ∈ Iλ CH : generate R
1b Iλ CH
∗→ CNj : R, TM
1c Iλ CNj : verify TM
1d Iλ CNj : generate R′
1e Iλ CNj : verify R′ − ε ≤ R ≤ R′ + ε
1f Iλ CNk: calculate EndCNk = h(c
CNk
λ ||R||TM )
1g Iλ CNk → CH : EndCNk
1h Iλ CH : store all EndCNk to R, TM
1i Iλ CH : calculate EndCH = h(cCHλ ||R||TM )
1j Iλ CH : calculate SEnd using EndCH and t EndCNk
1k Iλ CH : generate V
1l TS ∈ Iλ CH → Sink: R, TM ,SEnd, V
2a TR Sink: verify message is fresh
2b TR Sink: verify V contains IDCH and t additional
node identifiers
2c TR Sink: verify hash values have not been disclosed
2d TR Sink: calculate SEnd ′, verify SEnd ′ = SEnd
2e TR Sink: if necessary perform reaction
3a Tλ CNk → CH : cCNkλ
3b Tλ CH : remove non-disclosing CNk from F
3c Tλ CH : if h(c
CNk
λ ) 6= cCNkλ−1 remove CNk from F
3d Tλ CH : calculate all End ′CNk , if End
′
CNk
6= EndCNk
remove CNk from F
3e Tλ CH : if necessary perform reaction
The symbol
∗→ denotes that a message is sent to all CNj of the cluster.
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6.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security of our protocol. We perform our analysis according
to our adversary model presented in Section 4.3 and refer to the protocol steps listed in
Protocol 6.1.
Since our protocol focuses on the security threats of false data injection attacks and
FEDoS attacks to either deceive the sink by forging events or to invalidate the collab-
oratively generated report, we show the efficacy of our protocol against such attacks in
this section. In addition, we note the impact of the STEF protocol in the relevant text
passages since we assume that our protocol is used in combination with the STEF pro-
tocol presented in Chapter 5. Furthermore, we discuss additional attacks an adversary
can perform to disrupt the functionality of our protocol.
6.6.1 Resilience against False Data Injection Attacks
To successfully deceive the sink, an adversary has to generate a valid response message.
The sink accepts only a fresh response message containing a valid SEnd generated by
t+1 nodes (CH and t CNs) where the used hash values to generate SEnd have not been
disclosed yet (cf. steps 2a -2e). Thus, an adversary has to generate a response message
according to step 1l:
TS ∈ Iλ, CH → Sink : R, TM ,SEnd, V
containing report R, time of measurement TM , SEnd, and the set V containing the
identifiers of CH and the t CNs. SEnd must be generated using only hash values valid for
the current interval Iλ. In the following, we discuss how the different types of adversaries
specified in the adversary model can try to perform a false data injection attack to deceive
the sink.
Assume that a type I adversary (Outsider) successfully generates a valid response
message in interval Iλ for a false event. Thus, the adversary must be in possession of
t+1 valid endorsements for this event (cf. step 1j). To get t+1 valid endorsements the
adversary can try to convince neighboring sensor nodes to send valid endorsements for
the false event, misuse old messages, or try to generate valid endorsements by himself.
In the first case, the adversary sends his false event to neighboring sensor nodes (cf.
step 1b) to get endorsements from these nodes. However, this violates our assump-
tion that neighboring sensor nodes send only endorsements to nodes which authenticate
themself using the pairwise keys established in the initialization phase. Even if no au-
thentication mechanisms are applied, the adversary would not receive any endorsements
from neighboring nodes. An uncompromised sensor node first verifies the validity of the
event (cf. step 1c and 1e) before generating an endorsement.
In the second case, the adversary eavesdrops on transmitted messages and then tries
to misuse them. The adversary can record a valid response message sent in step 1l and
replay it at a later point in time to make the sink believe an event happened later on
again. However, since the sink keeps record of received messages, a message containing
the same timestamp TM for R and V is not accepted again (cf. step 2a). Alternatively,
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the adversary can record endorsements sent in step 1g and misuse them to generate a
new response message. However, endorsements are specific for R and TM (cf. step 1f)
and only valid as long as the hash values has not been disclosed (cf. step 2c). Thus, to
inject a message describing a false event (within this interval Iλ), the adversary would
have to invert the hash function to get in possession of a valid hash value. However,
this is in contradiction to our assumption that this is not possible (cf. Section 4.3).
Finally, the adversary can try to misuse disclosed hash values to generate endorsements
for his false event. However, the sink accepts only a message if the used hash values
have not been disclosed (cf. step 2c). Since we assume that sensor nodes are loosely
time synchronized (cf. Section 6.3), the adversary cannot misuse these hash values.
In the latter case, the adversary needs a hash value valid for the current interval to
generate a valid endorsement by himself. As stated above, he cannot extract a valid hash
value from an endorsement. The only alternative is to calculate preimages to already
disclosed hash values which is a contradiction to our assumption that the hash function
provides preimage and second preimage resistance.
In addition, since we assume that the protocol is used in combination with the STEF
protocol, false injected messages from a type I.1 adversary (Outsider, Mote Class) are
immediately filtered out at the next hop since the message does not contain a valid ticket
value (compare Section 5.5.1).
Now we consider type II.1.1, II.1.2, II.2.1 and II.2.2 adversaries (Insider,
Mote or Laptop Class, 1 ≤ m < T Nodes), i.e., an adversary has compromised
m < t+1 nodes. The adversary is in possession of m < t+1 valid hash values and can
generate m valid endorsements. However, to generate a valid SEnd , t+1-m additional
endorsements are required since SEnd must be generated by t+1 different nodes using
the appropriate values of their hash chains (cf. step 2b). As mentioned in the discussion
of type I adversaries, an adversary cannot generate these endorsements since this would
be in contradiction to our assumptions. Thus, the adversary is unable to generate a valid
SEnd. Furthermore, the applied STEF protocol, requires the adversary to compromise
the actual CH since the response message must include a valid ticket value.
A type II.1.3 or II.2.3 adversary (Insider, Mote or Laptop Class, m ≥ T
Nodes) has compromised m ≥ t+1 sensor nodes. Using the hash values stored on the
compromised sensor nodes, the adversary can generate endorsements and calculate a
valid SEnd for a false event. Thus, the adversary can generate a valid response message
according to step 1l and deceive the sink. However, the impact of these node compro-
mises is mitigated by the STEF protocol. It prevents an adversary from performing
PDoS attacks and limits the node compromise to the region of the compromise, i.e., an
adversary cannot inject false reports appearing from arbitrary locations. In addition,
the adversary can only inject messages if one of the compromised nodes is choosen as
CH (compare Section 5.5.1).
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6.6.2 Resilience against FEDoS Attacks
A FEDoS attack can be only performed by endorsing CNs which send false endorsements
to CH to invalidate the collaboratively generated report for the sink. The goal of our
proposed protocol is to detect and exclude a CN performing a FEDoS attack.
To perform a FEDoS attack in interval Iλ, an adversary uses at least one CN to send
an invalid endorsement according to step 1g to CH :
Iλ, CN → CH : EndCN 6= h(cCNλ ||R||TM ).
However, this attack is only successful when the endorsement is used to generate SEnd.
To elude detection, the adversary must disclose a valid hash value at time Tλ which
passes the verifications in steps 3c and 3d.
Any type I adversary (Outsider) cannot successfully perform a FEDoS attack,
since he is not in possession of pairwise keys to authenticate himself. False endorsements
or replayed old endorsements are immediately dropped. To be able to send endorse-
ments to CH , an adversary requires valid pairwise keys. Since an outside adversary
has no access to keys stored on sensor nodes, he can only analyze overheared messages
or misbehave in the execution of the security mechanisms to expose keys. The former
violates the assumptions that the applied cryptosystem cannot be broken, the latter the
assumption that misbehaving in the execution of the security mechanism does not result
in the exposure of keys (cf. Section 4.3).
Now we consider a type II adversary (Insider) who has compromised one or more
CNs. Since the adversary can access the pairwise keys, he can send authentic messages
which are accepted by CH .
We assume that a compromised CN sends a false endorsement EndCN in step 1g.
Since CH randomly uses t endorsements to generate SEnd (cf. step 1j), the attack
is successful with a certain probability. Now we discuss how the adversary can try
to elude detection to continue his attacks. To get not excluded, CN must disclose a
hash value cCNλ at time Tλ (cf. step 2b). This hash value must pass the verification in
step 3c. CH verifies that h(cCNλ ) = c
CN
λ−1. Since the hash function provides preimage
and second preimage resistance, the adversary must disclose cCNλ = c
CN
λ to pass the
verification. If the adversary discloses a different value, CH immediately excludes CN .
We assume that the adversary has disclosed the correct hash value. In step 3d, CH uses
this hash value to calculate End ′CN and compares it with the received EndCN . Since
the endorsements are calculated using a preimage and second preimage resistant hash
function, the false endorsement EndCN must be equal to the valid endorsement EndCN
to pass the verification End ′CN = EndCN . This is in contradiction to our assumption
that CN has sent a false endorsement. Thus, the adversary can either send only a valid
endorsement or gets detected and excluded.
When a false endorsement has been used to generate SEnd, a new report generation
is initiated but without the compromised node. Likewise, if a node does not disclose the
hash value in order to prevent detection of a FEDoS attack, this node is also excluded
from CH and a new report is generated.
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A compromised CN performing a FEDoS attack is detected at the time of disclosure
of the hash value used to generate the first false endorsement. The compromised CN
can send false endorsements until this point in time. The number of false endorsements
that can be sent depends on the number of regular reports generated for the sink and
on the setting of the hash value disclosure. If the parameters are well adjusted, then an
adversary can invalidate only one report and is then excluded.
If our protocol is used in a dynamic system where the role of a CH changes, then each
node must gain its own experiences which other nodes behave maliciously. Thus, if a
CN is excluded by the current CH it might be possible that the malicious CN can again
send a false endorsement to a successor CH which then excludes the malicious node.
6.6.3 Additional Attacks
In this section, we discuss how an adversary could try to disrupt the functionality of our
proposed protocol by performing one or more of the attacks described in Section 2.2.4.
An adversary can try to disrupt the collaborative report generation to prevent the
sink from receiving a response message. Since the report generation involves only local
one hop communications, attacks such as selective forwarding or data alteration are not
suitable. However, an adversary can perform a jamming attack to prevent sensor nodes
from receiving certain messages. Jamming the broadcast message sent by CH to its CNs,
can prevent some of the CNs from receiving R, TM . As a result, they do not generate
endorsements and CH might not receive sufficient endorsements to generate a valid sink
message. Likewise, the adversary can jam the wireless channel at the time where CNs
send endorsements or when CH sends the sink message. As already discussed in Section
2.2.4, jamming attacks are a general problem of all wireless communication systems and
can only be mitigated. Similar to the STEF protocol, non-receiving of these message
has no negative impact on the protocol itself (cf. Section 5.5.3) but may influence the
WSN application when messages do not arrive (in time).
Alternatively, an adversary can try to disrupt the detection process of false endorsing
nodes. As discussed in the previous section, an adversary cannot prevent that a false
endorsing CN is excluded. However, an adversary can try to mislead CH to falsely
exclude an uncompromised CN by jamming the wireless channel at the time of hash
value disclosure. This is possible since CNs that do not disclose the verification hash
values are excluded by CH . To address this issue, we propose an enhanced version of
our protocol in Section 6.8 which is not susceptible to this attack. This version of the
protocol can be used in scenarios where jamming attacks are likely and no jamming
countermeasures such as proposed in [255, 256] are taken.
6.7 Theoretical Performance Analysis
In this section, we theoretically evaluate the performance of our protocol. First, we
evaluate the storage requirements on the sensor nodes. Second, we analyze the energy
consumption of our protocol by evaluating the impact of computational and communica-
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tion overhead. In all our analyses the resources of the sink are assumed to be unlimited
and are therefore not considered.
6.7.1 Storage Requirements
We consider the storage requirements of a CH in the analysis since CH has the highest
requirements. CH needs to store a hash chain, verification values for all nodes in the
cluster, pairwise keys for all nodes in the cluster, and temporarily R, TM , received
endorsements and respective node identifiers of the endorsing nodes. If the role of CH
does not change, a CN needs only to store a hash chain and one pairwise key shared
with CH . In a dynamic system the storage requirements for CH can be transferred to
all nodes in the cluster.
Most of the storage space is required by the hash chain. As already mentioned above,
efficient constructions for one-way hash chains should be used. In [110] two efficient con-
structions for one-way hash chains have been proposed called Sandwich-chain and Comb
Skipchain. An example for a WSN with resource constrained sensor nodes is presented.
The WSN is assumed to have a lifetime of 10 years, where hash values are disclosed
every second, thus, requiring a total of 315 million values. Storing each single value in
one hash chain is impossible. Using the Sandwich-chain, the storage requirements are
still too large for current sensor hardware (more than 1.5 Mbyte) whereas the storage
requirements using Comb Skipchain (1188 byte) are feasible for this scenario. However,
the Sandwich-chain construction has the advantage that a verifier can “catch up”, i.e.,
verify a hash chain value based on a distant trusted chain value, faster. Summarizing,
the storage requirements for the hash chain depend on the scenario (lifetime of the net-
work, disclosure schedule of the hash values) and on the specific construction of the hash
chain. In addition, the storage requirements for the hash chain decrease since old already
disclosed hash values can be deleted to free storage space.
To verify the disclosed hash values, CH needs to store one (or more) verification hash
values. Using simple hash chain constructions [136] requires CH to store one hash value
for each CN. The Comb Skipchain is a hierarchical one way chain consisting of two
levels of chains where a primary chain act as root of a set of secondary chains. The
verification can be either realized by storing either only one value of the primary chain
or by storing one value of the primary and additionally one value of the secondary chain.
Storing two values has the advantage that the verification is faster and cheaper, since
the verifier has to perform only one hash computation. In the initialization phase CH
is configured with the initial verification values cCNj0 , j = 1, . . . , u where the respective
value represent either one or two effective values depending on the implementation of
the hash chain. These values are successively replaced with afterwards disclosed values.
Hence, the storage requirements for the verification values remain constant. If sensor
nodes are excluded from the communication (or fail because of energy failure), then CH
deletes the hash values of the respective nodes to free storage space.
CH establishes a pairwise key with each CN in the cluster to provide some basic
authentication and integrity measures. As stated in our general setting, for example
ZigBee link layer keys can be established in the initialization phase.
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If a report for the sink is generated, CH has to store R, TM , and the endorsements and
the related IDs of the endorsing CNs temporarily until the disclosure of the necessary
verification hash values. After the endorsements have been verified, this data can be
deleted.
To quantify the storage requirements SR let SRH , SRV , Ln, Lk Lr, Lt, and Lh denote
the storage requirements for the hash chain, the storage requirements for the verification
value(s) for one node, the length of an ID, the length of a symmetric key, the length of a
report, the length needed for the time of measurement, and the length of an endorsement
(i.e., the length of a hash value), respectively. Let u+1 be the number of nodes in the
cluster, v the average number of endorsement sets a node stores, i.e., the number of
reports for which endorsements are temporarily stored, and w the average number of
endorsements for one specific report. Thus, the storage requirements for a sensor node
are:
SR = SRH + u · (SRV + Ln + Lk) + v · (Lr + Lt + w · (Lh + Ln)) (6.11)
Example 6.5 Suppose a lifetime of 10 years where hash values are disclosed every sec-
ond. Using the Comb Skipchain construction for the hash chain requires 1188 byte (9504
bit) as mentioned above. Realizing the verification by storing two hash values requires a
verifying node to store one hash value of length 80 bit of the primary chain and one hash
value of length 64 bit of the secondary chain [110]. Let the length of an ID be 10 bit, the
length of a symmetric key be 64 bit, the length of a report be 24 byte, the length of TM
be 29 bit, the length of an endorsement be 64 bit, u = 6, v = 2, and w = 5. Thus, the
storage requirements are:
SR = 9504 + 6 · ((80 + 64) + 10 + 64) + 2 · (192 + 29 + 5 · (64 + 10))
= 11994bit = 1499.25byte
(6.12)
The example clearly shows that the major storage space is required by the hash chain.
Since only few values are currently needed and most of the values are only needed in
the far future, the main part can be stored in the 512 kbyte flash memory of a Berkeley
Mica2 mote. The currently needed space for hash values, temporarily stored reports etc.
requires only little space in the 4 kbyte RAM of the node. If new values of the hash
chain are required, they can be moved from the flash memory to the RAM.
To apply the STEF protocol together with our proposed protocol, additionally requires
that CH stores a shared key with the sink. This enables the sink to send encrypted ticket
values to CH .
6.7.2 Energy Consumption
In this section, we evaluate the energy consumption of our protocol. The energy con-
sumption of the sensor nodes can be divided into two parts, (1) the energy required for
the cluster C for report generation and the endorsement verification, and (2) the energy
to forward the message along multiple hops to the sink. We evaluate the energy require-
ments of our protocol solely and in combination with STEF. The combination of both
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protocols is compared with the PVFS scheme proposed by Li et al. in [150]. We consider
the worst case with the maximum energy consumption where all nodes in the cluster C
send endorsements and no PDoS attack is performed, i.e., no messages are filtered out.
However, we neglect the energy costs for comparison operations and the XOR operation
since these costs are negligibly small.
Energy Consumption of Cluster C
The report generation requires CH to broadcast R and TM to all u nodes CNj which
all u CNj receive. CH and all u CNj generate an endorsement by performing one
hash computation. Each CNj sends the endorsement back to CH . Thus, CH receives
u endorsements. CH generates the message for the sink, and sends it to the sink.
Each CNj discloses the used hash value and sends it to CH . The hash values2 and
endorsements are verified by CH . Equation 6.13 shows the required energy El1 for the
local communication and computational overhead of the cluster. We use e1 = e1s + e1r
to denote the energy consumed in sending and receiving one byte, and e2 to denote the
energy for one hash computation.
El1 = e1s · Lr · Lt
+ u · e1r · Lr · Lt
+ (u+ 1) · e2
+ u · e1s · Lh
+ u · e1r · Lh
+ (Lr + Lt + Lh + (t+ 1) · Ln) · e1s
+ u · e1s · Lh
+ u · e1r · Lh
+ 2u · e2
(6.13)
Example 6.6 We use the results presented in [261] to quantify e1s = 16.25 µJ for
sending, e1r = 12.5 µJ for receiving, and e1 = 28.75 µJ for sending and receiving one
byte using Berkeley Mica2 Motes. The energy consumed for performing one hash or
MAC computation using RC5 [195] block cipher is e2 = 15 µJ and takes about 0.5ms.
In addition to the values used in Example 6.5 let t = 4. This results in a total energy
consumption for the cluster C of El1 = 11.66mJ . Thus, the average energy consumption
for one node is 1.67mJ .
The Mica2 Motes are powered with two 1.5 V AA batteries in series connection. We
assume a total capacity of 2750 mAh using standard AA batteries which results in 29700
J . Thus, the average ratio of energy consumed for one node and one report generation
including the CH verification if a false endorsement has been sent is 0.0056% of the total
available energy.
2Depending on the the interval of the last previously verified hash value, and the used hash chain
construction, it might be necessary to compute more than one hash computation. We neglect this in
our theoretical analysis. In the implementation however, this issue is considered.
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Energy Consumption for Message Forwarding
Since transmitting messages is the most cost intensive factor in WSNs, it is crucial that
the transmitted messages are short. In particular, the message sent to the sink should be
short since the transmission of this message involves multiple forwarding en-route sensor
nodes. Thus, one goal in the design of our protocol was to let this message be as short
as possible.
The message sent to the sink consists of the report R, the time of measurement TM ,
the compressed endorsements SEnd and the t+1 node identifiers. Equation 6.14 shows
the energy consumption to forward the message along H hops to the sink.
Ef1 = H · (Lr + Lt + Lh + (t+ 1) · Ln) · e1 (6.14)
Example 6.7 Assuming that the message generated in Example 6.6 is forwarded along
100 hops, we have an energy consumption of Ef1 = 120.4mJ . Compared to the energy
consumed in the cluster C this is more than 6.68 times as much. Thus, the total energy
requirements are E1 = El1 + Ef1 = 132.06mJ .
Energy Consumption in Combination with STEF
The report generation and verification is performed as described in Section 6.5, except
that the message sent to the sink additionally contains a query identifier of length Ln
and a ticket value of length Lh which enables the resistance against PDoS attacks. The
ticket value is basically a hash value of length Lh.
The local communication and computational overhead is shown in Equation 6.15.
El2 = e1s · Lr · Lt
+ u · e1r · Lr · Lt
+ (u+ 1) · e2
+ u · e1s · Lh
+ u · e1r · Lh
+ (Lr + Lt + 2Lh + (t+ 2) · Ln) · e1s
+ u · e1s · Lh
+ u · e1r · Lh
+ 2u · e2
(6.15)
Equation 6.16 shows the energy consumption to forward the message along H hops,
where at each hop a hash computation is performed to verify if the ticket within the
message is valid to prevent PDoS attacks.
Ef2 = H · ((Lr + Lt + 2Lh + (t+ 2) · Ln) · e1 + e2) (6.16)
Example 6.8 We use the values of the previous examples. The energy consumption for
a combination of both protocols is E2 = El2 + Ef2 = 11.81 + 148.48 = 160.29mJ .
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Comparison to PVFS
The scheme proposed by Li et al. [150] addresses all three attacks. However, it is a
probabilistic scheme which tolerates a certain number of false endorsements but it does
not enable CH to detect and exclude a false endorsing CN .
The scheme requires CH to generate a report which is broadcasted to the CNs. Each of
the CNs and CH generate a MAC on the report using a symmetric key. Each CN sends
the MAC together with the key identifier of the used key back to CH . CH generates
and sends the message for the sink. The message contains an identifier of the cluster, the
report, and t+1 MACs with the respective key identifier. Let Lkid, and Lcid denote the
length of a key identifier, and the length of a cluster identifier respectively. The energy
for the cluster to generate and send the message is shown in Equation 6.17.
El3 = e1s · Lr
+ u · e1r · Lr
+ (u+ 1) · e2
+ u · e1s · (Lh + Lkid)
+ u · e1r · (Lh + Lkid)
+ (Lcid + Lr + (t+ 1) · (Lh + Lkid)) · e1s
(6.17)
Other CHs, which forward the message to the sink, share a symmetric key used to
generate a MAC with a certain probability. If a CH holds a corresponding verification
key, it verifies the MAC and records the verification result in two binary sequences.
One binary sequence records the verified MACs, and one binary sequence records the
verified valid MACs. The length of these two binary sequences depends on the length of
t+1 . Each node which has performed a verification, appends a signature (in the form of a
MAC), generated with a symmetric key shared with the sink, to the message. In addition,
an accepted flag is set if a certain number of valid verifications has been performed. If
this bit is set, the message is forwarded to the sink without further verifications. This
also limits the maximum message size, since no further signatures are appended. For a
comparison with similar properties, we set the number of verifications (and appended
signatures) to t+1 .
Equation 6.18 shows the energy consumption for forwarding the message including the
energy required to verify the MACs and to generate the signatures. The first part (lines
1-2) of the equation represents the constant part (containing cluster identifier, report,
t+1 MACs and the respective key identifier, the two binary sequences and the accepted
flag). The second part of the equation (lines 3-5) represents the energy required for the
dynamic part of the message, i.e., the transmission energy for the appended signatures.
We use the σ function3 to distinguish between two cases. Altogether, t+1 signatures are
attached at maximum. Therefore, it must be distinguished between the case H ≤ (t+1)
3σ(x) =
(
0 x ≤ 0
1 x > 0
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Figure 6.5: Energy Consumption depending on the average number of hops for u = 6 and t = 4
and H > (t + 1). The last part (lines 6-7) represents the energy required to verify and
generate the signatures where we also must distinguish between the two cases.
Ef3 = H · (Lcid + Lr + (t+ 1) · (Lh + Lkid)+
2dlog2(t+ 1)e/8 + 1/8) · e1
+ σ(t+ 2−H) · ΣHk=0k · Lh · e1 +
σ(H − t− 1) · (Σ(t+1)k=0 k · Lh · e1 +
(t+ 1)(H − (t+ 1)) · Lh · e1)
+ σ(t+ 2−H) · 2 ·H · e2 +
σ(H − t− 1) · 2 · (t+ 1) · e2
(6.18)
Example 6.9 We use the same values as in the previous examples and let the length
of a key identifier Lkid and the length of a cluster identifier Lcid be 16 bit, respectively.
The energy requirement is E3 = El3 + Ef3 = 5.3 + 333.87 = 339.17mJ .
Figure 6.5 plots the energy consumption depending on the average number of hops for
u = 6 and t = 4. E2 represents the energy consumption of our protocol in combination
with the STEF protocol and E3 the energy consumption of PVFS. It can be seen that
the local overhead of the combination of our protocol and STEF is slightly higher than
PVFS, but compensates this by reducing the energy required to forward messages.
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6.8 Enhanced Endorsement Protocol
The above described basic protocol can be used in scenarios where jamming attacks are
unlikely or measures, e.g., [255, 256], are taken to cope with jamming attacks. However,
as described in Section 6.6.3, if an adversary is able to successfully perform a jamming
attack, uncompromised sensor nodes may be falsely excluded by CH .
In this section, we discuss several possible solutions and extend the above proposed
protocol to additionally cope with this jamming attack. For this, we introduce a greylist-
ing approach. If CH does not receive the proof of a CN , either an active adversary might
have performed a jamming attack or the CN indeed did not perform the proof. Thus,
CH does not immediately exclude this CN , but rather greylists it. CN is able to perform
the proof within the next endorsement it sends when no jamming attack occurs. The
enhancement introduces only a marginal increase of energy consumption compared to
the basic protocol.
6.8.1 Addressing the Jamming Attack
Jamming attacks are a general problem in wireless networks. The shared wireless channel
can be easily blocked by an adversary, resulting in a DoS of transmission and reception
functionalities.
Security protocols should not enable an adversary to cause additional damage (other
than successful transmission or reception of messages) by performing a jamming attack.
In the basic protocol, however, this is possible. It is assumed that a CN is compromised
if it does not disclose the hash chain value used to generate an endorsement. As a result,
this CN is excluded by CH . However, if CH does not receive the hash chain values
because of a jamming attack, the CN is falsely classified as compromised and excluded
from the report generation process.
One way to cope with the jamming attack might be using jamming detection mecha-
nisms. If there are indications of a jamming attempt, CH could not immediately exclude
the CN from which it does not receive the hash chain value. However, detection of jam-
ming alone is not sufficient, since even if we were able to detect that a jamming attack
has been performed, we are not able to verify the previously received endorsement. Fur-
thermore, current jamming detection mechanisms are very unreliable.
Another approach would be a random variation in the disclosure schedule of the hash
chain values. Thus, the adversary does not know the exact point in time he should
perform the jamming attack. The problem with this approach is that we cannot extend
the variation to an arbitrary long time span, since the verification of received endorse-
ments should be as fast as possible to enable a quick reaction on false endorsements,
i.e., exclusion of false endorsing nodes and if necessary new report generation. Thus, the
adversary just has to jam a short period of time to accomplish the goal that innocent
CNs are falsely excluded.
Alternatively, CH can perform a challenge-response like verification with the CN from
which it does not receive the hash chain value. CH might request the hash chain value
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if it does not receive the value at the specified point in time. However, we still cannot
distinguish whether CN does not respond or a jamming attack occurs.
One approach that does not require any additional mechanisms, such as jamming
detection, introduces greylists and requires only slight modifications to the original pro-
tocol. This approach is based on the following considerations. As long as an adversary
continues the jamming attack, CH does not receive endorsements anyway. Thus, CH
requires to verify previously received endorsements not until the receiving of a new en-
dorsement. This can be realized by integrating a second verification process into the
endorsement messages. After verifying the old endorsement, CH can immediately use
the new one.
We propose to realize this approach as follows. Each CH maintains a greylist. CH
adds a CN to the greylist if it does not receive the hash chain value from CN to verify
the previously received endorsement at the specified point in time. CH does not use
subsequent received endorsements from a CN that is listed in the greylist, until it receives
a valid hash chain value to successfully verify the unverified endorsement. CH completely
excludes a CN if a verification fails or if a specified threshold is reached, e.g., maximum
time span without a successful verification or maximum entries in the greylist is reached.
To enable a CN to be trusted again, it appends the last hash chain value which is
allowed to be disclosed to the next endorsement sent to CH . This enables CH to verify
the old unverified endorsement. If the verification of the old endorsement passes, CN
is trusted again and the currently received endorsement can be used to generate the
current report. If an adversary still performs a jamming attack, CH would not receive
the message anyway and CN remains in the greylist. Generally, we cannot protect
against jamming attacks that prevent reception of messages. However, applying this
modification to the protocol prevents an adversary from performing a jamming attack
that affects the protocol in such a way that an innocent CN is falsely excluded. We
describe the enhanced protocol in the next section.
6.8.2 Description of the Enhanced Protocol
In the enhanced protocol, the initialization phase remains the same as in the original
protocol. However, the report generation and verification phase are modified to cope
with the jamming attack. Each CH maintains a greylist that stores the node identifiers
of CNs from which CH does not receive verification hash chain values. Furthermore, a
CN sends the last verification hash chain value that is allowed to be disclosed together
with each endorsement it sends to CH .
Before we describe the modified report generation and verification phase in detail, we
illustrate the jamming attack in the following example.
Example 6.10 We assume that a report generation has been performed according to
Examples 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4. However, we assume that an adversary has performed a
jamming attack at time T2 and successfully prevented CH from receiving the verification
hash values from CN1 and CN2. Figure 6.6 illustrates this. In the basic protocol, CH
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Jammed Region
Figure 6.6: Jamming Attack at time T2: CH does not receive c
CN1
2 and c
CN2
2
falsely excludes both CNs. However, in the enhanced protocol, CH adds CN1 and CN2
to its greylist and does not immediately exclude them.
In the following, we describe the modified report generation and verification phase in
detail. Each phase is first illustrated by means of an example. Afterwards, we describe
the respective modified algorithms.
Report Generation
We first continue Example 6.10 to describe how the uncompromised CN1 and CN2 can
prove with the next endorsement that they, indeed, have sent a correct endorsement in
interval I2.
Example 6.11 We assume that a new report is generated in interval I4. Since CH did
not receive hash values from CN1 and CN2, they are listed in its greylist. Furthermore,
we assume that the adversary that has performed the jamming attack has moved to a
different location, i.e., no jamming attack is performed anymore.
As in the basic protocol, CH generates R and TM and sends these values to the neigh-
boring CNs. After a CN has received this message, it checks the interval of validity of
TM by verifying if the measurement has been performed in the current interval I4, and if
the report R received from CH matches its own measurement R′ within a certain range
ε. We assume that these verifications fail on nodes CN3 and CN5. However, on nodes
CN1, CN2, and CN6 the verifications pass, i.e., these nodes generate an endorsement.
CN1, CN2, and CN6 calculate
EndCNk = h(c
CNk
4 ||R||TM ) (6.19)
for k = 1, 2, 6. In contrast to the basic protocol, each CNk sends the endorsement EndCNk
together with the last hash value that is allowed to be disclosed to CH . In this case, cCNk2 .
Figure 6.7 illustrates this. For each received endorsement, CH checks if the endorsing
CN is listed in its greylist. In this case, CN1 and CN2 are listed, and CH is now able
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Figure 6.7: CNk, k = 1, . . . , 4 send endorsements EndCNk and the last hash value that is allowed to be
disclosed c
CNk
2 to CH . The endorsement of CN4 is invalid.
to verify the old endorsements generated in interval I2. The detailed description of the
verification is described in Example 6.12 and Algorithm 6.7. Since, indeed, an adversary
has performed a jamming attack, and the verifications of the old endorsements of CN1
and CN2 pass, CN1 and CN2 are trusted again, i.e., the currently received endorsements
can be used. CH temporarily stores all received endorsements, R, and TM for future
verification purposes.
CH calculates its own “endorsement” EndCH , chooses two of the four received endorse-
ments, e.g., EndCN1 and EndCN6, and calculates
SEnd = EndCH ⊕ EndCN1 ⊕ EndCN6 . (6.20)
Then, CH sends the following message to the sink
R, TM ,SEnd, {IDCH , IDCN1 , IDCN6} (6.21)
containing the report R, the time of measurement TM , the compressed endorsements
SEnd, and the set of node identifiers of the endorsing nodes.
Now, we describe the modified report generation phase in general by means of two
algorithms. Algorithm 6.5 specifies the actions of CH . As in the original protocol, CH
generates R and TM and sends these values to all CNj in the cluster. Each CNk that
agrees on R and TM generates an endorsement EndCNk and sends it together with the
last hash chain value cCNkλ−∆ that is allowed to be disclosed to CH (see Algorithm 6.6).
CH maintains a set F , containing all node identifiers of trusted CNs whose endorsements
are accepted. Initially, after the initialization phase, F contains the node identifiers of
all CNj in the cluster. Furthermore, CH maintains a set G, containing all the node
identifiers of greylisted CNs, i.e., those CNs from which CH did not receive a hash value
to verify a previously sent endorsement. For each CNk from which CH receives the
tuple (EndCNk , c
CNk
λ−∆), it first checks if this CNk is listed in its greylist G. If so, CH
verifies the old endorsement for which it has not received a hash chain value at the
specified point in time, using cCNkλ−∆ according to Algorithm 6.7. The node identifier of
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CNk is removed from G and added back to the set of trusted nodes F if the verification
passes. Otherwise, CNk is excluded from any further report generation. The detailed
description of the verification is described below in Example 6.12 and Algorithm 6.7.
Next, CH temporarily stores each endorsement EndCNk it receives from a CN listed in
the set F for future verification. After CH has received the endorsements, it calculates
h(cCHλ ||R||TM ) and selects t endorsements received from trusted CNs, and compresses
them to one SEnd using bitwise XOR. The node identifiers of CH and the t CNs whose
endorsements have been used to generate SEnd, are stored in a data structure V . The
final message to the sink consists of R, TM ,End , and V .
Algorithm 6.5 CHRepGen(t, cCHλ )
1: Generate R and TM
2: Send R, TM to all CNs
3: while Receiving (EndCNk , c
CNk
λ−∆) from CNk do
4: if IDCNk ∈ G then
5: CHVerifyGreylist(cCNkλ−∆)
6: end if
7: if IDCNk ∈ F then
8: store EndCNk
9: end if
10: end while
11: EndCH = h(cCHλ ||R||TM )
12: End = EndCH
13: V = {IDCH }
14: randomly select t distinct endorsements Endf1 , . . . ,Endft
15: for i = 1 to t do
16: End = End ⊕ Endfi
17: add node identifier fi to V
18: end for
19: Sendto(Sink) : R, TM ,End , V
Algorithm 6.6 describes the actions of a CN when it receives R and TM from CH to
endorse (or not to endorse) a report. CN first checks that the measurement has been
performed in the current interval. Next, it performs its own measurement R′. If R′
matches R within a certain error range ε, CN generates an endorsement and sends it
together with the last hash chain value cCNλ−∆ that is allowed to be disclosed to CH .
Verification
The sink verification remains the same as in the original protocol. However, to address
the jamming attack, the verification performed by CH is modified. We distinguish
between two cases, (1) when CH directly verifies the endorsements of the CNs when
they disclose their hash chain values at time Tλ, and (2) the greylisting-based verification
when CH did not receive the value at Tλ.
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Algorithm 6.6 CNRepEnd(cCNλ , c
CN
λ−∆, Iλ, R, TM , ε)
1: if TM ∈ Iλ then
2: Generate R′
3: if R′ − ε ≤ R ≤ R′ + ε then
4: End = h(cCNλ ||R||TM )
5: Sendto(CH ) : End , cCNλ−∆
6: end if
7: end if
Figure 6.8: An adversary performs a jamming attack at time T2. During the report generation in
interval I4 no jamming attack is performed anymore.
The first case is identical to the basic protocol except that before Algorithm 6.4 is
executed, CH removes all CNs from which it does not receive a verification hash chain
value from the set F and adds them to the greylist G.
In the following, we describe the second case in detail. First, we continue Example
6.11 and afterwards present an algorithm describing the greylist verification.
Example 6.12 An adversary has successfully performed a jamming attack at time T2,
i.e., CH did not receive hash chain values from CN1 and CN2 and thus, cannot verify
the endorsements it has received in interval I2 (see Figure 6.8). Thus, CH has added
IDCN1 and IDCN2 to its greylist G and has generated a new message for the sink without
the nodes in the greylist. In the current report generation in interval I4, CH receives
cCN12 and c
CN2
2 together with the endorsements EndCN1 and EndCN2. Using these hash
values, CH verifies the old endorsements. In this example, the verifications pass since
a jamming attack has, indeed, prevented CH from receiving the verification hash chain
values. Thus, the jamming attack has no affect in the modified protocol, i.e., an adversary
cannot blame innocent CNs so that they are excluded by CH .
Now we describe the case where CH does not receive the hash chain value from a CN
to verify a previously sent endorsement in general. CH executes Algorithm 6.7 in the
next report generation phase when CN sends a new endorsement together with the last
hash chain value that is allowed to be disclosed. First, CH removes the identifies of CN
from G. Next, CH verifies that the received hash chain value is correct. If it is correct,
CH recomputes the endorsement and compares it with the stored old endorsement. If
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both verifications pass, CH re-inserts the node identifier of CN into its set of trusted
nodes F and accepts endorsements from this node again. Otherwise, this CN is excluded,
i.e., endorsements from this node are not accepted and CH can delete the pairwise key
and the verification value of this CN .
Algorithm 6.7 CHVerifyGreylist(Rold, T oldM , V, IDCN ,End
old
CN , c
CN
λ−∆, c
CN
λ−∆−1, F,G)
1: G = G \ {IDCN }
2: if h(cCNλ−∆) = c
CN
λ−∆−1 then
3: calculate cCNold used to generate End
old
CN
4: End
′old
CN = h(c
CN
old ||Rold||T oldM )
5: if End
′old
CN = End
old
CN then
6: F = F ∪ {IDCN }
7: end if
8: end if
The listing of Protocol 6.2 summarizes the enhanced protocol for the cluster C. For
the sake of clarity, we show only the modified protocol steps compared to Protocol 6.1.
Protocol steps 1a - 1f are identical to the original protocol. In step 1g, an endorsing CNk
sends not only the endorsement EndCNk but also the last verification value c
CNk
λ−∆ that is
allowed to be disclosed. A new step 1h is introduced after step 1g to verify previously
greylisted CNs. These CNs have sent an endorsement in a previous report generation
but did not disclose a verification value. Starting from step 1i the subsequent steps of
CH remain the same as in the original protocol. Since the sink verification is unchanged,
protocol steps 2a - 2e also remain unchanged. Protocol step 3a where endorsing CNs
disclose their used hash values remains unchanged as well. The last modified protocol
step is step 3b. Instead of immediately excluding a CNk which does not disclose the
verification hash value, such a node is greylisted. Steps 3c - 3e again remain unchanged.
In the description, we assume that the role of CH does not change. In case that the
role of CH can dynamically change between the nodes of the cluster, it is required that
all nodes establish pairwise keys and exchange the verification values.
As in the listing of Protocol 6.1, we do show the combination with the STEF protocol.
To use the protocol in combination with the STEF protocol, requires each node to store
a symmetric key shared with the sink.
The possibly required reaction depends on the setting. In a reactive setting (as in the
STEF protocol), reactions are initiated by the sink by sending new queries. In an active
setting, CH initiates a reaction by initiating a new report generation after detecting that
a FEDoS attack has been performed and the endorsement has been used to generate the
sink message.
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Protocol 6.2 Enhanced protocol to detect FEDoS attacks
1. Initialization:
• Each sensor node has a unique identifier.
• Each sensor node stores a hash chain.
• CH has established pairwise keys with its neighboring CNj .
• CH stores verification value(s) cCNj0 for each CNj .
• CH maintains a set F of trusted nodes.
• CH maintains a set G of greylisted nodes.
2. Protocol steps:
. . . . . . . . . . . .
1g Iλ CNk → CH : EndCNk , cCNkλ−∆
1h Iλ CH : if IDCNk ∈ G, remove IDCNk from G
verify h(cCNkλ−∆) = c
CNk
λ−∆−1
calculate cCNold used to generate End
old
CN
if End
′old
CN = End
old
CN add IDCNk to F
1i Iλ CH : store all EndCNk to R, TM
. . . . . . . . . . . .
3b Tλ CH : move IDCNk of non-disclosing CNk from F to G
. . . . . . . . . . . .
6.8.3 Security Analysis
In Section 6.6 we have analyzed the security of the basic protocol and showed that
innocent CNs can be falsely excluded if an adversary performs a jamming attack at the
time of disclosure of the hash chain values. The enhanced protocol is, except for the
greylist concept, identical to the original protocol. Thus, we briefly discuss only how
the enhancement addresses the jamming attack. We refer to the protocol steps listed in
Protocol 6.2.
The original protocol is modified by introducing a greylist. CH adds a CN to this
list if it does not receive the verification hash value to verify the previously received
endorsement (cf. step 3b). The next endorsement message, CH receives from CN , in-
cludes a hash chain value that enables CH to verify the old endorsement (cf. step 1g).
If the verification of the old endorsement passes (cf. step 1h), the currently received
endorsement can be used to generate the current report. It is sufficient to send the ver-
ification hash chain values together with the endorsements, since the information that
an old endorsement was correct or not is only required if we receive a new endorsement
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to decide whether this endorsement can be used for the current report generation. At
an earlier point in time, the adversary could still perform the jamming attack. If the
verification of the old endorsement fails, CN is excluded from any further report gener-
ation, since it has indeed performed a FEDoS attack. Thus, as in the original protocol,
an adversary can only send false endorsements until the point in time where verification
hash chain values have to be disclosed. In addition, a jamming attack with the goal that
CH falsely excludes innocent CNs is not possible anymore. However, constant jamming
attacks with the goal of disrupting the communication can prevent a successful report
generation since either CH does not receive t endorsements or the message for the sink
is blocked by the jammer. But, as soon as the jammer leaves the region, new reports
can be generated and old endorsements can be verified.
6.8.4 Theoretical Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the enhanced protocol and compare it
with the original protocol.
Storage Requirements
The only additional storage space required in the enhanced protocol compared to the
original protocol is required for the greylist. In addition, the respective endorsements
of greylisted CNs have to be stored together with R and TM until they can be verified
or are removed since the predefined threshold of stored values is reached. We use the
same notation as used in equation 6.11, i.e., we let SRH , SRV , Ln, Lk, Lr, Lt, and Lh
respectively denote the storage requirements for the hash chain, the storage requirements
for the verification hash chain value(s) for one node, the length of an ID, the length of
a symmetric key, the length of a report, the length needed for the time of measurement,
and the length of an endorsement (i.e., the length of a hash value). Likewise, we let
u+ 1 be the number of nodes in the cluster, v the average number of endorsement sets
CH stores, i.e., the number of reports for which endorsements are temporarily stored,
and w the average number of endorsements for one specific report. In addition, we let
SRG denote the storage requirements for the greylist, i.e., IDs of greylisted nodes and
the respective endorsements and if required respective R and TM . Thus, the storage
requirements SRenh for CH are:
SRenh = SRG + SRH + u · (SRV + Ln + Lk) + v · (Lr + Lt + w · (Lh + Ln)) (6.22)
Example 6.13 Suppose a lifetime of 10 years where hash chain values are valid for one
second. Using an efficient hash chain construction proposed in [110] requires 1188 byte
(9504 bit). Let SRV be 144 bit, the length of an ID be 10 bit, the length of a symmetric
key be 64 bit, the length of a report be 24 byte, the length of TM be 29 bit, the length of an
endorsement be 64 bit, u = 6, v = 2, and w = 5. The storage space for the greylist is zero
if no node is greylisted. In Example 6.10, CN1 and CN2 have been greylisted. Thus, CH
stores the IDs and endorsements of these nodes together with R and TM in the greylist.
This results in a storage requirement SRG = 20bit + 128bit + 24byte + 29bit = 369bit.
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The total storage requirements are SRenh = 12363bit ≈ 1545byte. Compared to Example
6.5, the enhanced scheme requires approximately 3% more storage space.
As in the original protocol, the main storage is required by the hash chain where
the majority can be stored in the 512 kbyte flash memory of a Mica2 mote. Currently
needed values occupy only a small fraction of the 4 kbyte RAM. The storage space for the
greylist depends on the number of greylisted nodes. Depending on the number of nodes
in a cluster, it might be necessary to limit the maximum size of the greylist. Using an
appropriate replacement strategy, such as least recently used (LRU), CNs are excluded
by removing them from the greylist. However, this is only necessary in scenarios where
memory space is extremely scarce. Usually the worst case of storage requirements for
the greylist should be reasonable for most scenarios. In the worst case, CH needs to
store for each CN the ID, one endorsement and different values for R and TM . Since
each new endorsement enables the verification of the old endorsement, no more than one
endorsement and respective R and TM for each CN needs to be stored. For Example
6.13, the worst case storage requirements are as follows.
Example 6.14 In the worst case, CH requires to store the ID, one endorsement, R
and TM for each of the 6 CNs. Thus, the storage requirements for the greylist are
SRG = 1770bit ≈ 221byte. Compared to Example 6.5 of the basic scheme, the storage
requirements are approximately 15% higher.
Energy Consumption
As in the basic scheme, the energy consumption of the sensor nodes can be divided into
two parts, (1) the energy required for the cluster for report generation and endorsement
verification, and (2) the energy to forward the message along multiple hops to the sink
(compare Section 6.7). The energy consumption of the sensor nodes can be divided into
two parts, (1) the energy required for the cluster for report generation and endorsement
verification, and (2) the energy to forward the message along multiple hops to the sink.
The enhanced protocol differs only slightly in the local communication overhead for the
cluster. The energy for sending and receiving the endorsement message is slightly higher
since a verification hash chain value is included in the message. Equation 6.23 shows
the required energy El4 for the local communication and computational overhead of the
cluster.
El4 = e1s · Lr · Lt
+ u · e1r · Lr · Lt
+ (u+ 1) · e2
+ u · e1s · 2Lh
+ u · e1r · 2Lh
+ (Lr + Lt + Lh + (t+ 1) · Ln) · e1s
+ u · e1s · Lh
+ u · e1r · Lh
+ 2u · e2
(6.23)
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The energy for message forwarding remains the same as defined in equation 6.14, i.e.,
Ef4 = Ef1.
Example 6.15 Compared to Example 6.6, the local energy consumption increases about
11.8% from El1 = 11.66mJ to El4 = 13.04mJ (13.19mJ if used in combination with
STEF). The energy for message forwarding remains the same, i.e., Ef4 = Ef1 = 120.4
(148.48mJ if used in combination with STEF).
Now we consider the case that the basic and enhanced protocol are used in combination
with the STEF protocol. The total energy consumption presented in Example 6.8 is
E2 = 11.81 + 148.48 = 160.29mJ . For the enhanced protocol the energy consumption is
E4 = El4 + Ef4 = 13.19 + 148.48 = 161.67mJ . This is an increase of 0.86%.
6.9 Implementation and Simulation
The STEF-Sim simulation environment developed to analyze the performance of the
STEF protocol presented in Section 5.7 has been extended in [96] to additionally support
our proposed protocols to cope with FEDoS attacks. Figure 6.9 shows the new main
window of STEF-Sim 2.0. In addition to false data injection and PDoS attacks, STEF-
Sim 2.0 supports FEDoS and jamming attacks. STEF-Sim 2.0 enables the analysis
of the energy and storage requirements of the STEF protocol, the STEF protocol in
combination with the basic or the enhanced protocol, or solely the basic or the enhanced
protocol. The results can also be exported in Gnuplot [95] files.
Figure 6.9: Main Window of STEF-Sim 2.0
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Several simulations have been performed using STEF-Sim 2.0 to evaluate the impact
of different parameters. The simulations use the STEF protocol as a reference to analyze
the overhead introduced by the basic and the enhanced protocol. Simulations with
different parameters have been performed for the STEF protocol, the basic protocol,
the enhanced protocol, the basic protocol in combination with STEF, and the enhanced
protocol in combination with STEF. The following parameters have been used4:
• number of sensor nodes in a cluster (including CH ): 5, 10, 20, 30
• number of regular queries and responses per interval: 1, 3, 6
• number of required endorsements: 3, 6, 12, 24
• number of false endorsing nodes: 1, 5, 10, 20
• number of jammed nodes (verification values): 1, 5, 10, 20
The number of nodes in a cluster has the major impact on energy consumption and re-
quired storage space. Since the number of endorsements CH receives increases with the
size of the cluster, CH consumes more energy. The progression of the energy consump-
tion of the basic and the enhanced protocol is similar to the STEF protocol. However,
both require slightly more energy wherein the enhanced protocol requires more energy
than the basic protocol. For example, in a simulation with 30 sensor nodes, 6 queries
per interval, 20 queries totally, and no adversary, the energy consumption for a CN is
1.3% (4.1%) higher for the basic (enhanced) protocol compared to the STEF protocol.
For CH , the energy consumption is 3.2% (7.1%) higher. The required storage space for
CH is also higher since CH has to store more endorsements in a larger cluster. For
the just mentioned example, the required storage space can be up to ten times higher
compared to the STEF protocol. However, even in this worst case scenario, the storage
requirements are still feasible on current sensor hardware. For WSNs with a large cluster
size, it is reasonable to change the role of CH to distribute the energy consumption to
the nodes of the cluster.
It is obvious that less queries result in a lower energy consumption and lower storage
requirements since less messages are sent and CH needs to store less endorsements.
The number of required endorsements has only a negligible impact on the energy
consumption since it influences only the size of the response message which contains
more node identifiers.
The number of false endorsing nodes has minimal impact on energy consumption and
storage requirements. Since in the simulations excluded sensor nodes are not considered
anymore, CH does not receive endorsements from these nodes. As a result, the energy
consumption of CH is slightly lower when more nodes are excluded. Similarly, the storage
requirements are slightly lower since CH has to store less endorsements, pairwise keys,
and verification values.
4Note that not all parameter combinations are applicable for all simulations.
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The number of jammed verification values has low impact on the energy consumption.
Since the number of messages CH receives decreases with the number of jammed mes-
sages, the energy consumption decreases also. However, the storage requirements are
slightly higher since CH has to store more endorsements for future verifications.
In summary, the simulation results confirm the low energy overhead and the feasi-
bility of the storage requirements on current sensor node hardware. All details of the
implementation and the performed simulations can be found in [96].
6.10 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a basic and an enhanced protocol to address FEDoS attacks.
They are based on a detection and recovery strategy. Compromised sensor nodes that
perform a FEDoS attack are detected and excluded. To achieve this, sensor nodes must
prove at a later point in time that they did not perform a FEDoS attack. In the basic
protocol, sensor nodes are immediately excluded if the proof fails or a node does not
perform the proof. However, if jamming attacks are possible, an adversary may prevent
a sensor node to perform the proofs. In this case, the enhanced scheme can be used that
is resistant against this attack by introducing a greylist approach.
The security analyses show that the scheme can efficiently detect and exclude com-
promised nodes performing a FEDoS attack. Our performance analyses show that both
protocols are feasible for current sensor hardware. The storage requirements are even
for large sensor networks with a long operation time feasible. Furthermore, the actual
required storage in the RAM of the node is very small. The energy consumption of both
protocols is low since it requires only cheap operations and the exchange of few, short
messages. In particular, the message for the sink is short compared to other protocols.
The additional overhead of the enhanced protocol is only marginal compared to the
original protocol.
Both protocols can be used to extend existing protocols addressing false data injection
and PDoS attacks to additionally cope with FEDoS attacks.
In addition, both protocols do not restrict the normal operation of the WSN by, e.g.,
introducing a delay in the report transmission to the sink. The report to the sink is sent
without delay (except for the local generation) to the sink. Thus, in the (common) case
where no attack is performed, the network can operate normally. If an attack occurs,
the attack is detected ex post but then the malicious node is locally excluded.
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7 Preventing Insider Attacks
In Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.3 we argued that prevention of insider attacks is difficult to
realize in WSNs. In this chapter, we present a new approach to prevent insider attacks
and to detect compromised sensor nodes by using tamper-resistant hardware and efficient
attestation protocols.
This chapter shares some material with previously published work Detecting Node
Compromise in Hybrid Wireless Sensor Networks Using Attestation Techniques [133].
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.1 we introduce and motivate our
approach to use tamper-resistant hardware and attestation protocols to prevent insider
attacks and to detect compromised sensor nodes. The aspects of different attestation
techniques are further illustrated in Section 7.2. We present setting and notation in
Sections 7.3 and 7.4. Our proposed protocols are described in Section 7.5. The security
of our protocols is discussed in Section 7.6, and a theoretical performance analysis is
presented in Section 7.7. In Section 7.8, we give a brief overview of the implementation.
Finally, the chapter is summarized in Section 7.9.
7.1 Introduction
Without deploying sensor nodes in physically secured areas, sensor nodes are susceptible
to node compromise. An adversary can access a sensor node and can read out all data,
such as the cryptographic keys or implemented algorithms and protocols, stored on the
node. Using this information, the adversary is able to perform insider attacks.
To prevent an adversary from performing insider attacks, he must be impeded from
accessing the cryptographic keys stored on a sensor node. We propose to use the TPM
(see Section 2.4) for this purpose. However, due to the large scale and the desired low-
cost of WSNs, it is not feasible to integrate a TPM in each individual sensor node.
Fortunately, many WSNs are organized in clusters where a minority of special nodes
performs some special functions, such as data aggregation, key management, localization,
or time synchronization for other sensor nodes. The special nodes usually store shared
keys with all other sensor nodes in their vicinity. If an adversary is able to compromise a
special node, he gets access to all stored keys. As a result, he is able to frame the sensor
nodes in his vicinity, inject false reports, etc. Since special nodes are a valuable target
for an adversary, it might be reasonable to equip them with a TPM in scenarios where a
high level of security is desired. However, an adversary can still try to tamper with the
remaining components of a sensors’ system to perform insider attacks. Such tampering
attempts have to be detected by neighboring sensor nodes.
One approach to detect compromised nodes is based on attestation techniques, where
sensor nodes must prove that their system has not been modified by an adversary. Attes-
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tation techniques that have already been proposed for WSNs [211, 210, 209] are software-
based and rely on relatively accurate time measurement. These techniques are unsuitable
for attestation along multiple hops and when static interferences delay message trans-
missions, which prevents an exact time measurement.
To overcome these shortcomings, we propose to use the TPM as the trust anchor
for attestation protocols. The trust anchor is responsible for providing assurance of
delivered attestation values. The TPM provides such a hardware-based trust anchor.
It also offers certain cryptographic functions which provide the foundation for attesting
the configuration of the local platform to a remote platform. Unfortunately, already
proposed TPM-based attestation protocols require asymmetric cryptography and have a
high communication and computational overhead [225, 217]. Such complex attestation
protocols are unsuitable for resource constrained WSNs.
We propose two efficient TPM-based attestation protocols for hybrid WSNs organized
in clusters. Networks consist of low-cost cluster nodes (CNs) and more expensive TPM-
equipped cluster heads (CHs).
The first attestation protocol is highly efficient and allows a number of CNs to si-
multaneously validate the trustworthiness of a CH in regular intervals. This protocol is
suitable for a continuous monitoring scenario. For example, several CNs perform a mea-
surement each minute in parallel and send their data to an aggregating CH which sends
the aggregate via a direct connection to the sink. A compromised CH could seriously
interfere with this process by sending for example false aggregates or by refusing to send
any aggregates. In case CH has been compromised, CNs want to know this, to be able
to send their measurements to another uncompromised CH . Our attestation protocol
efficiently ensures all CNs that CH has not been successfully tampered with, without
requiring each CN to individually perform an attestation.
The second attestation protocol enables an individual CN (or the sink) to verify the
trustworthiness of a CH at any time. This protocol is suitable for a scenario where CH
provides services such as key management, localization, or time synchronization for CNs.
For example, when new nodes have been deployed or mobile nodes enter the vicinity of
CH , CH provides accurate location and time information using an integrated GPS or
supports CNs to securely establish pairwise keys.
Both protocols do not require expensive public key cryptography on the CNs and
the exchanged messages are very short. The attestation can be performed even when
sensor nodes are multiple hops away from each other. However, due to the unreliable,
multihop communication, we can only prove the trustworthiness of the CHs, but not
untrustworthiness. In addition, these protocols are not limited to cluster-based scenarios.
For example the attestation protocols can be used in WSNs where many (mobile) TPM-
equipped sinks exist, which are deployed in insecure locations. The network operator
can verify if the data received from these sinks is still trustworthy.
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7.2 Attestation Techniques
In this section, we compare different attestation techniques and evaluate their applica-
bility for WSNs.
7.2.1 TPM-Based Attestation
Existing attestation protocols [225, 217, 202] are based on the TPM’s ability to report
the system configuration to a remote party. These approaches are mainly developed
for non-resource constrained computer systems. They require extensive computational
power from each communication partner to perform public-key cryptography and the
transmission of large messages, making these approaches not usable in WSNs (cf. Sec-
tion 2.4). The complete system configuration, as denoted in the PCRs of the attesting
entity, must be transmitted to the verifying entity. The verifying entity evaluates the
trustworthiness of the attested entity by comparing the received SML and PCR values
with given reference values. Since the verifying entity receives the current platform con-
figuration directly, we refer to this as explicit attestation. However, in hybrid WSNs
most sensor nodes do not possess enough resources to perform public key cryptography
and the transmission of large messages increases the energy consumption significantly.
This causes explicit attestation to be inapplicable in WSNs.
To perform an attestation in WSNs, computation intensive operations must be trans-
ferred to nodes which possess sufficient computational power, and resource constrained
sensor nodes need only to perform minimal verification computations. The sealing con-
cept of the TPM enables an attestation without directly transferring the platform con-
figuration (PCR values and SML). We refer to this as implicit attestation. This approach
minimizes the amount of transmitted data and does not require public key cryptogra-
phy on resource constrained nodes. Sealing provides the functionality to bind data to
a certain platform configuration. The TPM releases, i.e., decrypts this data only if the
current platform configuration is valid. The disadvantage of this approach is that soft-
ware updates change the values inside the PCRs. Since this results in inaccessible sealed
data, this approach is not very applicable in non-resource constrained computer systems,
where software configurations change very often through legitimate system updates. For-
tunately, the software configuration of sensor nodes often does not change during the
whole lifetime of a WSN. Therefore, the attested entity is only able to decrypt a sealed
data structure if the current platform configuration matches its initial platform config-
uration. Our protocols smartly exploit this property to enable a lightweight attestation
of the trustworthiness of the attested entity.
7.2.2 Software-Based Attestation
The main disadvantage of TPM-based attestation is that the platform configuration
only reflects the initial load-time configuration. Therefore, memory modifications during
the runtime cannot be detected, e.g., buffer-overflows. To overcome this shortcoming,
attestation software may measure the memory and report the values to a remote party. In
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this case, the attestation software forms the trust anchor which must be protected against
tampering. In [211, 210, 209, 213], approaches based on measuring the execution time of
an optimal attestation routine is introduced. The routine verifies the memory of a sensor
node by calculating hash values of randomly selected memory regions. The verifications
of the routine cannot be optimized further, i.e., the execution time cannot be made faster,
which prevents an adversary from injecting malicious code without detection. However,
the success of this approach relies critically on the optimality of the attestation routine
and on minimal time fluctuations of the expected responses. Particularly in WSNs with
multihop verification and external influences, time intervals for responses can vary. The
multihop communication also requires an authenticated communication channel between
the verifier and the attestor to reliably identify the number of hops. In scenarios where
attestation along multiple hops is required or external interferences prevent an exact
time measurement, timing-based software attestation techniques are not applicable since
attestations would fail, even though a sensor node is in a trustworthy system state.
7.3 Setting
We assume a hybrid WSN consisting of low-cost cluster nodes (CNs) and more expensive
TPM-equipped cluster heads (CHs). CNs are comparable to the sensor nodes described
in the device model in Section 4.1. However, CH s are assumed to possess much more
computing power, memory space, and energy resources, e.g., comparable to the resources
of the Stargate platform [55]. The TPM, integrated in the CH s, is used to protect keys
and other security related data and cannot be circumvented. We do not require any
modification of the TPM, such as adding support for symmetric encryption with exter-
nal data. Since present TPMs only support internal symmetric encryption, some data
must be stored temporarily in the Random Access Memory (RAM) of a CH for further
processing. We assume that access to this temporarily stored data is not possible. For
example, in Linux-based systems, such as the Stargate platform, all driver modules and
applications that enable direct access to the RAM should be disabled. For this purpose,
a static kernel that prohibits the dynamic reloading of modules has to be configured, and
all other possibilities to generate a memory dump, such as the /proc/kcore file system,
has to be disabled. As soon as future TPMs support symmetric encryption with external
data this assumption can be revoked. To subvert a CH , an adversary must re-program
and reboot the node to either modify the system so that access to the RAM is possible
or to access the security related data directly. After a reboot with a modified system,
the platform configuration is changed and the access to sealed data is no longer possible.
Thus, this data is neither accessible directly to the adversary nor loaded into the RAM.
To achieve the binding of cryptographic keys to a specific platform configuration, which
subsequently prevents rebooting in a compromised system configuration, we assume that
we have a reduced measurement architecture, such as IBM’s IMA [202], that extends
the trust chain specified by the TCG up to the firmware and therefore includes integrity
measurement of the kernel and operating system of the CH . To aggravate tampering
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attempts, we assume mechanisms increasing the effort for an adversary as described in
Section 3.2.1 are applied and that OTA programming is disabled.
We assume a slightly different adversary model compared to the one described in
Section 4.3. The adversary tries to compromise a CH to access stored information, e.g.,
keying material, and misuse the node to perform insider attacks, e.g., injecting false
reports to cause false alarms. Therefore, the adversary can try to read out data or
re-program the node to behave according to the purposes of the adversary. However,
since the TPM prevents access to the cryptographic keys, our definition of the inside
adversary does not exactly fit. In this chapter, an inside adversary tries to tamper with
a CH but is not able to circumvent the protection of the TPM.
7.4 Notation
CHs are denoted as CHi, i = 1, . . . , a and the CNs are denoted as CNj , j = 1, . . . , b,
where b a.
E(m, e) denotes the encryption of data m using an encryption function E and encryp-
tion key e. Encrypted data m using the key e is denoted with {m}e. The decryption of
{m}e using a decryption functionD and the decryption key d is denoted withD({m}e, d).
Similar to the notation provided in Chapter 6.4, applying a hash function h on data
m is denoted with h(m), and a one-way hash chain stored on CHi, or CNj is denoted
with CCHi = cCHi0 , . . . , c
CHi
τ , or C
CNj = cCNj0 , . . . , c
CNj
τ respectively. The values of the
hash chains are generated by applying the hash function h successively on a seed value
cτ , such that cν = h(cν+1), for ν = τ − 1, τ − 2, . . . , 1, 0.
A specific state of the system of a CHi is referred to as platform configuration PCHi :=
(PCR0, . . . ,PCRp) and is stored in the appropriate PCRs of the TPM. Data m can be
cryptographically bound to a certain platform configuration PCHi by using the TPM_Seal
command. Using the TPM_Unseal command, the TPM releases, i.e., decrypts m only
if the platform configuration has not been modified. This concept allows an implicit
attestation to be performed without a direct validation of the PCRs by a CN . Since
we are abstracting the TPM_Seal and TPM_Unseal commands, we denote our commands
with Seal and Unseal. Given a non-migratable asymmetric key pair (eCHi , dCHi) we
denote the sealing of data m for the platform configuration PCHi with {m}
eCHi
PCHi
=
Seal(PCHi , eCHi ,m). To unseal data m it is necessary that the current platform config-
uration P ′CHi is equal to PCH i : m = Unseal(P
′
CHi
= PCHi , dCHi , {m}
eCHi
PCHi
).
7.5 Attestation Protocols
In this section, we describe our proposed protocols which enable a CNj to verify the
platform configuration of a CHi. These protocols represent some basic primitives which
can be used in conjunction with or in more complex protocols. Our proposed protocols
enable only CNj to verify the platform configuration of CHi. To verify the trustwor-
thiness of received data from CNj , a CHi has to perform additional mechanisms like
redundancy checks or voting schemes.
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We have adapted the sealing technique provided by the TPM to realize the implicit
attestation (see Section 2.4). We assume, that in the initialization phase the platform
configuration of a CHi is trustworthy. Data needed to perform a successful attestation
is sealed in this phase to this platform configuration. Access to this sealed data is only
possible if the CHi is in the initially specified platform configuration. Compromising a
CHi results in a different platform configuration where access to this data is not possible.
Thus, a successful attestation is no longer possible.
The first proposed protocol enables a broadcast attestation, where a CHi broadcasts
its platform configuration to its CNj in periodic intervals. This enables CNj to verify the
platform configuration of the CHi simultaneously. The second protocol enables a single
CNj (or the sink), to either individually verify the platform configuration of a CHi using
a challenge response protocol or to send data to a CHi and receive a confirmation that
the data has been received correctly and that the CHi is trustworthy.
7.5.1 Periodic Broadcast Attestation Protocol (PBAP)
In some scenarios, many CNj perform measurements in parallel and in regular intervals.
For example, a couple of CNj monitor the temperature in a specific region of the WSN.
The measurement is performed every 10 minutes to see the change over time. Therefore,
the CNj report their measurement nearly in parallel in specific time intervals to their
CHi. If each CNj performs an individual attestation of the CHi, this results in an
avoidable overhead. It might be desirable that all CNj are able to nearly simultaneously
verify if their CHi is still trustworthy using an efficient mechanism. For this purpose, we
propose the Periodic Broadcast Attestation Protocol (PBAP).
The PBAP adapts the idea of µTESLA [181] to use one-way hash chains for authen-
tication and extends it to enable attestation in hybrid WSNs. The sealing function of
the TPM is used to bind a one-way hash chain to the platform configuration of a CHi.
A CHi sends the values of the hash chain in periodic intervals and its CNj can verify
these values. The proof of trustworthiness of a CHi is only possible while its platform
configuration has not been modified.
The protocol is divided into two phases. In the initialization phase CHi and CNj are
preconfigured before deployment. In the attestation phase, CHi periodically broadcasts
an attestation message. This phase normally lasts for the whole lifetime of the CHi.
Initialization Before CHi is deployed, it is preconfigured with a non-migratable public
key pair (eCHi , dCHi) and a hash chain C
CHi . The seed value cCHiτ of the hash chain
is generated on CHi using the TPM’s physical random number generator and used by
the CPU to perform the additional computations. CHi is assumed to possess only one
valid platform configuration, denoted as PCHi . After CHi is powered up, a measurement
about each component (BIOS, bootloader, operating system, applications) is performed,
and the related values are stored in the corresponding PCR registers. Each value of the
hash chain CCHi is sealed to this platform configuration PCHi :
{cCHi0 }
eCHi
PCHi
, . . . , {cCHiτ }
eCHi
PCHi
= Seal(PCHi , eCHi , c
CHi
0 ), . . . , Seal(PCHi , eCHi , c
CHi
τ ).
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Each CNj which interacts with a CHi is configured with the last value cCHi0 of the
hash chain CCHi . Since the number of CH s is very small compared to the number of
CNs, the CNs could be preprogrammed with the values of all CH s. After deployment,
the CNs can only keep the values for its CH and another certain number of CH s in their
vicinity to save memory.
Attestation CHi and the associated CNs (denoted as CN∗) are loosely time synchro-
nized. The time is divided into intervals Iλ, λ = 1, . . . , τ . At the beginning of each
interval, CHi sends a broadcast attestation message to CN∗. The attestation messages
consist of the values of the hash chain disclosed in reversed order of the generation and
the identifier Iλ of the current interval. If the platform configuration of CHi has not
been modified, it can unseal the values of the hash chain CCHi . In the first interval I1,
CHi unseals the hash value cCHi1 and transmits it together with the interval identifier.
In the second interval cCHi2 is unsealed and transmitted and so on. CN∗ check if the
interval I1 stated within the message matches their local interval counter I ′1 within a
certain error range. If they match, CN∗ verify whether h(cCHi1 ) = c
CHi
0 . If the equation
holds, CHi is considered trustworthy and the value cCHi0 is overwritten with the value
cCHi1 . In the next interval, CHi discloses c
CHi
2 and so on, which are similarly checked.
The complete protocol is shown in Protocol 7.1 whereas the protocol steps are repeated
for each interval Iλ, λ = 1 to τ .
Protocol 7.1 Periodic Broadcast Attestation Protocol
1. Initialization:
• CHi is preconfigured with non-migratable public key pair (eCHi , dCHi) and a
hash chain CCHi .
• The hash chain is sealed to the platform configuration PCHi .
• Each interacting CNj is configured with cCHi0 .
2. Protocol steps:
Interval Node(s) Message or Action
Iλ CHi: Unseal(PCHi , dCHi , {cCHiλ }
eCHi
PCHi
) = cCHiλ
Iλ CHi → CN∗: cCHiλ , Iλ
Iλ CN∗: Iλ
?= I ′λ
Iλ CN∗: if h(cCHiλ )
?= cCHiλ−1, state of CHi is valid
Iλ CN∗: overwrite cCHiλ−1 with c
CHi
λ
. . . . . . . . .
Due to unreliable communication, a CNj could miss some messages. Thus, CNj should
not immediately declare a CHi as being untrustworthy but wait for a certain threshold
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of time. If a CNj receives messages again, it can resynchronize by applying the hash
function multiple times. For example, assume that a CNj does not receive the disclosed
hash values cCHi3 and c
CHi
4 in interval I3 and I4. Receiving the value c
CHi
5 in interval I5,
CNj can resynchronize and verify the platform configuration of CHi by applying the hash
function three times on cCHi5 and verify if h(h(h(c
CHi
5 )))
?= cCHi2 . But if CNj does not
receive any attestation message after a certain number of intervals and/or the individual
attestation fails, CNj should react by declaring CHi as not trusted anymore and choose
another CHi as its CH .
We illustrate PBAP by the following data aggregation scenario where multiple CNj
want to verify in parallel that they can still trust a CHi.
Example 7.1 Assume a cluster consisting of CH1 and several CNs. The CNs are con-
figured with the verification value cCH10 for CH1 and the verification value c
CH2
0 of the
nearby CH2. Measurements are performed in regular intervals. PBAP is adapted to these
intervals, i.e., attestation messages are sent from CH1 (and CH2) shortly before the CNs
perform their measurements. After receiving the attestation messages, the CNs perform
their measurement and send this data to CH1 which performs the data aggregation and
sends a short message to the sink.
If the attestation of CH1 fails or repeatedly no attestation message is received, CNs
switch to CH2 (which is still sending correct attestation messages) and from now on send
messages only to this CH . Alternatively, a CN can immediately switch to a backup CH
if it does not receive an attestation message if a high reliabilty is desired.
7.5.2 Individual Attestation Protocol (IAP)
Using the Individual Attestation Protocol (IAP), a CN (or the sink) can individually
verify the platform configuration of a CH at any time. Alternatively a CN can send data
to a CH and receive a confirmation that the data has been received correctly and that
the CH is trustworthy. A CN needs only to perform symmetric operations and two short
messages need to be exchanged. The messages are very small, because no long public
key primitives, such as keys or signatures need to be transmitted. Since transmitting
messages is the most cost intensive factor in WSNs [261], this is of particular interest,
especially if the sink wants to verify the platform configuration of a CH . In this case,
messages are transferred along several hops.
The protocol we propose is again divided in initialization phase and attestation phase.
The initialization phase is performed only once after deployment of the sensor nodes while
the attestation phase can be performed every time a CN (or the sink) wants to verify
the platform configuration of a CH .
Initialization Each CNj establishes a shared, symmetric key KCNj ,CHi with its CHi.
Therefore, existing (non TPM-based) techniques, e.g., [270], might be used. However,
we recommend using the key establishment protocol presented in [87], which also assumes
a hybrid WSN with TPM-equipped CH s and resource constraint CNs. This approach
has the advantage that key generation within a TPM is inherently more secure than key
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generation on off-the-shelf embedded WSN platforms. As in [270], we assume that this
short period of time to establish pairwise keys is secure and nodes cannot be compro-
mised. The keys KCNj ,CHi are sealed on CHi to its valid platform configuration PCHi .
Thus, CHi can access these keys only if it is in its valid state.
To enable the sink to perform the attestation with CHi, a shared symmetric key
KSink,CHi is preconfigured on CHi before deployment and sealed likewise.
Attestation A CNj can verify the platform configuration of CHi as follows. First, CNj
sends a challenge to CHi. The challenge consists of an encrypted block containing a
Nonce and the identifier IDCNj of CNj , and additionally IDCNj in cleartext. KCNj ,CHi
is used for encryption. After receiving the challenge, CHi unseals KCNj ,CHi related to
IDCNj . This is only possible if the platform configuration PCHi is valid. Using this key,
CHi decrypts the encrypted block and verifies if the decrypted identifier is equal to the
identifier received in cleartext. If they match, CHi knows that this message originates
from CNj , encrypts the Nonce’ using KCNj ,CHi , and sends it back.
1 Otherwise, CHi
aborts. CHi then deletes KCNj ,CHi from the RAM. CNj decrypts the received response
message and checks if the decrypted Nonce” matches the Nonce it has sent in the first
step. If they match, CHi is declared trustworthy and CNj can send data to CHi. This
data is encrypted using KCNj ,CHi . The attestation of CHi by the sink is performed
analog, using the key KSink,CHi . The whole protocol is shown in Protocol 7.2.
Protocol 7.2 Individual Attestation Protocol
1. Initialization:
• CNj establishes a shared, symmetric key KCNj ,CHi with its CHi.
• Keys KCNj ,CHi are sealed on CHi to its platform configuration PCHi .
• KSink,CHi is preconfigured and sealed on CHi.
2. Protocol steps:
1 CNj → CHi: IDCNj , {Nonce, IDCNj}KCNj ,CHi
2a CHi: Unseal(PCHi , dCHi , {KCNj ,CHi}
eCHi
PCHi
) = KCNj ,CHi
2b CHi: D({Nonce, IDCNj}KCNj ,CHi ,KCNj ,CHi) = (Nonce ′, ID′CNj )
2c CHi: check ID′CNj
?= IDCNj
2d CHi: E({Nonce ′, IDCHi},KCNj ,CHi) = {Nonce′, IDCHi}KCNj ,CHi
2e CHi → CNj : IDCHi , {Nonce′, IDCHi}KCNj ,CHi
2f CHi: delete KCNj ,CHi from RAM
3a CNj : D({Nonce′, IDCHi}KCNj ,CHi ,KCNj ,CHi) = (Nonce ′′, ID′CHi)
3b CNj : if Nonce ′′
?= Nonce, state of CHi is valid
1However, the trustworthiness of CNj cannot be assumed, because the node could be potentially com-
promised and the key is not protected by a TPM.
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IAP is useful in scenarios where a single CN or the sink wants to verify that no
adversary has tampered with a CH . We illustrate this by the following example.
Example 7.2 As in Example 7.1, we assume a data aggregation scenario where CH1
aggregates measurements from several CNs and sends the aggregated data to the sink.
However, measurements are not sent in regular intervals to the sink but only if the
measured values exceed a certain threshold. Now we assume that the sink does not receive
data from CH1 for a long period of time. One reason for this could be the compromise
of CH1. IAP can be used to verify that CH1 can be still trusted. Performing a successful
attestation ensures the sink that nobody has tampered with CH1 and something else is the
reason for not receiving data. For example, there is just nothing to report or a number
of compromised CNs do not send measurements to CH1 impeding a successful report
generation for the sink.
However, if the attestation has failed, one cannot conclude that CH1 is compromised.
As already stated in the introduction, attestation along multiple hops is only able to prove
trustworthiness, but not untrustworthiness. A compromised en-route sensor node could
have dropped the attestation messages which results in a failed attestation. Thus, addi-
tional mechanisms are required, e.g., performing a new attestation by using a different
route. This issue is investigated in [72].
In certain scenarios it is preferable to transmit data directly within the attestation
messages. Therefore, we introduce the optional data fields (shown in squared brackets)
data1 and data2 . Protocol 7.3 shows the modified IAP, including the optional data fields
in squared brackets. Modified IAP can be used in two different ways: (1) using only
data1 , and (2) using both data1 and data2 .
The first case can be used in scenarios where an immediate receipt of data is important
or where CNs send data very infrequently to a CH . Therefore data is transmitted directly
within the challenge. Thus, in protocol step 1, CNj sends data in data field data1 to
CHi within the encrypted block. CHi can only decrypt this message in step 2b if its
platform configuration is valid and access the data. Thus, if CNj receives the message
in step 2e and the checks in steps 3a and 3b succeed, CNj can be assured that CHi has
successfully received the data and is still trusted.
Example 7.3 Assume that CHs act more as a second type of sink. CHs have a direct
link to the main sink using a powerful transmitter. Thus, CNs send their data to the
nearest CH that relays the data directly to the main sink. By applying the modified IAP,
CN can receive a confirmation that CH is not compromised and has correctly forwarded
the received data to the main sink.
The latter case is useful in scenarios where a CHi performs some tasks for a CNj
that requires a feedback back to CNj . In this case, data field data1 contains a query
from CNj and data field data2 contains the response of CHi. We illustrate this in the
following example.
Example 7.4 An example application for this setting is time synchronization. CHs are
equipped with an accurate clock whereas CNs are only equipped with a cheap clock that
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may deviate after a certain time span. To synchronize its local clock, a CN initiates
the modified IAP where data1 contains the query for the actual time. CH generates
a response that contains the time of the accurate clock of CH and sends the response
back to CN using data field data2. By considering roundtrip time etc. (compare time
synchronization protocols proposed in [89, 226, 227, 203]), CN calculates the correct
time. Since the time synchronization is included in the modified IAP, CN is assured that
CH is not compromised and that the received time is, indeed, correct.
Protocol 7.3 Modified Individual Attestation Protocol
1. Initialization:
• CNj establishes a shared, symmetric key KCNj ,CHi with its CHi.
• Keys KCNj ,CHi are sealed on CHi to its platform configuration PCHi .
• KSink,CHi is preconfigured and sealed on CHi.
2. Protocol steps:
1 CNj → CHi: IDCNj , {Nonce, IDCNj , [data1 ]}KCNj ,CHi
2a CHi: Unseal(PCHi , dCHi , {KCNj ,CHi}
eCHi
PCHi
) = KCNj ,CHi
2b CHi: D({Nonce, IDCNj , [data1 ]}KCNj ,CHi ,KCNj ,CHi)
= (Nonce ′, ID′CNj , [data1 ])
2c CHi: check ID′CNj
?= IDCNj
2d CHi: E({Nonce ′, IDCHi , [data2 ]},KCNj ,CHi)
= {Nonce′, IDCHi , [data2 ]}KCNj ,CHi
2e CHi → CNj : IDCHi , {Nonce′, IDCHi , [data2 ]}KCNj ,CHi
2f CHi: delete KCNj ,CHi from RAM
3a CNj : D({Nonce′, IDCHi , [data2 ]}KCNj ,CHi ,KCNj ,CHi)
= (Nonce ′′, ID′CHi , [data2 ])
3b CNj : if Nonce ′′
?= Nonce, state of CHi is valid
7.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security of our two proposed attestation protocols. The
goal of both protocols is that CNs can verify the trustworthiness of CHs. We distin-
guish between the following two strategies an adversary can pursue to circumvent the
functionality of our protocols:
1. compromise a CH and forge a trusted platform configuration or
2. prevent successful attestations.
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In the first case, the adversary wants to deceive CNs (and to perform insider attacks)
in a compromised environment by forging attestations. In the latter case, the adversary
performs attacks to prevent successful attestations although CH is not compromised.
These attacks can be either performed as an outside adversary or as in inside adversary
by compromising en-route CNs if the attestation involves multiple hops.
In this analysis, we show that our protocols are resistant against the forging of at-
testations. However, the wireless multihop communication may enable an adversary
to disrupt valid attestations. Thus, our protocols can prove only the trustworthiness of
CHs. However, untrustworthiness cannot be proven since one cannot distinguish whether
a “compromised” CH , a compromised en-route CN , or transmission errors in the unre-
liable multihop communication are reasons for invalid, modified, or dropped attestation
messages. Thus, additional mechanisms are required to distinguish between this cases
when an attestation fails.
As already mentioned in Section 7.5, our proposed protocols enable only CNs to verify
the platform configuration of CH s. Since CNs are not protected by a TPM, an adversary
is able to compromise them to perform insider attacks. To verify the trustworthiness of
received data from CNs, a CH has to perform additional mechanisms like redundancy
checks or voting schemes.
In the following, we separately discuss the security of our protocols. We use our
adversary model presented in Section 4.3 to discuss an adversary attacking en-route CNs
to prevent successful attestations. However, we do not use the adversary model to discuss
the adversary attacking a CH since the TPM prevents the classical inside adversary. In
this case, we consider an adversary that tries to tamper with the remaining components
of a CH , and/or tries to circumvent the functionality of the TPM.
7.6.1 Security of the PBAP
First, we consider the case where an adversary tries to perform a successful attestation
although he has tampered with a CH and forge a trustworthy platform configuration.
Before trying to access the sealed hash chain directly, an adversary can try alternative
ways to forge a trustworthy platform configuration. The adversary could try to perform
a replay attack by first blocking the forwarding of legitimate hash values to collect them,
then tamper with a CH , and finally use this hash values to perform the attestation.
However, an adversary would not be successful since hash values are only valid for a
specific interval, which is validated by each CN . Alternatively, after the adversary has
eavesdropped a hash value sent by CH , he can try to invert the hash chain to get valid
hash values. However, this is a contradiction to the pre-image resistance of the hash
function (compare Section 4.3). The only remaining way to get access to valid hash
values is to circumvent the functionality of the TPM.
Let’s assume that the adversary has successfully tampered with the TPM and has
access to the values of the hash chain. Thus, the adversary must have performed one
of the following three actions: (1) executed the unseal command under a compromised
platform configuration, (2) accessed the key used to seal the hash chain with physical at-
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tacks, or (3) decrypted the sealed values of the hash chain by breaking the cryptographic
mechanism.
The first case violates our assumption that access to the sealed hash chain is only
possible if the platform configuration has not been modified (compare Section 7.3). This
prevents the unauthorized extraction of the values of the hash chain in a compromised
system environment. The second case violates our assumption that the security mecha-
nisms of the TPM can be circumvented. As described in Section 2.4 the TPM is basically
a smartcard and offers high security mechanisms for preventing unauthorized extraction
of protected keys. Finally, the third case violates our assumption that the adversary is
able to break cryptographic mechanisms (compare Section 4.3). Even if an adversary
could access the RAM of a sensor node, he cannot retrieve other hash values, because
for each attestation only the actual hash value is unsealed and loaded into the RAM.
Thus, an adversary cannot forge a valid platform configuration and perform successful
attestations after tampering with a CH . Thus, if an attestation of a CH was successful,
this CH can be declared as trustworthy.
However, our approach cannot handle runtime attacks caused by buffer overflows,
since we report the platform configuration measured in the initialization phase, i.e.,
when the software is first executed. Such attacks would result in a (malicious) modified
system configuration, but the platform configuration stored in the PCRs is still the valid
configuration.
Now, we consider the case where an adversary tries to prevent successful attestations.
A type I adversary (Outsider) might be able to prevent successful attestations by
performing a jamming attack. In the worst case, the adversary is located nearby CH ,
and is able to constantly jam all (attestation) messages of CH . In this case, CH might be
anyway useless and the CNs could switch to a new CH . However, if the jamming attack
stops and CNs receive attestation messages from the old CH again, they can switch back
to the old CH . Such jamming attacks are a general problem in wireless communications.
To mitigate their impact, additional mechanisms as discussed in Section 2.2.4 can be
applied.
An en-route type II adversary (Insider) is able to perform Man-in-the-Middle
attacks if the attestation is performed between nodes which are multiple hops away from
each other. To prevent successful attestations, an adversary can either alter or drop
attestation messages.
The altering of an attestation message results in an unsuccessful attestation. To cope
with that, a CN should possess an additional mechanism which enables the CN to
reach its CH using a different communication path or change to a different CH . The
CN can then use an alternative path and perform the IAP with the CH to make a
clear statement, whether the route, or the node has been compromised. If the CH is
compromised, a CN could, for example, switch to another CH where the communication
paths and the new CH may not have been compromised.
An adversary is able to drop messages by performing a blackhole or a selective for-
warding attack. Since the PBAP is performed in cleartext an adversary can distinguish
between attestation and data messages, and therefore, perform a selective forwarding
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attack by forwarding attestation messages, but blocking data messages. That kind of at-
tack is a general problem in WSNs and shows that the PBAP is not resistant against all
attacks in a multihop scenario with malicious en-route CNs. This issue can be mitigated
by using multipath routing schemes, as discussed in Section 3.2.8, to forward attestation
messages along multiple paths. If the adversary has not compromised nodes on each
path to a CN , the attestation messages can still reach CN .
Alternatively, an adversary could perform further DoS attacks (cf. Section 2.2.4) to
prevent attestation messages from reaching their destination.
Finally, note that spoofing or relay attacks are not relevant, because PBAP is not an
authentication protocol. It gives an assertion about the trustworthiness of the specific
CH and not which node has relayed the message.
7.6.2 Security of the IAP
Analogue to the sealing of the hash chain in PBAP, the security of IAP relies on the
sealing of the symmetric keys to the valid platform configuration. Thus, an adversary
that wants to perform a successful attestation although he has tampered with a CH
requires access to the symmetric keys. Just as described above, tampering with the
TPM will not enable an adversary to access the sealed symmetric keys. Alternatively,
an adversary may record some individual attestations before tampering with a CH and
try to perform a replay attack. However, since a new Nonce is used in each message,
such an attempt will be detected. All the adversary can try now is breaking the cryp-
tographic mechanism by analyzing recorded attestations to get access to the symmetric
keys. However, as already mentioned above, this is a contradiction to our assumption
that this is not possible (compare Section 4.3).
Furthermore, in contrast to WSNs where CHs are not equipped with a TPM, a single
compromise of a CH does not result in the compromise of all shared keys stored on this
node. Even using the TPM in only a few sensor nodes, results in a higher resilience to
node compromise.
Now, we consider the case where an adversary tries to prevent successful attestations.
Analogue to PBAP, a type I adversary (Outsider) can perform a jamming attack to
prevent a CN (and/or CH ) to receive the attestation messages.
An en-route type II adversary (Insider) can perform a blackhole or a selective for-
warding attack to prevent attestation messages to reach their destination. However, since
attestation messages and data messages have the same form (identifier plus encrypted
data block), an adversary cannot distinguish between them to perform a sophisticated
selective forwarding attack by blocking only certain messages2. Furthermore, the ad-
versary could perform other DoS attacks to prevent attestation messages from reaching
their destination as discussed above.
2However, an adversary may analyze the different length of the messages to get indications of the
message type, e.g., data message, IAP message, modified IAP message. To cope with that, padding
could be used to set all messages to the same length.
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Furthermore, an adversary can alter a response message sent to a CN which results in a
failed attestation. CN cannot distinguish if either CH is compromised, or if the message
has been altered by an en-route adversary. Thus, if an attestation fails, a CN should
first try to perform a new attestation of the same CH using another communication
path, if possible. If this is not possible or the attestation fails again, either the CH or
a node on the communication path is compromised. The CN should then select a new
CH , since messages sent to the old one might be susceptible to attacks.
Note that IAP includes an authentication protocol. An en-route adversary acting as
a man-in-the-middle cannot spoof the identifier of a CN (and/or a CH ). A CH (and/or
CN ) detects the modification of message 1 (and/or message 2e) (see Protocol 7.2) by
an en-route adversary, since the included identifier does not match the identifier sent in
cleartext. Since a new Nonce is used in each message, replay attacks are not possible.
7.7 Theoretical Performance Analysis
Since we assume that CHs possess sufficient resources, we perform our analysis only
for the CNs. First, we analyze the additional storage requirements. Next, we estimate
the additional energy consumption by evaluating the computational and communication
overhead.
7.7.1 Storage Requirements
For the PBAP, a CN must store one hash value and the identifier for the corresponding
CH . Depending on the network configuration, it might also store hash values (and iden-
tifiers) for other CHs in its vicinity. Let Ln, and Lh denote the length of a node identifier
and a hash value, respectively. Let the number of CHs for which a CN stores values be
v. Thus, the storage requirements SRPBAP for a CN are:
SRPBAP = v · (Ln + Lh) (7.1)
Example 7.5 Suppose a CN stores values for 5 CHs. The length of each hash value is
64 bit and the length of a node identifier is 10 bit. This results in a storage requirements
of SRPBAP = 46.25byte.
For the IAP, a CN must store one symmetric key for each CH with which it wants
to perform an attestation. Let this number be denoted by w and the length of a key
denoted by Lk. Thus, the storage requirements SRIAP for a CN are:
SRIAP = w · Lk (7.2)
Example 7.6 Suppose a CN stores keys for 5 CHs. The length of each key is 64 bit.
Thus, the storage requirements are SRIAP = 40byte.
The low storage requirements of both PBAP and IAP, enables that the required data
can be permanently stored in the 4kbyte SRAM of a Berkeley Mica2 Mote. Both proto-
cols are suitable for current sensor nodes, even if both protocols are used in conjunction.
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7.7.2 Energy Consumption
The PBAP requires a CN to receive one attestation message and to perform one hash
computation at each time interval. An attestation message consists of a hash value
and an identifier of the interval, e.g., a counter. Although computing hash values only
marginally increases energy consumption [181], we consider the computational overhead,
since a hash computation is performed in each time interval.
We use e1 = e1s + e1r to denote the energy consumed in sending and receiving one
byte, and e2 to denote the energy for one hash computation. In addition to the notation
used above, let Lt denote the length needed for the interval identifier. The total number
of intervals in the whole lifetime of the network is denoted with t. This results in an
additional energy consumption:
EPBAP = t · ((Lt + Lh) · e1r + e2) (7.3)
Example 7.7 Suppose the lifetime of the network is one year and broadcast messages
are sent every 10 minutes. Therefore, a 16 bit counter is sufficient for numbering each
interval. We use the results presented in [261] to quantify e1s = 16.25 µJ for sending,
e1r = 12.5 µJ for receiving, and e1 = 28.75 µJ for sending and receiving one byte
using Berkeley Mica2 Motes. The energy consumed for performing one hash computation
using RC5 [195] block cipher is e2 = 15 µJ . This results in a total energy consumption
of 7358.4 mJ . The Mica2 Motes are powered with two 1.5 V AA batteries in series
connection. We assume a total capacity of 2750 mAh using standard AA batteries which
results in 29700 J . Thus, the ratio of energy consumed in one year by the PBAP is
about 0.025% of the total available energy which is negligibly small.
Just as in our proposed protocols to cope with FEDoS attacks, efficient hash chain
constructions (compare Section 6.4) could be used. This would decrease the storage
requirements on CH and would enable a faster resynchronization if a CN has missed
multiple hash values. However, since we assume that CH possess sufficient resources
and the case that CN misses many hash values is rare, we consider only the usage of
“normal” hash chains.
The IAP requires a CN to generate and send a challenge3, and the verification of the
response (see Protocol 7.2, steps 1., 2e., 3a. and 3b.). The challenge requires one Nonce
generation, one encryption and one transmission, while the response verification requires
the receipt of one message, one decryption and one comparison of two values. Thus, the
additional energy consumption is:
EIAP = 3 · e2 + (e1s + e1r) · (2 · Ln + Lh) (7.4)
Example 7.8 We assume the values from above. Additionally, we assume that as in
[181], the Nonce is generated using a Message Authentication Code (MAC) as pseudo-
random number generator with a generator key KrandCNj . Using RC5 for MAC generation
3We do not consider the case where data is sent within the challenge, because we estimate only the
additional overhead introduced by our protocol.
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requires e2 = 15 µJ . The encryption cost using RC5 are also 15 µJ . We neglect the
energy cost for the comparison of two values since they are negligibly small. This results
in a total energy consumption on a CN for one individual attestation of about 347 µJ
which is 1.17 · 10−6 % of the total available energy.
7.8 Implementation
A proof of concept implementation has been provided using Java and the tpm4java4
library to show that PBAP and IAP can be realized with current TPMs [72]. The
implementation supports the three different types of nodes: CH , CN , and en-route CN .
On each CH an attestation service runs that is responsible for the communication with
the TPM. Depending on a parameter, the attestation service can run either PBAP or
IAP. For PBAP, the TPM creates a non migratable asymmetric key pair, generates the
seed of the hash chain using the random number generator of the TPM, and generates
the hash chain using the SHA-1 module of the TPM. The generated hash chain is sealed
using the asymmetric key pair to the platform configuration stored in the PCRs. For IAP,
symmetric keys are generated using the javax.crypto package. Another non-migratable
asymmetric key pair is generated to seal the symmetric keys. During an attestation, CH ,
CN , and en-route CN communicate to each other using sockets. The implementation
shows that our protocols can be realized with current TPMs.
In addition, to run simulations of an attestation-enhanced WSN in the presence of
an adversary, the J-SIM5 simulation environment has been extended to support our
protocols. Furthermore, a routing concept is developed to search for an alternative route
after a failed attestation. Details about how these protocols have been implemented can
be found in [72].
7.9 Summary
In this chapter, we presented an approach to prevent and detect insider attacks in hybrid
WSNs. The WSNs consist of resource constrained CNs and TPM-equipped CHs. The
TPM chip acts as a trust anchor and prevents unauthorized extraction of cryptographic
keys. Since an adversary can still try to tamper with a CH, we propose two attestation
protocols to detect such tampering attempts. Both protocols allow CNs to verify whether
the platform configuration of a CH is trustworthy or not, even if they are multiple hops
away. The PBAP runs in fixed time intervals, allowing multiple nodes to verify the
trustworthiness simultaneously, while the IAP enables a direct attestation. In contrast
to WSNs where CHs are not equipped with a TPM, a single compromise of a CH does
not result in the compromise of all shared keys stored on this node. Even using the TPM
in only a few sensor nodes, results in a higher resiliency to node compromise.
In contrast to attestation protocols proposed for non-resource constrained systems,
our protocols are adapted to WSNs and have a low overhead in terms of storage and
4http://tpm4java.datenzone.de
5http://www.j-sim.org/
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energy consumption. Furthermore, our protocols are applicable in multihop attestation
in contrast to timing-based software attestation.
In addition, our proposed protocols are not limited to be used only in WSNs. They are
also applicable in other environments where efficiency is also essential, e.g., in embedded
systems.
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8 Conclusion
In this thesis, we proposed techniques and mechanisms to improve the security of WSNs
against insider attacks. Since insider attacks can seriously disrupt the functionality of a
WSN and nearly all WSNs are susceptible to insider attacks, appropriate security mech-
anisms and protocols are required. For a deeper understanding of the different aspects
of insider attacks in WSNs, we first proposed a new classification scheme. Moreover,
we proposed several protocols to protect against certain types of insider attacks and a
general approach to protect against all types of insider attacks.
Our proposed classification enables a systematical categorization of mechanisms and
protocols to cope with insider attacks in WSNs. Classifications are based on the ap-
plied security strategy, namely: prevention, detection, or recovery. These strategies are
further subdivided into mechanisms that apply the respective strategy. We categorized
related work and identified properties as well as open problems in the respective areas.
We argued that a prevention strategy is hard or even impossible to realize when sensor
nodes can be compromised. Detection strategies, especially when based on misbehavior
detection, are difficult to realize because of the resource constraints and unreliable wire-
less communication. In addition, usually only known attacks can be detected. Recovery
strategies are often realized with threshold schemes which are only secure when an ad-
versary has not compromised more than a certain number of sensor nodes. Furthermore,
recovery is achieved by excluding compromised nodes which requires an efficient mech-
anism to immediately exclude such nodes. In addition, our proposed classification can
serve further purposes. The classification can be used as an introduction to the topic
of insider attacks in WSNs by providing a broad overview of the different aspects and
related work in the respective areas. Furthermore, the classification can support a secure
WSN deployment and make WSN users aware of security related properties and open
problems. Before deploying a WSN, a threat analysis should be performed. Our classi-
fication can be used as a basis for a systematical threat analysis to identify new threats
or threats depending on the application scenario. Appropriate countermeasures may be
found in the related work sections of our classification. Likewise, the classification can
expedite the development of new or modified security protocols. The modification or
combination of existing security protocols can be used to address application specific
scenarios or different types of attacks. In addition, the classification may help to secure
areas other than WSNs which share similar properties. For example, the classification
may be adapted to computational constrained embedded systems used in a car with
real-time requirements.
We proposed several protocols to cope with insider attacks in WSNs addressing open
problems identified in our classification. The protocols encompass two areas: (1) securing
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the report generation process, and (2) developing a general approach to prevent insider
attacks and to detect compromised nodes.
Since energy saving is crucial for the operation of a WSN, the report generation process
must be protected against PDoS attacks in which an adversary injects a large amount of
false report messages to drain the energy resources of message forwarding nodes. Thus,
we proposed the STEF protocol to address this issue. We pursued three major goals in
the design of STEF. First, false messages should be filtered out as early as possible since
the transmission of messages requires a large amount of energy. Second, only efficient
cryptography should be used. Third, no threshold scheme should be applied to provide
a high resilience to node compromise. Since previously proposed protocols to cope with
PDoS attacks use probabilistic filtering and apply threshold schemes, false messages are
not filtered out immediately and security breaks down when an adversary compromises
a certain number of sensor nodes. In contrast, STEF is able to detect and filter false
messages immediately at the next hop and does not rely on a threshold scheme. Thus,
even if an adversary compromises an arbitrary number of sensor nodes, he is not able to
perform a successful PDoS attack. STEF achieves the second form of recovery by using
a mechanism that tolerates compromised nodes and adaptable mechanisms. The typical
operation mode of query-response is exploited and verifying nodes need only to perform
efficient symmetric cryptography to detect false messages. The theoretical performance
analysis and the simulation results showed that STEF is able to significantly reduce
the energy consumption through the immediate filtering of false reports while having
low storage requirements. In addition, STEF applies a commonly used threshold-based
mechanism where multiple sensor nodes collaboratively generate a report to protect
against an adversary performing a false data injection attack with the goal to deceive
the sink. However, this approach has the drawback of relying on a threshold scheme and
is susceptible to FEDoS attacks. FEDoS attacks are a serious threat since only a single
compromised node may prevent a successful report generation.
Protection against false data injection attacks should be part of any security mecha-
nism in WSNs. However, since the usually applied collaborative report generation mech-
anism is susceptible to FEDoS attacks, a new security mechanism is required. Thus, we
proposed a basic and an enhanced protocol to cope with false data injection attacks
while being resistant against FEDoS attacks. Before our work, only one protocol has
been proposed to cope with false data injection and FEDoS attacks. However, this pro-
tocol is a specific extension for an already proposed protocol to cope with PDoS attacks
and is not able to detect and exclude sensor nodes that perform a FEDoS attack. Our
proposed protocols are based on detection and recovery strategies and are able to detect
and exclude compromised nodes performing a FEDoS attack. FEDoS attacks are de-
tected without using a resource consuming monitoring mechanism. Instead, sensor nodes
have to prove that they have not performed a FEDoS attack, and if the proof fails, they
can be immediately excluded. The idea is inspired by the µTESLA broadcast authenti-
cation protocol. We modified and adapted the idea to be able to address this new type
of attack. The theoretical performance analysis and the simulation results showed the
feasibility of our protocols on current sensor hardware. The energy consumption of both
protocols is low since only cheap operations and the exchange of few short messages
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is required. The storage requirements are feasible even for large sensor networks with
a long operation time. Our protocols can also be used in combination with any other
protocol. For example, the combination with the STEF protocol provides protection
against all three types of attacks: false data injection, PDoS, and FEDoS.
Since in the usually assumed WSNs (just as in our previously proposed protocols)
sensor nodes can be compromised, the prevention of insider attacks is hard or even im-
possible. To address this issue, we investigated mechanisms to prevent sensor nodes
from being compromised. The obvious approach of deploying sensor nodes in physically
secured areas is often not possible. We proposed to use tamper-resistant hardware in
the form of the TPM to prevent node compromise while still being able to deploy sen-
sor nodes in hostile environments. Our approach is designed for the widely-used hybrid
WSNs where some special nodes perform some tasks for ordinary sensor nodes. The
TPM is used only to protect the special nodes since these nodes are a valuable target
for an adversary. The TPM, which has properties similar to a smartcard, protects the
cryptographic keys stored on a node. However, an adversary can still try to tamper
with the remaining components of a sensor’s system to achieve an invalid system state
enabling illegal access to the TPM. These tampering attempts have to be detected by
neighboring sensor nodes. To achieve this, we proposed two efficient attestation proto-
cols for hybrid WSNs. Attestation enables the detection of all types of insider attacks
since it addresses the problem at its root by directly detecting tampering attempts in
contrast to unreliable mechanisms such as misbehavior detection. Previously proposed
TPM-based attestation protocols typically require asymmetric cryptography and intro-
duce a high communication cost. This makes these protocols unsuitable for resource
constrained WSNs. Our proposed protocols, however, are adapted to WSNs and effi-
ciently enable ordinary sensor nodes to verify the trustworthiness of a TPM-equipped
node. Ordinary sensor nodes need only to perform efficient operations such as computing
hash functions and symmetric cryptography and the few exchanged messages are very
short. Furthermore, in contrast to software-based attestation which requires exact time
measurement, our protocols enable attestation even if sensor nodes are multiple hops
away from each other. We evaluated the performance of our protocols and showed that
the overhead for storage and the energy consumption are negligibly small. In addition,
our proposed protocols are not limited to use in WSNs. They are also applicable in
other environments where efficiency is essential, such as the above mentioned embedded
systems.
In summary, this thesis provides an additional step to secure WSNs against insider at-
tacks. However, there still exist open problems or application scenario specific problems.
Since the different application scenarios have different security requirements, it is impos-
sible to specify a generic security architecture for all scenarios. Further research could
develop guidelines for the development of scenario-specific security architectures. These
guidelines could help to systematically identify possible threats and respective mecha-
nisms to cope with these threats. Using the results of our classification could facilitate
the development of such guidelines and our proposed protocols to cope with false data
injection, PDoS, and FEDoS attacks are suitable candidates for security mechanisms.
Another promising area for further research is the use of tamper-resistant hardware in
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WSNs. Although tamper-resistant hardware cannot be used in the majority of appli-
cation scenarios, it is indispensable for most high-security scenarios to prevent insider
attacks. Since these scenarios may also have different requirements, new application-
specific protocols are needed in addition to our attestation protocols.
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